Belarus and Putin’s Three-Body Problem
What does Xi’s support for Luka indicate?
Vladimir Putin faces a complex and highly consequential three-body problem: simultaneous crises or near-crises in Belarus, domestic protests in the Russian Far East, and occupied Crimea. In Belarus, Lukashenko’s downfall appears to only be a question of timing, barring an unlikely but increasingly conceivable Russian intervention; protests in the Russian Far East city of Khabarovsk are still reportedly drawing tens of thousands of individuals; and occupied Crimea’s water shortages are becoming more acute. Each of these factors directly or indirectly threatens Putin’s domestic political position; the confluence of these problems poses a dire risk to his regime.
When considering Putin’s potential responses to these crises, particularly the Belarusian crisis, it’s worth remembering Bobo Lo’s articulation of Putin’s foreign policy motivations:
“Russian foreign policy would continue to be based on the primacy of the Putin interest and the premise that the perpetuation of the regime is the highest good from which all other objectives flow. This intense personalisation of the Russian national interest will remain in place as long as Putin sits in the Kremlin, and probably long after.”
Putin will respond to developments in Belarus and elsewhere through the prism of his own personal interests and regime security; maximizing Russian power and influence will be a secondary priority for him, at best. Nationalism will figure into Putin’s response (nationalists and anti-Westerners in the Russian force structures are, after all, a key pillar of Regime Putin), but Putin will be very reluctant to undertake risks in Belarus that could undermine his domestic political position.
Putin does not want to militarily annex Belarus: Russians are already weary of the intervention in the Donbas; the Russian budget and economy is in no position for another expensive war; there appears to be no popular or elite Belarusian demand for annexation; the protests have reinforced an already strong Belarusian nationalist identity; and any invasion would likely face determined conventional and irregular Belarusian resistance – not to mention that NATO would be extremely alarmed. A war against Belarus would likely shatter Putin’s domestic standing and therefore appears unlikely at the moment.
Still, Putin could miscalculate. It’s worth noting that Kavkaz-2020 will take place in Russia’s southern military district in September. Belarus is also conducting 4-day military exercises on the border with NATO members Poland and Lithuania. It’s possible that Lukashenko and/or Putin will use the exercises to manufacture a provocation and lay the groundwork for a military intervention. Putin is more likely to threaten military force than to apply it, however – he is unlikely to abandon his “economy of force” model amid declining economic and political resources. Samuel Charap perceptively wrote “the use of force has come after other non-kinetic means have been tried and are seen to have failed. Put differently, the use of force is a last resort. Russia tries to achieve its objectives using diplomacy, economic pressure, threats, etc., and only when it still has not succeeded does it resort to the military tool.”
Putin will more likely attempt to influence the next Belarusian leadership through political maneuvering and economic incentives. Russia enjoys immense political, economic, cultural and linguistic influence in its neighbor: Putin has a variety of non-military tools to persuade or pressure Belarus. Maria Snegovaya suggests that Putin would prefer roundtable talks leading to the ascension of a pro-Kremlin candidate. If Putin can mire the Belarusian situation in roundtable talks until the winter he may get some lucky breaks on the other two parts of his problem.
If Putin can temporize in Belarus, Khabarovsk’s unrest could fade due to protest fatigue and colder temperatures; Crimea’s water shortages could be ameliorated by rainfall from the precipitation-heavy winter. It’s also possible that a successful “Sputnik V” vaccine could provide a major legitimacy boost.
Trying to kick the can down the road might only compound Putin’s domestic and foreign policy problems, of course. It’s possible that each element of “Putin’s three-body problem” could grow worse if Belarus begins to openly consider aligning with the West, Crimea experiences water shortages and protests, and protests beyond Khabarovsk. Russia’s financial and economic dislocations are metastasizing and could spark popular protests and/or an elite rupture, while a failed Sputnik V vaccine could prove catastrophic.
On the other hand, it’s important not to underestimate Vladimir Putin. His COVID strategy has proved more adept at maximizing his personal interests than I initially thought. He has curtailed his media exposure as much as possible; effectively covered up, for now, the extent of COVID-related deaths; “delegated” unpopular functions to lower-ranking officials (while taking credit for any successes); and – perhaps most importantly – advanced the “constitutional referendum” to the earliest feasible date.
I wrote in early April, “Not only is Putin’s performance legitimacy eroding, but he also appears increasingly out of touch. Amid Russia's gravest economic and public health crisis since the 1990s, he is asking to extend his rule to 2036 [via the constitutional referendum]… Putin could reverse these setbacks: he created Sistema and understands Russian domestic politics better than anyone. Still, he is flailing and looks out of his depth in the crisis.”
I was wrong. While Putin’s decision to hold the referendum during the pandemic almost surely provoked outrage and damaged his support, it was also Putin’s least bad option. Putin judged, probably correctly, that delaying the elections would have led to even more risk.
Elections have often proved highly dangerous for post-Soviet autocrats, as faking an election can prove costly. Shevardnadze was ousted in Georgia in 2003, the Kuchma/Yanukovych clique fell in Ukraine in 2004/2005, Kyrgyzstan’s Akayev was defenestrated in 2005, and now Lukashenko appears on his way out in 2020. In each case, autocrats “won” blatantly fraudulent elections, angering citizens and sparking massive protests which ultimately led to their downfall. There is also a positive correlation between the scale of fraud and the resulting protests, as Lukashenko is discovering. Putin likely calculated that his approval and trust ratings would continue to decline amid COVID and the economic crisis, necessitating even more “administrative resources” and outright fraud. Thus, while the risible nature of the June-July 2020 “referendum” damaged Putin’s standing, delaying the electoral event would likely have proved even more costly. Putin’s decision to advance the “referendum” was savvy. It’s worth remembering that Putin created Sistema and understands Russian domestic politics better than anyone.
Of course, if Putin believes that delaying elections will require more fraud and risk a Lukashenko-like event, will he bring the Russian Parliamentary elections forward? Ben Noble’s latest analysis suggests that there is some confusion about whether or not the parliamentary elections will take place in September 2021 as originally planned. It seems increasingly likely that the date will be brought forward. Russia’s parliamentary elections could have seismic implications.
Does Xi Jinping’s call to Lukashenko have broader implications?
General Secretary Xi called Lukashenko immediately after Belarus announced its final “election” results. The People’s Daily listed this call prominently; Belarus state media said Xi was the first foreign leader to offer congratulations. What does this event say about the direction of Chinese foreign policy? Why did Xi issue a congratulatory call to a highly unpopular autocrat of a tertiary power?
1) Belarus
2) China-Belarus
3) Russia-Belarus
4) Democracies and Belarus
5) China-Russia
6) Russian domestic politics
7) Occupied Crimea and water
Belarus Protests: NEXTA
1) Belarus
COVID is playing an invisible but important role in the Belarusian protests. Lukashenko no longer appears sick with COVID, but it’s also possible that he has not fully recovered, either, and his health may be affecting his judgment. It seems highly likely that many regime elites are infected, particularly after Lukashenko held a massive in-person gathering earlier in the month.
The COVID-19 novel coronavirus is indifferent to the morality of a protest’s cause, and very few protesters seem to be wearing masks or practicing any physical distancing measures. COVID cases will almost surely spike in both the pro and anti-Lukashenko camps in the next 2-4 weeks. Negotiations between Luka and the opposition and/or a Russian military intervention will likely be affected by COVID dynamics on the ground.
Lukashenko, Putin discuss situation in Belarus over phone – Belta [Belarusian state media]
“Aleksandr Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin discussed the situation in Belarus. The Russian president expressed his vision of the situation which has been developing around Belarus. The two heads of state talked over all the issues on the bilateral agenda. The leaders reaffirmed their agreement that if the situation aggravates due to the external threats the parties will provide a joint response in line with the provisions envisaged in the Collective Security Treaty.”
Lukashenko about street riots: Give us a chance to restore order – Belta [Belarusian state media]
“There are plenty of problems and issues that need to be addressed. Today we absolutely clearly see what is going on. We see the parties involved. As we said, people from abroad are masterminds and organizers of all that's happening. People with a criminal past, a decent criminal past at that, march in the front ranks. And then there are our people – kids and not kids anymore.
Aleksandr Lukashenko addressed his fellow Belarusians: “Don't you go to the streets these days! You have to understand that you and our kids are used as cannon fodder! People from Poland, Holland, Ukraine, from Russia across the open border, Navalny's people, and so on and so forth have come to Belarus. An aggression against the country has been launched,” the president said.”
EU moves to impose individual sanctions against Belarus – TASS
“It is still not clear whether incumbent[bolded by The Report] President Alexander Lukashenko will be blacklisted”
Comment: This quote is from TASS, interesting.
“The nation isn't split like in Venezuela where Maduro still has a significant support. The only support Lukashenko has is his goons and a handful of corrupt officials who won't have future in a new Belarus. But I think even they are becoming to understand that the end is near”
“Metropolitan Paul, Archpriest of Belarusian Orthodox Church, was outraged,horrified & upset about events in Belarus and will now pray for those incarcerated. And he revoked his „premature“ congratulations to Lukashenka.”
“Workers from at least half a dozen of Belarus’ biggest state-owned companies walked off shop floors on August 13 as part of a general strike that spread like a bush fire through the country's top companies. Factory managers who are used to dictating to their work force found themselves facing down angry rooms of defiant blue-collar workers, long Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko’s core supporters, who heckled and refused to be cowed by the authorities.”
Revolution or repression? Belarus stands at a crossroads – The Guardian
'We can only help ourselves': women in Belarus take protests into their own hands – The Guardian
“On Friday evening, thousands of protesters descended on the Belarusian parliament, potentially setting the scene for a new show-down with riot police. As the demand for change intensifies and reaches even the factories that are the pride of Alexander Lukashenko’s neo-Soviet economy, the authoritarian ruler ends the week clinging on to power in defiance of an ever-broader coalition of opponents. But from the beginning, this has been an uprising inspired and led by women.
…By Wednesday morning, it seemed the protest had been decisively crushed. The reappearance of the internet, crudely switched off across the country just after the vote, seemed to be a sign that the authorities felt back in control of the situation. The picture painted by opposition social media channels of a country on the verge of a successful revolution seemed just as detached from reality as the nightly spots about grain harvest targets and rapeseed oil prices on Lukashenko’s state television. But as prisoners began to be released, thousands of graphic videos of their injuries and testimony were shared with disgust on messaging apps. The mood changed again, as the country began to appreciate the scale and brazenness of the abuse.
…There has been total absence of demonstrations of support for the dictator, with none of the flag-waving youth groups or angry grandmas that presidents in Russia and Ukraine have mustered over recent years in attempts to showcase the depth of their support as protest movements flared. Lukashenko appears to be in control of little except the police and army.”
Why Belarus Is Not Ukraine – Amy Mackinnon for Foreign Policy
“But despite the similar, gruesome optics, the differences between the two uprisings far outweigh their similarities, though the two countries may both be neighbors and former Soviet Republics. Those differences make it harder to look to Ukraine as a potential road map for how the events in Belarus may unfold.”
Foreign leaders congratulate Lukashenko on re-election – Belta
Chinese President Xi Jinping was the first to send a message of greetings to Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko congratulating him on the victory in the presidential election, BelTA has learned.
Comment: Erdogan also extended congratulations. There’s been speculation on social media that Lukashenko’s family fled the country to Turkey – and not Russia, which is telling.
2) China-Belarus
http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/zgyw/t1805167.htm
“习近平致电祝贺卢卡申科当选白俄罗斯总统2020/08/10
2020年8月10日，国家主席习近平致电卢卡申科，祝贺他再次当选白俄罗斯共和国总统。习近平在贺电中指出，在卢卡申科再次当选白俄罗斯共和国总统之际，我谨代表中国政府和中国人民，并以我个人的名义，向卢卡申科总统致以热烈的祝贺和良好的祝愿。我高度重视中白关系发展，愿同卢卡申科总统携手努力，共同推进中白全面战略伙伴关系，开拓两国各领域互利合作新局面，为两国和两国人民创造新福祉。”
“Chinese President Xi Jinping on Monday sent a congratulatory message to Alexander Lukashenko on his re-election as Belarusian president. In the message, Xi extended warm congratulations and best wishes to President Lukashenko on his re-election on behalf of the Chinese government and people as well as in Xi's own name. Noting that he highly values the development of China-Belarus ties, Xi said he stands ready to work with President Lukashenko to jointly push forward China-Belarus comprehensive strategic partnership and expand mutually-beneficial cooperation between the two countries in various fields, so as to create new benefits for the two countries and peoples.”
Comment: Also on front page of People’s Daily (ahead of a pro-forma Zhong Sheng article titled “Attempts to challenge the one-China principle will fail” criticizing an American cabinet secretary’s visit to Taiwan)
Foreign leaders congratulate Lukashenko on re-election – Belta
Chinese President Xi Jinping was the first to send a message of greetings to Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko congratulating him on the victory in the presidential election, BelTA has learned.
Comment: Reposting here. This seems like a big deal.
“据塔斯社报道，白俄罗斯中央选举委员会14日在官网发布消息称，现任总统卢卡申科赢得了于9日举行的白俄罗斯总统选举，支持率为80.1%。卢卡申科在本次总统选举中的主要竞争对手斯维特兰娜·季汉诺夫斯卡娅支持率为10.12%。”
“According to TASS, the Belarusian Central Election Commission announced on its official website that the current President Lukashenko won the Belarusian presidential election held on the 9th, with a support rate of 80.1%. Lukashenko's main rival in this presidential election, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, has a support rate of 10.12%.”
Comment: The Chinese Embassy in Belarus has been pretty quiet, which seems to indicate that the crisis is being managed at a higher level. Also note that the PD is citing TASS, not Belta, for an event taking place in Belarus.
3) Belarus and Russia
Russia’s Belarusian policy has been highly inconsistent and reactive, as you can see below. To be fair, however, few could have anticipated that Lukashenko would mismanage COVID, the electoral event, and protests so counterproductively.
Putin confirms readiness to help Belarus based on Union State Treaty – TASS
“Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone conversation with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko on Sunday confirmed Moscow’s readiness to provide assistance in solving problems based on the treaty on creating the Union State and in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Kremlin press service said.
"Russia confirmed readiness to provide necessary assistance in ironing out emerging problems based on the principles of the treaty on creating the Union State and also if needed in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization," the statement said. The two leaders continued discussing the situation in Belarus after the presidential election, "including given the external pressure on the republic," the press service said.”
Comment: Bolded by The Report. The “CSTO framework” could enable Putinist intervention if Belarus faces “external threats.”
“Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko.”
“The two presidents further discussed the situation that has developed following the presidential election in Belarus including with due regard to external pressure. The Russian side reaffirmed its readiness to render the necessary assistance to resolve the challenges facing Belarus based on the principles of the Treaty on the Creation of a Union State, as well as through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, if necessary.”
Comment: back to “President Lukashenko” – a change from earlier in the week (see below).
“Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with President of the Republic of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko at the initiative of the Belarusian side.”
“Alexander Lukashenko informed Vladimir Putin about the developments following the presidential election in Belarus. Both sides expressed confidence that all existing problems will be settled soon. The main thing is to prevent destructive forces from using these problems to cause damage to mutually beneficial relations of the two countries within the Union State. In connection with the return to Russia of 32 people who were previously detained in Belarus, a positive assessment was given to close cooperation of the relevant agencies in this regard. They also agreed on further regular contacts at various levels, and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening allied relations, which fully meets the core interests of the fraternal nations of Russia and Belarus.”
Belarus protests death toll may be higher than official numbers — UN expert – TASS
“The number of casualties in the Belarusian protests may be higher than the official data provided by the government, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus Anais Marin told TASS on Friday.”
“#Zakharova We want to emphasise that #Russia has been and remains a reliable ally and friend to #Belarus and its brotherly people. We strongly believe that attempts to sow discord between us are doomed to failure. #RussiaBelarus #TogetherWeStand”
Comment: No mention of Lukashenko
“Greetings to Alexander Lukashenko on winning presidential election in Belarus
Vladimir Putin congratulated Alexander Lukashenko on winning the Belarusian presidential election.
“I hope that your governance will facilitate further development of mutually beneficial Russian-Belarusian relations in all areas, closer cooperation within the Union State, extensive integration within the Eurasian Economic Union and the CIS, and military and political links within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Without doubt, these efforts serve the core interests of the brotherly nations of Russia and Belarus,” the President stressed in his message.”
Comment: No reference to “President” Lukashenko. The Kremlin was hedging its bets.
“Question: After the presidential elections in Belarus, protesters clashed with law enforcement in Minsk and other cities, and Russian journalists were among those detained and injured there. How do you assess this situation, and what is the Foreign Ministry doing to resolve it?
Sergey Lavrov: We have seen how law enforcement agencies, including special forces, act in various countries during social unrest (remember, for example, the yellow vests’ rallies in France, or the anti-globalisation protests in Germany). As for the situation with Russian citizens, we are addressing this matter. This topic has been raised by the Russian ambassador, by our Information and Press Department, and I also mentioned this during a conversation with Minister Makey (head of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry) and insisted that our journalists be released as soon as possible. We understand that many of those who were detained did not have accreditation, but at the same time, we also know that they had actually applied for media accreditation in a timely manner and in compliance with the applicable rules and procedures. This situation must be resolved on the basis of humane considerations. And we will make efforts for an early settlement in contact with our Belarusian colleagues.”
Police push demonstrators back outside Belarusian embassy in Moscow – TASS
“Police on duty at the Belarusian embassy in central Moscow are pushing back the people who got together outside the diplomatic mission to protest against the results of Sunday’s presidential election, TASS reports from the site.”
Possible EU sanctions against Belarus should target individuals — top Lithuanian diplomat – TASS
“Possible sanctions of the European Union against Belarus should be slapped on individuals, they must not harm the rank and file, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius told Echo of Moscow radio on Wednesday.
… After exit poll results were revealed late on August 9, suggesting Lukashenko’s landslide victory, many cities and towns across the country saw mass protests that in some cases turned into clashes with the police. The national Interior Ministry said about 3,000 people had been detained while dozens of police officers and protesters were injured. Moreover, law enforcement officers apprehended a few reporters. Tikhanovskaya challenged the results, refused to recognize them and said that she believes herself to be the elected president. She also filed a complaint with the national election commission. Tikhanovskaya then left the country and fled to Lithuania on Tuesday.”
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland float plan to resolve crisis in Belarus – TASS
“"Upon the acceptance of this plan our countries are ready to serve as mediators to broker the process of overcoming this crisis," the Lithuanian leader stated. He noted that the failure of this plan will lead to European and national sanctions applied to Minsk.”
Belarus women form human chains in solidarity with protesters – TASS
“Women took to the streets of Belarusian cities on the fourth day after the presidential election and formed human chains in solidarity with the people detained or injured by the police during protests across the country, TASS reports.”
One protester killed in Minsk after explosive device blows up - Interior Ministry – TASS
“One protester was killed in clashes with special ops units in Minsk, Belarusian Interior Ministry Spokesperson Olga Chemodanova said on her Telegram channel.
"During the clashes with special ops units, which arrived to unblock the square, one of protesters tried to throw an unidentified explosive device at the law enforcement officers. It exploded in his hand and the man sustained fatal injuries," the statement said.
The protests in the Belarusian capital have been ongoing for nearly four hours. The hotbeds of resistance to the law enforcement officers, who have been trying to establish order in the streets, remain in three Minsk areas - near Pushkinskaya metro, near Gorky Park and Bangalore Square.”
Comment: This is an extraordinarily pro-Lukashenko framing. TASS first uncritically quotes the Interior Ministry’s version of events and then says that OMON is trying to establish “order.”
Belarusian law enforcement officers quell protests in Minsk residential districts – TASS
“According to eyewitnesses, police and security forces are responding in a more decisive and tougher way than the day before”
Comment: “More decisive” “Tougher”
Teams of Iskander tactical missile systems go on alert in drills in Russia’s northwest – TASS
“The personnel will sharpen the skills of reconnoitering enemy air and ground targets and repelling an attack by subversive and reconnaissance groups, according to the statement.”
Comment: These drills aren’t necessarily related to the protests in Belarus, but Russia’s public announcement suggests it doesn’t appear to mind if the exercises are interpreted as a threat.
Belarusian security chief says assassination attempt on candidate Tikhanovskaya was foiled – TASS
“Belarusian security services have prevented an assassination attempt on presidential candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, chief of the country’s State Security Committee (KGB) Valery Vakulchik said on Monday.
"We received information from the so-called united [opposition] headquarters that they were afraid of provocations and an attempt on Tikhanovskaya’s life," he told the ONT television channel. According to Vakulchik, ahead of that the Interior Ministry’s anti-extremism division intercepted a message reading that a "sacred sacrifice is needed.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said earlier on Monday that law enforcers had protected not only rank and file people during riots but also the election team of his rival, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. In his words, law enforcers ensured protection of some 60 people, including "opposition journalists," "all through the night."”
Comment: If you’re reading this as an unsubtle threat to President-elect Tikhanovskaya you’re probably right.
Belarus’s regime is nearing collapse – Mark Galeotti for the Spectator
“The scale of the violence at the protests last night was perhaps predictable. The question now is what happens the day and the week after. If the demonstrations can be contained, if the security forces stay loyal and if the elite remains united, then Lukashenka will probably hold on for now. This is just delaying the inevitable, though. He cannot regain his legitimacy, and a throne of bayonets is not only uncomfortable, it leaves the monarch dependent on those who wield them. Politically, Lukashenko is a dead man walking.
This will pose an international challenge. Moscow has no desire to annex Belarus – not least, it is a handy transit point for dirty money laundered westwards, and sanctioned luxuries smuggled east – and regards a weakened but still surviving Lukashenko as its best option. What it cannot and will not accept is another of what it considers its ‘Near Abroad’ satellite states being lost to the West.”
“Many are asking whose victory Russia wants in Belarus. With Kremlin spox Peskov maintaining his usual line of "we don't meddle in the affairs of sovereign states" and TV news not really covering the vote, I've watched some state TV talk shows to see what's being said.
In short, Lukashenko is still being backed despite the Wagner scandal. No other candidate is seen as realistic. 60 Minut host Olga Skabeyeva: "We know perfectly that the majority supports Luka." Pundit Sergei Mikheyev: Luka would win even if "super honest" elections were held.”
As Belarus's Strongman Seeks To Extend His Embattled Rule, Moscow Watches Warily – RFE/RL
“But Moscow was relatively tight-lipped, apparently waiting to see what happens in the unfolding standoff between an authoritarian leader it has helped prop up for a quarter-century and the growing number of citizens opposed to his continued rule. "Moscow, like pretty much everyone else, assumed that Lukashenka still had a good number of years in him," Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russia's security services at the Royal United Services Institute in London, told RFE/RL. "But this puts Moscow in a difficult situation. They're not making a big deal of it, because they're having to take stock."”
4) Democracies and Belarus
COMMENT: Belarus and the Dividends of Democracy – Anders Aslund for bne Intellinews
Donbass Ceasefire Defies Expectations – Bear Market Brief
Comment: Quieter in the Donbass because Putin wanted to deescalate ahead of potential trouble in Belarus?
5) China and Russia
“We consider the unreasonably harsh restrictive action of the American side in relation to one of the largest social media platforms, the TikTok video sharing app, to be a violation of a wide range of Washington's international obligations to ensure the unimpeded and broad distribution of all forms of information, as well as the free choice of its sources, and to encourage cooperation in this area.
The actions of the US authorities run counter to the basic principles of a free market economy and violate WTO rules. The attempt by the Washington establishment to justify this unceremonious arm twisting policy against a Chinese competitor in order to take it over by national security interests looks especially cynical. We urge Washington to reconsider its methods of competition to preserve the US IT giants’ monopoly in the international social media market and to bring them in line with the generally accepted democratic values and international law.”
Comment: Did “the Washington establishment” sign the TikTok executive order? Goodness heavens, why ever would the Kremlin shy from criticizing Trump?
“Though state news outlets and pro-government media in Russia publish roughly 100 Chinese propaganda stories a month, the efficacy of this publicity offensive is doubtful. These materials generate little interest, attracting barely a few hundred views each. When it comes to downloads, the mobile app “Russia-China: Top News” (this is often the source for stories like “Opinion Poll: Bilateral Relations Between Russia and China Have a Solid Foundation,” which Rossiyskaya Gazeta cited in a text about Xinjiang) is no industry leader, either. According to the service “App Annie,” since the beginning of the year, “Russia-China: Top News” hasn’t cracked to top 200 news apps on the iOS AppStore (though it’s done slightly better on Android devices). Posts shared on its verified VKontakte account rarely get more than a dozen likes.
… “They spare no expense for propaganda abroad, but, as colleagues have said, they operate under the watchful eye of the anti-corruption authorities, who have flourished under Xi,” says Meduza’s source. “So what happens is that media organizations first and foremost need to reaffirm their loyalty constantly and impress the leadership with growing numbers of platforms where China is broadcasting its views. And they have to show that the state’s funding isn’t being wasted, which again necessitates even more reports about publications and events. Meanwhile, the efficacy of the work and the level of influence partners wield is of secondary importance. What matters is going through the motions and logging all the numbers.””
“Beijing and Moscow have different attitudes and approaches to the global order. Yet these contradictions have not damaged their relationship. The Sino–Russian partnership has gone from strength to strength, leading some observers to conclude that it is an alliance in all but name. This assessment, while plausible, is mistaken. China and Russia are strategically autonomous actors. They cooperate not because they are fellow members of an Authoritarian International, but because they judge that it best serves their respective political, economic, and strategic interests. This is a partnership largely free of ideological and emotional baggage — in marked contrast to the Sino–Soviet ‘unbreakable friendship’ of the 1950s. It helps, too, that it is not an alliance. Both sides retain the flexibility to develop other relationships, and to hold divergent positions with limited consequences for their partnership.”
6) Russian Domestic Politics
Income of Russian top officials in 2019 – TASS
“Russian President Vladimir Putin earned 9.726 mln rubles ($133,400) in 2019. The income, expenses and property declaration was posted on Friday on the Kremlin’s website. The president declared 8.65 mln rubles ($118,600) of income in 2018. The property list in the declaration remained unchanged in 2019. Putin owns an apartment with an area of 77 square meters, a garage with an area of 18 square meters, two vintage Volga GAZ M21 cars, a Niva SUV and a Skif trailer. The Russian president is using an apartment of 153.7 square meters and a garage parking lot of 18 square meters. All this property is based in Russia.”
1 in 2 Russian Doctors Distrust New Coronavirus Vaccine – Poll – Moscow Times
“About one in two Russian medics — 52% — surveyed by the Doctor’s Handbook app said they won’t take the new vaccine. Only 24.5% of healthcare workers surveyed said they’d be willing to get vaccinated, according to RBC. Out of the 52% of Russian medics who said they won’t get vaccinated, 66% cited insufficient data proving its effectiveness and 48% said it was developed too fast.
Twenty percent of the medics who won't get vaccinated told the Doctor’s Handbook that they’d still recommend the Sputnik V to patients, colleagues and friends.”
Moscow residents will be able to choose out of a few coronavirus vaccines — mayor – TASS
“Moscow residents will have a few coronavirus vaccines to choose from, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said Thursday. "We now have our own vaccine, which means that there will be an opportunity to get the real vaccine in civil circulation. This is great," he said. "I am certain that more vaccines will come out in the coming months. People will have a choice which vaccine to use."”
Comment: The vaccine issue could easily become politically contentious in Russia.
7) Occupied Crimea and water
“According to international law, the occupying state bears full responsibility for the situation in the occupied territory. Period. At the same time, there is no humanitarian crisis with fresh water in the occupied Crimea whatsoever, chief of Ukraine's diplomacy emphasizes.
… On August 7, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal expressed the opinion that Ukraine could resume water supplies to the temporarily occupied Crimea for the needs of the population in the event of a humanitarian disaster. At the same time, the head of government said that the supply of water for industrial purposes is off the table.”
“The weather in July brought rain to Crimea—but still not enough to save the peninsula from its severe multi-year drought. That same month, the volume of freshwater in Crimea’s reservoirs decreased by almost 8.5 million cubic meters. By August, the amount of reservoir water left totaled around 75 million cubic meters, compared to 164 million last year.
Following Russia’s forcible annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine blocked the canal, but Moscow promised to find a new fix; it never did. Six years on, the peninsula risks drying up completely. This past July, the water levels at Crimea’s main reservoirs, including Bilogirske and Taigan, dropped drastically. According to Reshad Memedov, an activist of the Free Crimea movement, these reservoirs could dry up completely in the fall.”
Comment: Sevastopol’s precipitation levels tend to increase in winter months, although local water shortages across the peninsula could still emerge.
Sevastopol’s climate – Weather Atlas
Comment: Water demand typically peaks in the summer months and abates in the winter. Crimea’s water stocks levels *could* rise in the winter months.
The Three-Body Problem appears to be an excellent book. I haven’t read it yet, but it’s on the bookshelf.
Until next time,
Joe Webster
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