Europe or Russia?

The costs of a “Reverse Kissinger”

In recent weeks the Trump administration has clarified, somewhat, its thinking on a “reverse Kissinger,” or where the U.S. aims to drive a wedge in the China-Russia axis or even detach Moscow from Beijing. In an interview with Breitbart News, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said:

I don’t know if we’ll ever be successful at peeling [Russia] completely off a relationship with the Chinese. I don’t think having China and Russia at each other’s neck is also good for global stability because they’re both nuclear powers. But I do think we’re in a situation now where the Russians have become increasingly dependent on the Chinese, and that’s not a good outcome either if you think about it. I mean, the idea that somehow – the big story of the 21st century is going to be U.S.-Chinese relations, and if China become – and if Russia becomes a permanent junior partner to China in the long term, well, now you’re talking about two nuclear powers aligned against the United States. And even 10 years from now, five years from now, if this trend continues, we could find ourselves in a situation with – where whether Russia wants to improve its relations with the U.S. or not, they can’t, because they’ve become completely dependent on the Chinese because we’ve cut them off.

Secretary Rubio recently issued another statement on Friday, saying “If it is not possible to end the war in Ukraine, we need to move on.”

As the New York Times noted, it’s unclear whether Rubio meant the U.S. would abandon efforts for a 30-day ceasefire or broader commitments to Ukraine. Still, there are troubling signs: Secretary Hegseth is only meeting virtually with Ukraine’s defense group; Vice President Vance has expressed deep hostility toward Europe; and President Trump has blamed Kyiv for Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, the U.S. is imposing major tariffs on European democracies —but not on Russia or Belarus—despite minimal trade, sending a striking signal. Finally, the U.S. is levying major tariffs against the European Union – and other democracies – without applying the same taxes to Russia or Belarus. While U.S. trade with these two countries is negligible and already subject to sanctions, the symbolism is nevertheless striking, and suggests that the U.S. is willing to side with Russia over European democracies, at least on discrete issues.

This potential pivot toward Russia would harm U.S. interests. Even leaving aside shared values or longstanding cultural ties, the U.S. shares concrete economic, financial, and military ties with Europe that vastly exceed anything Russia can offer. Alienating Europe in pursuit of Moscow would be a costly mistake.

Comparing U.S. economic ties with Europe and Russia

The U.S. conducts vastly more trade with Europe than it does with Russia. It isn’t close. The European Union and the United States conducted nearly $1 trillion in total goods trade last year; U.S. – Russia trade, conversely, totaled only $3 billion.

Even at its 2013 peak, U.S.–Russia trade was modest and offered few unique benefits—mostly medium-sour crude oil, which can be sourced from elsewhere.

Sources: US Census Bureau, Author’s Calculations

Additionally, the United States and Europe conducted nearly $450 billion in bilateral services trade in 2023, the latest year for which data was available. While bilateral trade balances hold little relevancy, the U.S. runs a sizable services trade surplus with the European Union of over $75 billion USD.

Sources: BEA, Author’s Calculations

Lifting U.S. trade and investment restrictions on Russia would have minimal impact, as Russia’s economy is small and distant. The EU’s GDP alone is nine times larger.

Sources: IMF WEO, Author’s Calculations

Broadly defined to include the EU, UK, EFTA states, the Western Balkan states in NATO, and Ukraine, Europe’s 2024 GDP reaches $24.7 trillion—over ten times Russia’s.

Sources: IMF WEO, Author’s Calculations

Russia is weak; Europe is strong

The reality is that Europe is a far more powerful and consequential actor than Russia ever will be. While Russia undoubtedly punches above its weight in international affairs, and Europe often lacks initiative, economic gravity is inescapable.

Despite urgent needs for fundamental defense reforms and rearmament, Europe is a powerful security actor. Take military expenditures. In 2024, and before Germany’s rearmament campaign, NATO Europe and Canada accounted for $430 billion USD in defense expenditure. Janis Kluge of SWP estimates the Russian defense budget at 130 billion euros (~$147 billion USD), if measured at the current exchange rate (Kluge notes Russian defense spending is much higher if purchasing power adjustments are applied). Furthermore, European defense spending is set to surge, especially after Germany, the largest European economy, announced massive investments. Defense spending doesn’t fully measure capability, but European defense investments will easily outpace Russia’s.

The Russian military may also suffer qualitative disadvantages in any conventional fight with Europe. While it is very difficult to assess latent combat capabilities until they are put to the test in a specific scenario, there are real questions about the quality of the Russian military. Russian forces’ performance in Ukraine was deeply flawed across various dimensions, including command and control, combined arms operations, air operations, logistics, and more. While Russian forces have adapted after learning painful lessons, many of their battlefield successes have stemmed from manpower advantages.

Russia would very likely lack a manpower advantage in any hypothetical conflict with NATO. European NATO countries (i.e. every NATO power, with the exception of Canada, Turkey, and the United States) have a combined population of about 512 million; Russia’s total population stands at about 146 million, and its military-aged male population has been wracked by the invasion of Ukraine.

Finally, Russia has historically suffered far more casualties than it has inflicted, at least when fighting Western powers. For instance, during the Winter War invasion of Finland, the Soviet Union likely suffered about 333,000 casualties, or about six times as many casualties as Finnish forces. Similarly, in Ukraine, Russian forces have sustained about 900,000 casualties – likely far more than they have inflicted.

Russia retains its nuclear deterrent and, despite its manifest problems, a formidable conventional military. Yet it is a relatively weak Great Power when compared to the United States, the PRC, or Europe. The Russian economy is fairly small (albeit a significant player in energy markets), and Russian armed forces are no longer clearly a first-rate military power.

Potential European responses

Washington’s current policymaking climate shows growing interest in greater alignment with Moscow, driven partly by shared skepticism toward democracies. Accordingly, given the limited shared values between Brussels and DC, European actors must adopt pragmatic approaches and appeal to U.S. self-interest. Namely, Europe must underscore the continent’s significant economic and financial power and its growing military capabilities.

Some ways to impress an optics-gripped U.S. policymaker include holding a military parade to show martial prowess. This approach has yielded success before, including in 2017 when President Macron hosted President Trump on Bastille Day. Additionally, European powers could publicize defense-related actions (and there are many such examples to draw on, such as a French frigate’s recent shoot-down of a Houthi drone).

Finally, in addition to standard trade measures, Europe might consider retaliating against U.S. social media companies if DC continues to drift towards Moscow. There is a growing backlash against social media, including a growing belief that smartphones – and associated social media applications – are contributing to a host of negative outcomes, including a decline in literacy rates, political polarization, and overall unhappiness. Europe may face growing calls to ban social media platforms anyway, but if Washington pivots to Russia at the expense of Europe, Brussels may apply greater scrutiny to U.S. social media companies.

Choose Europe, not Russia

Even setting aside any consideration of values, Europe is wealthy and powerful; Russia is poor, weak, and firmly tied to the PRC. Turning away from Europe to pursue Russia would severely damage U.S. national interests.

Until next time,

Joe

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.