Geopolitical Disorder in 2026 and Implications for Beijing and Moscow

China-Russia ties unlikely to shift even as U.S. alliances face ruptures; Iran, Venezuela, AI

Bilateral ties between the People’s Republic of China and Russia will likely be marked more by continuity than change in 2026, but both Beijing and Moscow will seek to capitalize on profound geopolitical disruptions that seem very likely to occur this year.

As in 2025, some assumptions about China-Russia relations seem safe to hold. In a continuation of trends seen since the Prigozhin mutiny, Beijing will continue to de-personalize and institutionalize China-Russia relations, in order to hedge against Russian domestic political uncertainty. Accordingly, bilateral political and military ties will likely remain robust no matter who sits atop the power vertical. Finally, PRC-Russian defense industrial base cooperation will remain in place for at least the duration of the war – although Beijing may have obtained Russia’s most valuable technology already, either through voluntary transfer or other means.

On the other hand, developments in Russian domestic politics could inject uncertainty into bilateral ties. A cease fire in Ukraine could, in fact, irritate ties between Beijing and Moscow, if post-war Russia experiences domestic political economy convulsions. If the war winds down, the Russian economy will need to reorient from military to civilian production, which will create winners – and losers. Putin’s ability to buy off losers will be constrained, moreover, by dwindling national wealth reserves and low oil prices, assuming there are no major global oil production outages. Finally, an unsatisfactory political outcome in Ukraine could roil elite and domestic perceptions of Putin, especially if paired with discontent from returning veterans. Still, the Russian economy is faring better than many anticipated and is not yet on the verge of crisis. Putin is an adept manager of Russian domestic politics and will likely continue to rule throughout 2026, but outside analysts, including in China, may pay growing attention to potential succession plans.

Bilateral economic ties will remain robust, although additional frictions will likely emerge as commercial relations become even more tilted in Beijing’s favor. As Russian firms return from a wartime economy they will increasingly compete with Chinese firms, raising questions about how much Chinese economic and technological influence Moscow will tolerate. Indeed, Chinese vehicles trade with Russia will be something to watch closely (and will be a subject of an upcoming analysis), as Moscow began imposing restrictions in 2024. Russia will also have to determine what role Chinese-owned Douyin (Tiktok in the West) and other Chinese technology companies will play in 2026.

Finally, bilateral energy ties will be worth watching, as always. Global oil markets will very likely be oversupplied throughout 2026 – barring major production outages in the Middle East and Latin America. Should oversupply persist, Russia’s export earnings and budget outlook will suffer. If Beijing stops stockpiling Russian crude oil, or if AI markets experience a severe correction, however, then Russian energy export earnings will fall dramatically. While China and Russia are unlikely to ever construct the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, analysts should watch closely to see if and how the two countries expand cooperation in oil and nuclear energy.

Beijing and Moscow’s bilateral ties will likely see more continuity than change in 2026. At the same time, radical changes in geopolitics are possible – and perhaps even likely – and may present more opportunities than risks for the PRC and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Developments in artificial intelligence, Iran, Venezuela, and the fraying of the alliance system traditionally led by the United States will likely make 2026 disorderly, and potentially chaotic.

Beijing is primed to exploit geopolitical disorder in 2026

January 2026 started with a shocking Maduro raid, an unprecedented spat – or rupture – in the alliance system traditionally led by the United States, and is ending with, potentially, another round of U.S. – Iran military confrontation. The rest of the year could prove even more geopolitically tumultuous. The trajectory of artificial intelligence is highly uncertain but could upend geopolitics in 2026. Another great geopolitical uncertainty is the United States’ fraying ties with traditional allies across Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and even North America. China and, to a lesser extent, Russia are primed to translate short-term disorder into enduring geopolitical advantages vis-à-vis the alliance system formerly led by the United States.

Artificial intelligence

Although it will fade in-and-out of the headlines, the development of artificial intelligence (AI) could very well be the single-most important element shaping macroeconomics and geopolitics in 2026 – and, indirectly, China-Russia relations. As with COVID-19 (and vaccines) in 2020 and 2021, AI inescapably “makes the weather” across macroeconomics and geopolitics. Consequently, it’s worth examining potential scenarios for AI development in 2026, and their implications for China and Russia. The below chart (click to see it in a new page) identifies five different scenarios, lists their associated subjective probabilities and consequences, and elaborates on potential implications for global markets, Russia, and the PRC. The range of AI-related outcomes is very, very wide and will impact Beijing and Moscow in starkly different ways.

Source: Author’s research and analysis; visualization by Claude Opus 4.5

Note: Click to open in a new page

Turning to more traditional geopolitical matters, Beijing and Moscow may see more opportunities than risks in 2026. In ascending order of importance, Venezuela, Iran, and fissures in the alliance system traditionally led by the United States will hold major implications for the PRC and Russia. Both powers, especially Beijing, are poised to benefit from any missteps by DC.

Venezuela and Iran

A large-scale, long-duration U.S. military intervention in Venezuela will have relatively modest direct impacts on the PRC and Russia. Both countries are distant from Latin America, which is of modest strategic content. Still, both Beijing and Moscow could secure important benefits if the U.S. intervention is unsuccessful, which seems likely.

The Maduro raid was an undeniable tactical success, but one of little strategic consequence. The Chavista regime remains intact, and Washington’s ability to influence on-the-ground events in Caracas seems predicated on indefinitely maintaining a large U.S. naval presence off the Venezuela coast. Given the highly credible threat from U.S. forces in the Caribbean, the most hardline elements in Venezuela – such as the Interior Minister, Diosdado Cabello – are laying low in what Orlando Perez of the University of North Texas at Dallas terms “elite survival calculus.” The Trump administration, meanwhile, appears to be pinning its hopes on Delcy Rodriguez, believing her to be a relative soft-liner and open to rationalizing oil production and expanding engagement with U.S. oil companies. It is possible, as Imdat Oner of Florida International University posits in a tripartite scenario called “the good, the bad, the ugly,” that the Chavismo regime, led by Delcy Rodriguez, remains in power but boosts oil production. That scenario, while ugly, is not the worst outcome for the United States – or the Venezuelan people.

Still, in Oner’s “bad” scenario, “Cabello manages to bring key parts of the military to his side and openly challenges Delcy’s authority. A coup attempt might occur and a power vacuum emerges.” Will Cabello and other hardliners – including the Cuban security services operating in Venezuela – feel emboldened to challenge Rodriguez and other softliners if (when?) the U.S. carrier strike group and amphibious ready group sail away?

The direct financial costs of maintaining a U.S. presence in the Caribbean are significant but not exorbitant: about $28 million per operating day, according to a CSIS analysis, or about $10 billion per year. That compares to the total DoD budget of about $840 billion. Moreover, the U.S. operation could – potentially – defray costs, if Venezuela boosts oil production (or if the U.S. seizes enough oil barrels, leaving aside the legal ramifications and long-term diplomatic costs). But the most consequential costs of the U.S. intervention are not direct and financial. Rather, the strategic and indirect opportunity costs of a large-scale deployment in a tertiary theater are already impacting U.S. interests in higher-priority theaters such as the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East.

The long-duration, large-scale military intervention in Venezuela is already imposing immense tradeoffs on U.S. military forces: an aircraft carrier cannot be in two places at the same time. Mark Cancian and Chris H. Park of CSIS write perceptively that “The major cost [of the intervention] is the strategic trade-off: Forces in the Caribbean limit assets available for other hotspots, such as the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific.” The transfer of the USS Gerald Ford carrier strike group from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean has constrained the U.S. response to fast-developing protests in Iran, potentially allowing Tehran to viciously repress opposition at a moment of maximum danger for the Khamenei regime.

In response to spiraling prices and broader discontent with the Khamenei regime’s repressive social policies, Iranian citizens staged massive anti-regime protests. The regime responded with brutality. The true number of casualties will likely never be known, but credible estimates suggest that thousands of individuals were murdered by regime forces.

We’ll never know if U.S. forces might have prevented the atrocities, or even intervened on the side of protesters at a moment of peak danger for the regime. That’s because U.S. regional naval forces had been transferred to Venezuela: the USS Gerald Ford carrier strike group moved from the Red Sea to the Caribbean in October 2025.

Let’s be clear: a U.S. carrier strike group might not have proved decisive in responding to the Khamenei regime’s crackdown on protesters, and military intervention should be conducted thoughtfully – especially in the Middle East. Still, the United States’ unique capabilities, including in precision-guided munitions, may have been able to support the protests, or at least caused the Khamenei regime to think more deeply before murdering protesters at an unprecedented scale. But Tehran understood that the U.S. military response would be constrained by a lack of in-theater strike assets. The Venezuelan intervention is already impacting U.S. interests in higher-priority theaters.

The strategic tradeoffs from a long-duration intervention in Venezuela (and in Cuba?) could become more painful over time. In a delayed response to the protests, the U.S. has moved the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group from the South China Sea to the Middle East. While the Middle East undoubtedly needs more U.S. Naval presence, the Indo-Pacific – the primary theater – now only has two carriers in the region (if we classify the USS Tripoli LHA as a “light carrier”). While the PRC is very unlikely to escalate against Taiwan in 2026, in part due to extensive military purges in the PLA, it may be learning that stimulating out-of-theater crises, and drawing U.S. naval forces out of the Indo-Pacific, can be a fruitful tactic ahead of a contingency involving Taiwan.

Another U.S. – Iran conflict, while not necessarily likely, would have momentous impacts on global energy, markets, and politics. Russian energy exports could rise – or surge – in value terms if large-scale oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) production outages occur across Latin America, the Middle East, or both. China, meanwhile, is the world’s largest energy importer and would suffer from large-scale energy outages, all else being equal. Still, China’s total crude oil reserves stand at an unprecedented 1.2 billion barrels, versus about 839 million in all United States reserves for the week of 1/23/26.

Both Beijing and Moscow are taking another potential U.S. intervention in Iran seriously. The Kremlin reported that Putin met in Moscow with the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani on January 30^th; the PRC’s authoritative People’s Daily readout, meanwhile, noted RIA Novosti’s reporting that the meeting was not announced beforehand. Putin’s January 30th meeting with Iran’s top national security official occurred on the heels of Russia-UAE talks the day before.

In a discussion with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Kremlin reported that Putin said “We attach great value to your significant personal contribution to all spheres of the Russia-UAE strategic partnership, which is multifaceted, mutually beneficial and growing dynamically.” Putin also said “Naturally, we are all also closely following developments on the Iranian track.” A People’s Daily article emphasized Putin’s comments in the article’s headline (正密切关注伊朗局势).

How will China and Russia respond? Beijing, the world’s largest oil importer, has an interest in stable oil flows; it also is highly sensitive to protests resulting in so-called “color revolutions.” Beijing will therefore seek to maintain stability but will tilt to the side of the Arab powers in any dispute. (For more: Ryan Hass and Allie Matthias of Brookings have written a helpful analysis, “How is China positioning itself as Iran’s regime teeters?” They note “China has considerable interests in Iran, but those interests are not existential or even critical.” For following China’s Middle East activities, Jonathan Fulton’s China-MENA Newsletter has been helpful.)

Russia is in a complicated position: it would reap short-term economic benefits from a crisis over Iran but would not necessarily benefit from a conflict. Iran is significantly integrated into the Russian defense industrial base, especially with its Shahed drones. At the same time, Russia has extensive commercial ties with the Middle East, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Still, Moscow’s energy export earnings would benefit greatly from widespread oil and gas outages in the Middle East. About 27 percent of global maritime oil trade, 20 percent of world petroleum liquids consumption, and 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas transit the Strait of Hormuz; the overwhelming majority of these shipments are directed to Asian markets. Russian oil and gas exports would therefore become much more desired if Middle East oil and gas exports are disrupted.

Moscow may be ambivalent about a conflict in Iran and may even see more opportunities than risks. Still, it certainly does not want to be seen as fomenting a conflict, given its important defense ties with Iran and commercial relationships with the Gulf States.

In sum, Beijing and Moscow are well-positioned to weather or even exploit an energy supply shock, respectively, whether it occurs in Latin America, the Middle East, or both.

Unprecedented Western fissures

But the greatest opportunity Beijing and Moscow are presented with in 2026 is the potential disintegration of the Western alliance system that has been led by the United States since 1945.

Traditional U.S. allies, from Canada to Denmark and beyond, are recoiling at the vision of American power on display. Washington DC is threatening to absorb the territory of its NATO allies, warning Denmark it could conquer Greenland, while the White House is entertaining conversations with separatists from the Canadian province of Alberta. In response, European NATO members are deploying forces to Greenland, while Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in thinly veiled criticisms of U.S. President Donald Trump at the World Economic Forum, warned that the world order faces a “rupture, not a transition.” Canada, traditionally the United States’ closest ally (and one of the only countries to align its connected vehicle policy with DC’s), later inked a trade agreement with Beijing allowing the import of up to 49,000 electric vehicles from China.

If the United States chooses to forfeit its alliances, Beijing and Moscow will benefit. The U.S. is undoubtedly the world’s greatest power, but its most powerful rival – the People’s Republic of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party – is rapidly closing the gap. By some measures, it already has. Take GDP at purchasing power parity, which roughly approximates a country’s military potential. According to this metric, the PRC is roughly at parity with the U.S. – and would have a slight GDP advantage if Moscow threw its defense industrial base behind Beijing.

U.S. vs PRC + Russian GDP, at Purchasing power parity

Sources: Author’s Calculations, IMF October 2025 WEO, Visualization by Claude Opus 4.5

On the other hand, the U.S. has a clear GDP and defense industrial base advantage over the combined forces of the PRC and Russia if it can draw on its alliances across North America, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. There’s a long history of U.S. and allies scaling up their combined defense industrial bases to overcome great power competitors. In World War II, the U.S. relied on Canadian uranium to power the war effort, including for the Manhattan project. During the Cold War, U.S. – UK collaboration was vital to nuclear submarine cooperation, while the Five Eyes intelligence network of the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand was critical for collecting signals and human intelligence against the Soviet Union and the PRC – as well as projecting power in space. Finally, and more subtly, the U.S. economic and financial alliance with Japan allowed the U.S. to run fiscal deficits, bolstered the U.S. economy and defense complex, and ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s dissolution. With the combined resources of the allied system, or what Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi call “Allied scale,” the United States easily outpaces both the PRC and Russia.

U.S. + NATO/non-NATO allies vs PRC + Russian GDP, at Purchasing power parity

Sources: Author’s Calculations, IMF October 2025 WEO, Visualization by Claude Opus 4.5

Besides their usefulness in scaling the U.S. industrial base, allies have fought – and bled – alongside the U.S. in conflicts for centuries. The Continental Army and Navy were not only able to tap into the scale of France, but the French fleet defeated the British fleet at the Battle of the Chesapeake, helping to seal the decisive victory at Yorktown. The British in World War II preserved a foothold in Europe, paving a way for the ultimate liberation of the continent. To aid the invasion of Normandy, fighters from the nations of occupied Europe, from Belgium, Denmark, France, and beyond – helped sabotage Nazi supply lines, often at profound cost.

Turning to the modern era, about 5,000 Korean soldiers and 500 Australian soldiers died fighting alongside American troops in Vietnam. Of the 3,500 NATO troops that died in the Afghanistan campaign, nearly 1,000 European soldiers gave their lives for the mission. Denmark, a country of under 6 million, suffered 44 deaths in the NATO operation, a higher per-capita casualty rate than the United States itself sustained.

The United States has chosen to lead alliances out of pragmatic self-interest, not out of charity. Even leaving aside normative considerations, the U.S. has reaped huge economic, strategic, and military benefits from its alliances. In order to overcome Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the U.S. leaned on alliances. The need for allied scale is greater than ever, as the U.S. finds itself confronting a much larger power in the People’s Republic of China.

In his December 23, 1981 address to the nation, President Reagan spoke on the Polish Solidarity movement, and the shared destiny of the U.S. and Europe: “When 19th century Polish patriots rose against foreign oppressors, their rallying cry was, “For our freedom and yours.” There is a spirit of solidarity abroad in the world tonight that no physical force can crush.”

The need for a spirit of solidarity between the United States and Europe is greater than ever in 2026. If the United States cannot find ways to work with allies across Europe and beyond, the Chinese Communist Party may reap the benefits.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.