5 Propositions Concerning the Ukraine Crisis
Putin and the Siloviki
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned today that Russia may be attempting a coup against him as early as next week. The Kremlin denies any such plan. While Zelensky has his own motives and purposes, some observers have been far too dismissive of a Russian-backed or Russian-initiated coup attempt. One of Zelensky’s top aides faced an assassination in September 2021 (admittedly under cloudy circumstances that may or may not be linked to Russian security services), and Putin has the means and motive to attempt a coup. Russian security services attempted to assassinate Montenegro’s Prime Minister in 2016 and have conducted other “wet” operations in Europe; there is a sizable pro-Putin contingent within Ukraine; Putin seeks to minimize intervention costs; and an assassination could substantially degrade Ukraine’s military and political response to coercion. While Putin likely believes that the potential costs of assassinating Zelensky outweigh the benefits, he has very likely at least considered some operation.
I’m not a public health expert, but the Omnicron COVID-19 variant could play a major role in shaping the Ukraine crisis. More on that as information develops.
Finally, many facets of the crisis are ongoing or non-public (such as Crimea’s water levels, potential Russian pre-siting or deployment of field hospitals and supply dumps, etc), but some elements of the crisis appear predictable. Read on for 5 assertions concerning the Ukraine crisis.
1) Vladimir Putin is a rational actor and prioritizes regime preservation.
Vladimir Putin is a creature of Soviet intelligence, a product of the tumultuous 1990s, and a man of lavish tastes. He believes that maintaining power is necessary. From Bobo Lo: “[T]he supreme foreign policy goal of the Putin regime is domestic, namely its own self-preservation. This goal is timeless and all-encompassing, and comes with its own iconology. For Putin, international relations, good or bad, are ultimately an extension and a subset of domestic politics and his personal interest.”
While many Western observers were surprised or even shocked by Putin’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas, these actions represented continuity, not change. Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, Putin largely eschewed economic changes that would have likely bolstered growth but reconfigured the domestic political landscape and potentially threatened his hold on power. Similarly, Putin appears to have occupied Crimea in 2014 because he calculated (correctly, sadly) that the domestic political benefits from annexation would greatly exceed the military and geopolitical costs. Indeed, Putin’s public approval ratings rose to ~90% after the annexation, enhancing regime legitimacy at a time of faltering economic performance. Putin then escalated Russian military involvement in the Donbas later in the year, only to “freeze” the conflict after Russian public opinion (and, probably, elite opinion) soured on the project. Putin is attuned to Russian domestic politics.
Putin’s actions in 2014 – and throughout his tenure – suggest that he prizes regime survival and is highly responsive to elite and popular opinion. He understands the severe costs and risks of a major military escalation in Ukraine and will be reluctant to intervene.
2) Putin may nevertheless escalate due to domestic political pressure from security elites.
Putin’s military build-up has occurred over months and represents a very conscious decision to (at the very least) threaten the use of force. Meanwhile, the Russian state – from the military to the foreign ministry to authoritative state media – have issued increasingly bellicose rhetoric, and, as Michael Kofman notes, Russian complaints over the TB2 drone incident appear pretextual rather than genuine. Putin may be actively seeking a casus belli.
Why might Putin seek to initiate a potentially dangerous and politically unpopular conflict, given that he is (generally) a cautious operator and highly sensitive to potential domestic political risks? His calculus can be explained largely by the features of Sistema, or the Russian domestic political system. In Sistema, elite opinion is vastly more consequential than popular opinion, and, within the elite, the force structures – the siloviki – are ultimately more influential than the oligarchs. Indeed, the force structures have become increasingly prominent in Sistema since 2014, while the Kremlin has become much less sensitive to public opinion pressures.
The siloviki are not only an essential element of Putin’s domestic political “coalition,” they also generally are quite sincere in 1) opposing Ukrainian sovereignty; 2) believing that Russia should enjoy a privileged sphere of influence in the “near abroad”; and 3) holding a jaundiced (arguably paranoia-tinged) view of the West in general and the United States in particular. Perhaps most importantly, they generally believe that the correlation of forces is trending in an unfavorable direction in Ukraine and, therefore, are willing to countenance the use of force in Ukraine.
The siloviki, perhaps the most important faction in Putin’s coalition, may be clamoring for a more permanent solution to the Ukrainian adventure, even if it leads to confrontation with the West.
3) The PRC appears unlikely to pressure Putin over Ukraine and may actually be hoping for some sort of escalation between two of its rivals – but it may be worth testing Beijing out.
The PRC appears to be quietly (but deniably) backing Putin’s position in the Ukrainian crisis and may even be urging the Russian dictator to press onwards. Indeed, Beijing has compelling reasons to encourage hostility between two of its rivals, as a confrontation or even conflict between NATO and Moscow could increase the PRC’s share of relative global power.
On the other hand, Beijing does not want a conflict to spiral out of control, and the economic consequences of even a short conflict could slow Chinese economic growth and potentially threaten domestic social stability ahead of the 20th Party Congress in 2022.
China, the world’s largest energy importer, may be willing to (further) pressure Saudi Arabia and other OPEC+ states to expand near-term production and lower oil prices. Lower energy prices, in turn, could constrain Putin’s ability to finance military adventures abroad. Beijing’s apparent release of crude oil from its strategic petroleum reserves not only highlights how its energy and economic interests differ from Moscow’s – it also suggests that China could, once again, largely comply with Free World sanctions.
If an appeal to reason fails, Washington (and, potentially, Canberra and Ottawa) could quietly inform Beijing that it would divert China-directed LNG, coal, and crude oil cargoes to Europe and other markets if Putin escalates in Ukraine. Western governments likely have the legal powers for this action, while Western corporations would be highly reluctant to stand up for Beijing, at least publicly.
4) Western policymakers shouldn’t be surprised or intimidated if a Power of Siberia 2 pipeline agreement is announced.
While the Power of Siberia 2 (PoS-2) natural gas pipeline would likely suffer from even worse economics than PoS-1, there are more and more indications that the two sides will at least publicly sign a deal. Implementation will remain an uncertainty, however: the financing arrangements, volume commitments, construction timeline of the pipeline, etc will determine PoS-2’s ultimate impact.
Yes, the PoS-2 could indeed ultimately displace natural gas molecules that would otherwise flow to Europe, but some perspective is in order. Gazprom’s experience with PoS-1 suggests that PoS-2 will take several years to achieve its first gas deliveries – probably at least 2-3 years, but likely closer to 5 years. Natural gas could become obsolete within a decade or two, however, and European policymakers have a variety of energy alternatives to choose from, particularly if PoS-2 experiences delays. Europe can select from nuclear power, which has zero GHG emissions and can be produced on the continent with local labor; offshore wind; solar, wind, and potentially Green Hydrogen production from North Africa, particularly Morocco; imported LNG, (potentially) nascent fusion power, and more.
Beijing and/or Moscow may be willing to tolerate PoS-2’s economic inefficiencies in favor of secure energy supplies and closer political ties, but the pipeline could easily backfire on Putin and the PRC in the long run due to changing energy realities. PoS-2 might lead to a “sugar-high” for Beijing and Moscow’s near-term political relationship but create severe bilateral political economy issues over time.
5) There are a range of options: the broadly defined West doesn’t face a false dichotomy between total capitulation and total war.
Vladimir Putin, a former intelligence officer, is quite skillful at exploiting ambiguity and gradating coercive actions. Putin’s skillful (albeit morally grotesque) actions in Syria in 2015 and 2016 saved an allied dictator; triggered a refugee crisis that may have secured his desired outcomes in electoral events in the UK and the US; and enhanced Russian military credibility and capability – all at virtually no cost. In retrospect, President Obama’s failure to employ effective violence in Syria in 2015 and 2016 – even, in a limited way, against Putin’s own forces – may have proved to be one of the most consequential and disastrous decisions of his presidency. While a NATO-Russia war would prove disastrous for all sides, another capitulation, this time in Ukraine, could prove even more catastrophic.
Ukraine, comprising about 44 million individuals, is more than twice as populous as Syria; it also shares land borders with EU states. Allowing Putin to devastate Ukraine would likely trigger an unprecedented refugee crisis for the EU and the broadly-defined West just ahead of the French Presidential election. While NATO should seek to deescalate the crisis whenever possible, it should also acknowledge that there are times and places when it is necessary to kill.
v/r,
Joe Webster
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.