Hi everyone,
Thank you to everyone who reached out after not receiving weekly updates – but life has been quite busy recently. The newsletter will be updated every quarter or so.
This edition of the newsletter will cover the following China-Russia topics: Kazakhstan, India-Pakistan, Russian 5G, Venezuela, and Belarus.
Summary:
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned last Tuesday but will remain head of Kazakhstan’s Security Council and its ruling party. He has also assumed the title “leader of the nation.” Nazarbayev’s resignation affects both China and Russia.
Putin is determining whether or not to follow Nazarbayev’s model; Kremlin-affiliated media, notably, asserted Nazarbayev followed the “Deng Xiaoping model.” The Central Asian country is symbolically importance to China: it was the first to sign on to the Belt and Road Initiative. Kazakhstan is also a major oil and gas producer, as well as a transit country along the Central Asia-China Pipeline (or CACP, which transports gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to China). While Central Asia is not the most important sphere of interaction for China or Russia, and the two authoritarian powers share certain political values, their regional economic interests are not necessarily aligned. Central Asian and Russian commodity exports, particularly oil and gas exports, compete for market share in China and Europe. Expect China and Russia to (quietly) jostle for influence in the post-Nazarbayev transition.
Kazakhstan Pipeline Maps: Energy Information Administration
Most of Kazakhstan’s oil production currently heads west to Europe, not east to China. Kazakhstan’s light, sweet crude oil will become more valuable after new International Maritime Organization regulations are implemented in 2020, however, which could make new pipelines to China more attractive. And China may seek more overland access to oil in the future for non-economic reasons.
Completion of another Central Asian gas pipeline could render the potential Russia-to-China Altai gas pipeline uneconomical. Kazakhstan has limited domestic gas production potential but is an important transit country. The planned CACP Line D transits Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (and not Kazakhstan), but any other additional Central Asian gas pipeline capacity will likely transit Kazakhstan.
Whoever ultimately succeeds Nazarbayev will face an extraordinarily complex domestic and international environment. Kazakhstan is a *relative* oasis of freedom and tolerance in Central Asia. The world’s largest landlocked country contains about 120 ethnic minority groups, more than 7 recognized religions, and highly complex linguistic dynamics (about as many Kazakhstani individuals speak Russian as Kazakh, and the Kazakh alphabet is transitioning from Cyrillic to Latin characters). While Nazarbayev has often harshly cracked down on opposition movements, one of his great achievements is preventing the outbreak of mass intolerance and violence while delivering rising living standards. Internationally, Nazarbayev has deftly maneuvered between Russia, China, and the West and largely preserved – arguably, created – Kazakh nationhood.
It’s not clear if Kazakhstan’s next leader will be able to preserve Nazarbayev’s achievements, however. As Warren Buffet once said, "invest in businesses any fool could run because someday one will.” Or, as Kissinger said of Bismarck, “In the hands of others lacking his subtle touch, his methods led to the collapse of the nineteenth-century state system.” Has Nazarbayev successfully created enduring institutions that will outlast him? Time will tell.
Don’t forget about Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Although most observers are focusing on Russia’s reaction to Nazarbayev’s resignation, political elites in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are closely watching the transition while monitoring the reactions of China, Russia, and the West. Both countries are politically unstable and already experiencing economic crises. If a global economic slowdown or recession occurs, a political transition in those countries could become much more likely. Many observers noted a potential palace coup in Turkmenistan in 2018. Tajikistan, meanwhile, is arguably Central Asia’s most unstable state. A crisis in Tajikistan could get very complicated very quickly: Russia and China have major in-country military assets, while an Indian helicopter detachment is stationed at Farkhor Air Base.
The Pulwama crisis illustrates that South Asia is perhaps an even more sensitive issue for China-Russia relations than Central Asia. Russia generally (but hesitatingly) supported the Indian position, offered to mediate the crisis, and did not vote against the French-US-UK UN Security Council resolution labeling Masood Azhar (leader of the terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed) an international terrorist. The PRC, meanwhile, used its UN Security Council veto to shield Masood Azhar and his supporters in the Pakistani force structures. Russia, notably, did not co-sponsor the UN Security Council resolution to sanction Azhar; a Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral in late February did, however, agree to eradicate “breeding grounds of terrorism.”
As The Report has noted before, China and Russia have complicated and perhaps contradictory interests in South Asia. India is Moscow’s only plausible hedge against Chinese dominance for as long as Putin rules. Beijing, meanwhile, regards India as a strategic rival and may be attempting to contain its neighbor. South Asia is perhaps the second most important region in Sino-Russian relations, after Europe.
While some European countries have wavered on whether or not to include Huawei 5G in their internet architecture, Russia’s silence has been highly conspicuous. Russia seems very reluctant to insert Huawei into its internet architecture, although there is discussion of developing and rolling out a “network competitive model.” Still, it's entirely possible that many Western countries will adopt Huawei technology when even Russia is highly anxious about the dangers of the Chinese state-owned company.
Russia and China’s Venezuela policy hasn’t really changed since the last update: Putin is still desperately trying to shore up an incompetent competing oil producer, while the CCP is still willing to overlook its economic interests in lower energy prices.
Putin likely wants the Belarus issue on the backburner amid Ukrainian and European Parliamentary elections, as well as the transition in Kazakhstan. The PRC likely also wants to minimize Putin-related frictions in Europe, at least until after the EU-China trade dispute/Huawei espionage issues are resolved. Putin and the PRC will likely seek little movement on the Belarus issue for some time.
And, finally, an authoritarian political interference update: the first round of Ukrainian Presidential elections are on Sunday; European Parliamentary, Australian, and Indian elections are upcoming.
Sections:
Kazakhstan, India-Pakistan, Russian 5G, Venezuela, and Belarus.
Kazakhstan
The BBC’s Steve Rosenberg has an excellent explainer of Nazarbayev’s resignation, including how Kremlin-affiliated newspapers in Russia reacted.
Kazakhstan: Real Power Transition Still to Come – Kate Mallinson for Chatham House
“While the resignation of Kazakhstan’s first president is significant, it does not signal any immediate major policy shifts. Rather, Nazarbayev will continue to rule as the elder statesman behind the throne. As chair of the Security Council he will wield great power domestically and still manage relationships with key neighbours including Russia and China. The real power transition is yet to come and Nazarbayev will be well-positioned to oversee it…
Nazarbayev’s daughter Dariga has been promoted from senator to speaker of the Senate. Therefore, should Tokayev resign before the 2020 elections, Dariga would automatically step in. Her new post will allow her to assume an even more vocal role in Kazakhstan’s day-to-day politics - a perfect platform to acclimatise the electorate to the fact that she may one day lead the country. While Dariga is an acceptable option internationally, she is unpopular at home. Selling a female president to Kazakhstan’s patriarchal society could be difficult, and a large segment of the population are tired of the Nazarbayev family’s dominance…
The loyalty of the security forces during this transition stage, particularly in a time of rising disaffection, is paramount. The day before Nazarbayev’s resignation, prosecutor-general Kairat Kozhamzharov was dismissed and demoted to senator. Kozhamzharov’s close ties to the Russian elite might have been viewed as a potential trouble spot in this transition period. His removal could have been a precautionary step immediately preceding Nazarbayev’s resignation.”
Comment: Best piece I’ve read on the transition. Worth a read.
Kazakhstan’s president announces resignation – TASS
“Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced on Tuesday that he will step down after 30 years in power.
At the same time Nazarbayev said he will remain chairman of the Central Asian state’s Security Council despite his resignation. "In accordance with our laws, I’m given a status of the first president - the nation’s leader (elbasy in Kazakh), I will remain the Security Council’s chairman, who has serious powers to determine the country’s domestic and foreign policy in line with the laws," Nazarbayev said in his televised address to the nation. Nazarbayev will also remain chairman of the Nur Otan Democratic People’s Party and a member of the Constitutional Council.
The Kazakh leader said he would continue taking care about the country and the people. "As the founder of an independent Kazakh state, I see my future task in ensuring the assumption of power by a new generation of leaders, who will continue carrying out current reforms in the country," he stressed.”
Kazakhstan’s Senate Speaker Tokayev to serve as acting president – TASS
“Kazakhstan’s Senate Speaker Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will become acting president after Nursultan Nazarbayev’s resignation, the nation’s long-time leader announced in his televised address on Tuesday. Under the constitution, "in case of an early resignation of the incumbent president his powers will be transferred to the chairman of the Senate until his term ends," Nazarbayev said, noting that then the country would hold the election.”
Comment: The procedures of democracy (if not its substance) are important to Putin and will likely be a key element in any succession plan.
Telephone conversation with Nursultan Nazarbayev and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev – The Kremlin
“Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first President and the incumbent Head of the Security Council of Kazakhstan, and President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
Vladimir Putin once again thanked Nursultan Nazarbayev for his personal contribution to the development of allied bilateral relations and to the success of the Eurasian integration project. Confidence was expressed that the first President of Kazakhstan would continue to actively contribute to the efforts to strengthen cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. The President of Russia congratulated Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on assuming office as the President of Kazakhstan and wished him every success in this responsible position. The parties agreed to closely coordinate their actions in the interests of stronger Russia-Kazakhstan ties and to organise a visit by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Russia in the near future.”
China has full confidence in relations with Kazakhstan – Xinhua
“Responding to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's resignation on Tuesday, spokesperson Geng Shuang said at a daily news briefing that Nazarbayev was the founder of the country and a national leader deeply supported by the Kazakh people. China understands the decision made by President Nazarbayev.
Committed to advancing the China-Kazakhstan friendship, President Nazarbayev promoted the establishment of the bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership, and supported and actively participated in the Belt and Road cooperation, Geng said, adding that China highly evaluates his efforts.
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who was just sworn in as Kazakhstan's president, has been an old friend and a good friend that Chinese people are familiar with. China hopes and believes Kazakhstan will constantly make new achievements in national development and construction, he said.
Noting that China and Kazakhstan are important neighbors, Geng said bilateral relations have kept high-standard development at present, and it is in the common interests and also the consensus of both countries to deepen China-Kazakhstan all-round cooperation.”
Nazarbayev announced his resignation as president of Kazakhstan – People’s Daily [Chinese-language]
“纳扎尔巴耶夫当天在对国民发表电视讲话时宣布自3月20日起辞去总统职务。他表示,到举行总统选举前,哈萨克斯坦国家领导人的职务将由哈议会上院议长托卡耶夫代为履行。辞去总统职务后,纳扎尔巴耶夫仍将担任执政党“祖国之光”人民民主党主席,以及国家安全委员会主席。”
“On the same day, Nazarbayev announced in his televised speech to the nationals that he resigned from the presidency since March 20. He said that before the presidential election, the position of the leader of the Kazakh state will be fulfilled by the Speaker of the Upper House of the Kazakh Parliament, Tokayev. After resigning from the presidency, Nazarbayev will still serve as the chairman of the ruling party "The Light of the Motherland" and the chairman of the National Security Council.”
“克里姆林宫网站21日发表声明说,普京祝贺托卡耶夫就任哈萨克斯坦总统,并对他表示良好祝愿。声明说,两国愿紧密协作,推动伙伴关系继续发展。
声明说,普京在电话中感谢纳扎尔巴耶夫为发展俄哈双边关系和推进欧亚一体化作出的贡献,希望他继续积极推进欧亚经济联盟框架内的合作。”
“The Kremlin website issued a statement on the 21st saying that Putin congratulated Tokayev on his assumption of the presidency of Kazakhstan and expressed his good wishes to him. The statement said that the two countries are willing to work closely together to promote the continued development of partnership.
The statement said that on the phone, Putin thanked Nazarbayev for his contribution to developing bilateral relations and promoting the integration of Europe and Asia. He hoped that he would continue to actively promote cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union.”
“谈到“一带一路”倡议与欧亚经济联盟对接的作用,诺罗夫援引专家的观点说:一方面,这为俄罗斯及欧亚经济联盟其他成员国提供了从欧洲至亚洲的广阔过境区域,扩大其产品在中国及其他亚洲国家的销售市场;另一方面,中国将有更多的机会扩大本国产品的销售市场并获得进入原料产地的途径。考虑到俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦等3个欧亚经济联盟成员国同时也是上合组织成员国,上述对接合作将在很大程度上扩大上合组织国家间的经贸合作,将为中俄之间乃至上合组织各国之间经济关系的发展注入动力。”
“Speaking about the role of the “Belt and Road Initiative” and the Eurasian Economic Union, Norov quoted experts as saying that on the one hand, this provides a wide transit area from Europe to Asia for other members of Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union and expand the sales market of its products in China and other Asian countries; on another hand, China will have more opportunities to expand the sales market of its products and gain access to raw materials. Considering that the three member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, including Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are also members of the SCO, the above-mentioned docking cooperation will greatly expand the economic and trade cooperation between the SCO countries and will inject momentum into Sino-Russian development of economic relations between countries and even the SCO countries.”
Comment: China chiming in with a helpful reminder to Kazakhstan and Russia not to deviate from the BRI line
The Week In Russia: Do Kremlin Bosses Dream In Kazakh? – Steve Gutterman for RFE/RL
Nazarbaev's Decision To Leave Office Just Might Be His Greatest Legacy – Bruce Pannier for RFE/RL
Kazakhstan: A president called Tokayev. A future called Nursultan – Joanna Lillis for Eurasianet
“This kind of poker-faced flattery from [Kazakhstan’s new President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev] should perhaps be expected from a career diplomat who has represented Kazakhstan in high-flying foreign missions, which included serving as deputy secretary-general of the United Nations from 2011 to 2013.
Tokayev was born into an elite Soviet family – his father was an eminent writer and war hero. A graduate of the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations, he started out in the 1970s in the Soviet foreign service. His time in China and Singapore helped develop his Mandarin- and English-language skills.
The transition into the higher echelons of Kazakhstan’s diplomatic corps after the collapse of the Soviet Union was natural and smooth. For two stretches, from 1994 to 1999 and 2003 to 2007, he served as Nazarbayev’s foreign minister.”
China, Russia Stand to Gain From Kazakhstan’s Political Transition – WSJ
““I think that they understand that putting all their eggs in China’s basket—that is, [having] China as your provider of economic benefits and your security partner—is risky,” Mr. Gabuev said. “So…they want to maintain a very strong economic relationship with China, because that’s beneficial and that’s the future, but at the same time they want to have a hedge, and this hedge for them is Russia.””
Comment: Speaking of hedging, it won’t be surprising if Russia invites India (and, after Putin, the West) into the region
India
Russia set to propose hosting India-Pakistan talks to defuse conflict – TASS
“Russia is ready to propose hosting talks between India and Pakistan to achieve settlement, if they wish this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told reporters on Thursday. "Certainly, if they wish this," Lavrov said answering a TASS question.”
“The head of the Pakistani Armed Services Public Relations Bureau, Asif Ghafoor, held an emergency press conference on the afternoon of the 26th to confirm that several Indian military aircraft crossed the India and Pakistan actual line of control in Kashmir in the morning and invaded the airspace of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.
Ghafoor said that on the morning of the 26th, after the Pakistani radar discovered that the Indian warplane was approaching the actual control line of Kashmir, the Pakistani fighter aircraft was temporarily lifted and intercepted. The Indian military aircraft then abandoned the load and flew away from the Pakistani airspace. There was no exchange of fire between the two sides. The Pakistani ground forces investigation found that four bombs dropped by Indian fighters did not cause casualties.
Ghafoor said that on the evening of the 25th, Indian fighters tried to approach the eastern and southern borders of Pakistan and were intercepted by the Pakistan Air Force.”
Comment: Note the lack of context for why Indian fighters crossed the line of control (to neutralize terrorist facilities in response to a terrorist suicide bombing that killed 40 Indian security personnel).
“There should be little surprise that China has blocked the designation of Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist once again. It was clear on Monday, when the Chinese official spokesman Lu Kang, read off the usual rigmarole, in response to a question on the listing, “China has all along participated in relevant discussions in a responsible manner and in strict accordance with the rules of procedure and provisions of the (UN’s) 1267 Committee.””
“Regardless of the spin Indian diplomats put on it — and no matter how much anyone tries to play down China’s veto (for the fourth time) on designating the Pakistani jihadi terrorist, Masood Azhar, as an international terrorist by the UN Security Council — the fact is that this was a blatantly unfriendly act by a country that has proved, once again, that it is anything but a friend of India. To not put too fine a point on it, China is an openly hostile country which shamelessly supports and defends Pakistani terrorists who attack India, and then, with a forked tongue, speaks of peace and friendly relations with India….
The Chinese are, of course, being disingenuous when they seek more discussions and evidence for sanctioning Azhar. It is indeed quite rich of China, a country which has interned over a million Muslims in concentration camps simply because of how they look, what they wear, whether or not they pray and what they say, to demand evidence against a self-confessed terrorist. Evidence is not — and never was — an issue. The issue is geo-politics, geo-strategy and geo-economics. And India has failed to leverage its strengths in this domain to force the Chinese hand.”
“Chinese support, in particular, will remain limited…
The language does not break through a major impasse that has separated India and China, in particular, on Jaish-e-Mohammed: the listing of the group’s leader Masood Azhar as a “global terrorist” under United Nations Security Council resolution 1267. Over several years, China has used a technical hold to prevent his designation. But, on balance, taking the reality of Chinese and Russian preferences into account, the RIC trilateral statement is probably as good an outcome India could have hoped for.”
Comment: The crisis in South Asia isn’t over but does seems to be getting closer to resolution. A week ago there were rumors of artillery exchanges along the international border (as opposed to the line of control in Kashmir). Escalation appears unlikely but is not impossible. Note that Pakistan’s air traffic was closed as late as March 20th, incurring considerable costs even amid its ongoing financial crisis.
Finally, there’s this article from Reuters: “The sparring after the Pulwama attack had threatened to spiral out of control and only interventions by U.S. officials, including National Security Adviser John Bolton, headed off a bigger conflict, five sources familiar with the events have told Reuters.” It would be nice if the administration officials described above spent more time resolving the crisis and supporting India, and less time congratulating themselves to Reuters.
Moscow is silent: China-Russia Huawei 5G
Putin instructs to launch 5G networks in Russia in coming years – TASS
“Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed in the coming years to organize in Russia access to high-speed Internet and start operation of the fifth-generation communication systems (5G)…
It was reported earlier, that development of 5G communication networks in Russia was expected to be launched into commercial operation after 2020. By 2024, according to the "Digital Economy" program, 5G networks in one form or another will be launched in all cities with population over 300,000 people. Telecom companies MTS, Vimpelcom and Megafon are testing the 5G technology in Russia.”
Comment: Vimpelcom announced in 2018 it would conduct 5G testing with Huawei? Then why isn’t that partnership mentioned?
Russian government assigns priority to 5G network competitive model - TASS
“The Russian Government views a competitive model of the fifth-generation (5G) network development and rollout as a priority option, Deputy Prime Minister Maxim Akimov told reporters.
The Russian telecom ministry presented earlier a 5G network development concept to certain ministries, which contemplates establishing of a single private infrastructural operator because of frequency range shortage in Russia. "The position is rather simple. This [creation of the single infrastructural operator - TASS] is not a priority option. Preference is assigned to the competitive model.
We would like to develop this market in the same way, in which other mobile communication generations evolved, when all desirous operators were present," the official said.”
Comment: This “all desirous operators” seems to be an allusion to Huawei – but why won’t TASS come out and say it?
Huawei Cloud’s First Anniversary in Russia – TASS
“Since HUAWEI CLOUD's launch in Russia, it has grown to become the country's largest cloud service provider, with the most services and fastest progress. The number of cloud services it offers increased from 20 to 50, and availability zones (AZs) increased from one to three. Leveraging its hard-core technology solution and localized service capabilities, HUAWEI CLOUD's partnership with local enterprises has accelerated the digital transformation of Russia.”
Comment: Wonder if Moscow is under any pressure to publish articles like this.
Russia’s Huawei 5G Conundrum – Jeff Schubert for Russian International Affairs Council
“There is little reason to believe Russia will be any better than Western countries in evaluating the security related aspects of Chinese technology, and there would be a strong case for Russia to follow the lead of Australia, the UK, USA etc. However, there would be several arguments against such a course of action.
Firstly, Russia will not want to jeopardize its present good political relationship with China… Secondly, if it is possible for Huawei and other Chinese companies to do the harmful things that are claimed then presumably non-Chinese suppliers could also do the same to Russia at the request (or demand) of their country’s security agencies… Thirdly, at a purely technical level there is nothing to suggest that Russia could build 5G infrastructure without importing most of the equipment… Fourthly, my September 2016 report on the National Technology Initiative (NTI) suggested that Russia needed to put more emphasis on using available digital technology rather than trying to develop new leading-edge products…
As things now stand, Russia is likely to use Chinese Huawei (and other Chinese) hardware while attempting to ensure that Russian software is used wherever possible. However, as already noted, this will be no easy task. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that when it comes to 5G and national security, Russia is between a rock and a hard-place. Even if its NTI was to be re-focused, Russia lacks the actual or potential 5G infrastructure manufacturing capacity of the US and China. Nor does Russia have any real friends that are capable of helping it (be it part of a bloc or otherwise) develop a 5G value-added chain. China is very unlikely to help as it aims for high-tech self-sufficiency, while the generally underdeveloped countries that Russia has good relations with lack technical capacity.”
Comment: RIAC has close ties to the Kremlin. RIAC has written only one article mentioning 5G, and by a non-Russian (to maintain some separation?). 5G appears to be a very, very sensitive issue for China-Russia relations.
Venezuela
IDB scraps annual meeting after China excludes Venezuela – FT
Comment: It says a lot about the CCP that it’s willing to pay high economic costs in order to support Nicolas Maduro.
Venezuela says Russian planes land for military cooperation – Washington Post
Belarus
“[Chinese Ambassador to Belarus] Cui Qiming noted: “One of the most important objectives of this project is to establish exchange of best practices between China and Belarus in the field of public safety and urban governance. As far as I know, the University has many prestigious scientific achievements. We have something to learn from our Belarusian partners in this area,” he said. The diplomat noted that the establishment of the center will benefit the peoples of the two countries. This is an important project for the Belt and Road initiative.”
Comment:
Putin likely wants the Belarus issue on the backburner amid Ukrainian and European Parliamentary elections, as well as the transition in Kazakhstan. Beijing seems highly unenthusiastic about Belarussian-Russian integration.
Exiled members of the opposition
“From 2000, an estimated 1.6 – 2.0 million out of 145 million population left Russia under Putin’s watch. This trend has intensified since Putin assumed his third term in office in 2012, at which annual emigration started to exceed its highest levels since the early 2000s. While the emigration of the 1990s was driven by economic frustration, the reasons for the Putin exodus appear to be more complex…”
Comment: Does accepting Russian dissidents (or sorta dissidents) further Western interests? Dissidents are very, very rare: totally committed to the dignity struggle, they work until they are dead. In the Russian context, think of Andrei Sakharov or Anna Politkovskaya. Dissidents believe that the cause is greater than any one individual and are willing to give up everything. While flawed, as all individuals are, dissidents do not calculate the personal costs and benefits of their actions; they are subsumed by the cause. Sorta dissidents are less rare and not as committed as dissidents – but are absolutely vital for any opposition movement. Accepting immigration from Russia is a good long-term policy, yes, but does it also serve as a political “safety valve” for Putin in the near-term?
China-Russia
Asia-Pacific becoming new center of political and economic power — Russian ambassador – TASS
“The Asia-Pacific is becoming a new center of economic and political power, Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov said in an address to the 13th regional conference "Russian Diasporas for Cooperation" in Shanghai... The conference that was first held in Beijing 12 years ago, now hosts representatives of Russian diasporas from 11 countries, including China, India, Iran, Cambodia, Mongolia, Nepal, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Japan.”
Comment: The countries above aren’t listed in alphabetical order and are presumably ranked according to Moscow’s foreign policy preferences. India is ranked second (behind China), while Thailand is listed 2nd worst… because of the Nastya Rybka incident?
Ms. Rybka is a former mistress of Oleg Deripaska, claimed to have information about Trump’s connections with Russia, and spent a year in a Thai prison after allegedly running an illegal “sex seminar” in Bangkok. Something about this Rybka story smells fishy (sorry, Russian-language joke): it’s still not clear how Rybka, an Instagram model, managed to evade the FSB en route to Thailand.
That’s all for this quarter’s edition of The Report, folks. Thanks for reading.
Until next time,
Joe Webster
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan weekly newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.