Bilateral gaps over a potential Middle East war?
Iran and 两国各自和共同利益
Bilateral ties between China and Russia may undergo strain if a war in the Middle East erupts. The two sides have structurally different interests in oil and energy markets: China is the world’s largest importer of both, while Russia is one of the world’s largest exporters. There are some indications that Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, delivered a subtle but public hint to Sergei Shoigu, the secretary of the Russian Security Council, emphasizing the two sides’ different interests in oil and energy markets.
Let’s be clear: Moscow and Beijing enjoy strong ties, and attempting a “reverse Kissinger” of separating the two sides will fail. Still, if a conflict in the Middle East breaks out, ties between Moscow and Beijing may become more uncertain.
Image source: ChatGPT 5.2
Structural divergences in energy markets
A potential Middle East war would hold huge implications for Beijing and Moscow but affect each country very differently.
Russia stands to be a major beneficiary of a conflict in the Middle East, on balance. Moscow has important defense, political, and economic ties across the Middle East and does not want to be perceived as a destabilizing force. At the same time, it appears highly willing to indirectly and deniably undermine energy competitors, which bolster the earnings of its own energy exports. Meanwhile, Washington announced that the US and India agreed to a trade deal, under the terms that India would cease importing of Russian oil. The Indian side, notably, did not mention this condition in their announcement.
If India does indeed halt Russian oil imports – which is highly unlikely but possible – then the Russian oil industry could face a crisis. India accounted for 38 percent of Russia’s crude oil exports in December 2025, there are relatively few suitable alternative export destinations for Russian crude outside of Europe, and Russia has little capacity to store oil. Russia may be forced to shut-in significant upstream production if India does, in fact, cease importing its oil.
Conversely, China, the world’s largest energy and oil importer, has an interest in stable global energy flows, especially from the Middle East. While Beijing understands China’s energy vulnerabilities and is quickly mitigating them, it recognizes that short-term outages would be disastrous for the Chinese economy.
Structurally divergent interests between Moscow and Beijing exist over energy. Given these incentives, Beijing had reason to explain its position to Moscow about the risks of stimulating a conflict in the Middle East.
A subtle warning?
There are hints that Beijing conveyed this message to Moscow. In comments likely related to Iran and the Middle East, Wang Yi may have suggested that China’s interests are distinct from Russia’s.
According to a Chinese readout, the Wang-Shoigu meeting largely concerned itself with geopolitical developments, as Beijing reported it “welcomed Shoigu’s visit to China for a strategic dialogue as designated by Russian President Vladimir Putin.” While neither Shoigu nor Wang mentioned the Middle East or Iran, the region was very likely the featured discussion. Not only is the region the dominant geopolitical story, but representatives of several Gulf powers, including Iran and the UAE, swung through Moscow immediately before Shoigu’s Beijing visit.
Intriguingly, Wang said the following in the official PRC readout: “Noting that China and Russia are each other’s largest neighbors and comprehensive strategic partners of coordination for a new era, Wang said the two countries should maintain close communication on major issues concerning bilateral relations, step up mutual support on matters involving each other’s core interests, and safeguard their respective and common interests [维护好两国各自和共同利益].”
This formulation – the two countries’ respective and common interests, or 维护好两国各自和共同利益 – is striking. This is not entirely a new formulation in the context of China-Russia relations, as Xi himself repeated a very similar line to Shoigu at their October 20, 2018 meeting, when he said”中俄要坚定不移深化战略协作，共同做好稳定国际秩序的压舱石，维护好各自和共同利益. [China and Russia must unswervingly deepen strategic coordination, together serve as the ballast stone for stabilizing international order, and safeguard [our] respective and common interests]”
While parsing CCP language may seem pedantic, the distinctions between Xi’s comments in 2018 and Wang’s comments in 2026, while subtle, may also be significant. In 2018, Xi’s comments (维护好各自和共同利益) acknowledged that each side has respective and common interests; moreover, this exact phrasing appears only to have occurred for bilateral China-Russia ties. In 2026, conversely, Wang’s comments elaborated on the differences between the two countries, or “维护好两国各自和共同利益.” This subtle shift may be intentional. Not only does the phrase “respective and common interests” occur only rarely in China-Russia ties and across Beijing’s other diplomatic relations, but senior CCP leaders do not appear to have ever uttered the framing to anyone but Shoigu. The framing by CCP leadership suggests that Beijing perceives that bilateral ties with Moscow are strong but, importantly, acknowledges “respective interests” and occasional divergences.
There are limitations to reading diplomatic tea leaves, especially when evaluating the two highly opaque governments found in Beijing and Moscow. Nevertheless, there is some limited evidence suggesting Beijing is concerned about a Middle East war and discouraging Moscow from lighting matches and stoking flames.
While Beijing and Moscow are undoubtedly moving closer, the two sides do not share identical interests. If a war in the Middle East erupts, likely sending oil and energy prices higher, ties between Moscow and Beijing could become more complicated.
Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.