Is Western SIGINT deterring Chinese arms transfers to Russia?
Chinese components are finding their way to Russian military kit, according to Ukraine
China apparently refused to respond to an arms request from Wagner, according to FT’s analysis of the Discord leaks.
Wagner has a hard-to-characterize relationship with the Russian state. There are some rumors that elements within the Russian force structures are trying to undermine Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner Group, by restricting arms shipments to Wagner, purposefully attriting Wagner soldiers, and etc. On the other hand, the Russian government also has a relationship with Wagner, which shares infrastructure with the GRU’s 10th Separate Special Purpose Brigade.
If the information from the Discord leaks is accurate, Moscow likely sought to use Wagner’s quasi-deniability to secure weapons directly from Beijing. It seems reasonable to conclude that Beijing turned down the request largely because of fears of detection – especially due to Russia’s very poor signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.
On the other hand, another, separate item from the Discord leaks – reportedly obtained by extracting information from the SVR, Russia’s premier intelligence service – suggested that the Chinese Central Military Commission approved the transfer of weapons to Russia but wanted the transfers to be disguised under civilian items, according to the Washington Post.
If Beijing approves arms transfers to Russia, it likely won’t take long for Western security services long to discover the trade, due to their apparently extensive insights into Russian force structures. The high probability of detection, and the concomitant risks of sanctions, may be deterring Beijing from supplying Moscow directly with military kit, or at least limiting the amount of assistance.
Even if Beijing doesn’t provide Moscow with direct military assistance, however, it’s still helping to enable the Russian war effort economically, diplomatically, and logistically.
Table of Contents:
Sino-Russian military ties
The Chinese ambassador to France on territorial integrity in the post-FSU
Sino-Russian security cooperation: the view from Moscow
Russian warfighting capabilities
RIC (Russia-India-China)
1. Sino-Russian military ties
Russia says China agreed to secretly provide weapons, leaked documents show – Washington Post
THE DISCORD LEAKS | U.S. eavesdropping reveals that Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service believed it had a deal with Beijing for the provision of ‘lethal aid’
China snubbed Wagner arms request, says US intelligence leak – FT
Classified document suggests Beijing did not respond to Russian paramilitary group’s request for weapons in early 2023
Ukraine says it is finding more Chinese components in Russian weapons – Reuters
Ukrainian forces are finding a growing number of components from China in Russian weapons used in Ukraine, a senior adviser in President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's office told Reuters, as Western supplies are squeezed by sanctions.
In "the weapons recovered from the battlefield we continue to find different electronics," said Vladyslav Vlasiuk, who advises the president's chief of staff on sanctions policy.
According to reports from the defense departments of Russia and Japan on the 18th, two Russian strategic bombers carried out patrol missions in the Far East that day, and Japan then dispatched a jet fighter to respond.
According to a report from the Russian Ministry of Defense, two Tu-95MS bombers carried out patrol missions in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea as part of the military's surprise inspection of the combat readiness of the Pacific Fleet.
The Ministry of Defense of Japan later stated in a statement that a Japanese fighter jet had scrambled off in response to Russian "intelligence gathering" aircraft over the Sea of Japan. The statement also said that from the 17th to the 18th, two Russian destroyers and six patrol boats were observed operating in waters near Hokkaido, Japan.
The day before, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroichi Matsuno lodged a protest against Russia's holding of military exercises near islands disputed by Japan and Russia. Russian President's Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov responded later in the day that the Russian exercise was carried out "in strict accordance with international law" and aimed at dealing with various regional security threats.
Russia-Japan relations have always been plagued by territorial disputes. To the north of Hokkaido, Japan, the four islands of Hamai, Shikotan, Kuniko, and Etoro are called the Four Northern Islands by Japan, and the South Kuril Islands by Russia. These islands belonged to Japan before World War II, and were occupied by the Soviet Union after World War II. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, they were actually controlled by Russia as the successor country. Russia and Japan have continued to dispute over the ownership of these islands, and the two sides have not yet concluded a peace treaty.
According to the order of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Defense Ministry has conducted surprise inspections of the combat readiness of the Pacific Fleet since April 14. According to a report by the TASS news agency on the 17th, the fleet recently conducted anti-submarine exercises in the Sea of Japan.
Qin Gang said that at the Samarkand Summit last year, President Xi Jinping summed up the successful experience of the SCO and reached new important consensus with the leaders of the participating countries on expanding cooperation in various fields, which pointed out the direction for the next development of the SCO. China is willing to strengthen cooperation with other member states, actively implement the three major initiatives proposed by President Xi Jinping, and join hands to build a closer community of shared future.
Zhang Ming said that he will lead the secretariat to earnestly implement the consensus reached by the heads of state and promote greater development of the SCO. He thanked China for its strong support for the work of the Secretariat.
2. The Chinese ambassador to France on territorial integrity in the post-FSU
https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1649790055513202688
Chinese diplomat draws ire from Baltic nations over statehood remarks – Financial Times
Beijing’s ambassador to France questioned legitimacy of countries formerly in the Soviet Union
Comment: I’m not sure if Moscow views this perspective as helpful vis-à-vis Ukraine or (especially) in its long term interests. I haven’t seen an official Russian response yet, although it is the weekend.
Baltics blast China diplomat for questioning sovereignty of ex-Soviet states – Politico Europe
Lu Shaye, China’s ambassador to France, said in an interview on Friday with French television network LCI that former Soviet countries have no “effective status” in international law.
Asked whether Crimea belongs to Ukraine, Lu said that “it depends how you perceive the problem,” arguing that it was historically part of Russia and offered to Ukraine by former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.
Comment: If Lu’s comments reflect Beijing’s official perspective (and it’s not at all certain that they do), there are some straightforward implications for how the PRC perceives the sovereignty of the Baltics (which are members of NATO), the Caucuses, or the Central Asian states. More intriguingly, Lu’s comments, if reflective of official policy, could have implications for Mongolia. Beijing’s “historical” claims are often fairly threadbare, especially in the case of the South China Sea. Mongolia and China have interacted for millennia, the border has shifted several times, and the Yuan dynasty ruled over both countries. Mongolia has significant coal reserves and – much more importantly – solar and wind potential. It could very conceivably be a major (perhaps *the* major) point of tension between Moscow and Beijing, albeit probably not for at least several years. More on this, soon.
3. Sino-Russian security cooperation: the view from Moscow
Third, the visit of Li reconfirmed that China-Russia security cooperation is based not on the balance of power, but on a balance of interests. Traditionally, geopolitical and military cooperation within the international system was defined by the balance of powers between the major participants to such cooperation, more specifically—by the correlation of their military forces. A stronger partner always had the upper hand—this is clearly not the case with the China-Russia security cooperation. There are multiple asymmetries between the two states: For example, in terms of its nuclear missile capacity, Moscow is significantly superior to Beijing, while in conventional naval forces, China has some undeniable advantages over Russia. [Comment: What happens if – when – the PRC’s nuclear capabilities exceed Russia’s?] Such asymmetries, however, do not impede bilateral cooperation, since in each specific dimension of relations the parties seek to find a balance of interests. Russian-Chinese security cooperation emerges as relations between two equal partners capable of successfully levelling numerous specific asymmetries in a more general context of bilateral relations.
Fourth, China-Russia security cooperation, unlike traditional military alliances, is not targeted against the interests of any third countries. This cooperation has its own dynamics and is not hostage to the changing geopolitical environment. It can be assumed that even a potentially significant reduction of tensions between Beijing and Washington or between the Kremlin and the White House would not lead to a parallel decrease in the interest of Russia and China in working with each other. Though, of course, one cannot deny the fact that the presence of common geopolitical opponents leads to further consolidation of the Russian-Chinese partnership, at least in the political and military and security domains.
Fifth, Russian-Chinese security interaction includes a diverse combination of bilateral and multilateral formats. The visit of Li included discussions of multilateral mechanisms (SCO, BRICS) that are supposed to compliment bilateral dimensions of the China-Russia cooperation. Such an extension allows the two sides to demonstrate that they are not trying to forge any kind of a bilateral "axis" in order to divide "spheres of influence" at the expense of their smaller and less powerful neighbors.
4. Russian warfighting capabilities
(Australian) Chief of Air Force Symposium 2023 – Australian Airforce
“[Electronic warfare], ever a secretive area, has been vital ground in the drone campaign, built on a bedrock of E-LINT and an understanding of how the Electro-magnetic spectrum is being used. Undoubtedly Ukraine has been helped by discreet western advice, but it has shown real savvy in becoming an intelligent customer here and is far from a passive recipient.
And what has been revealed to us is that our assessment of Russian EW capability was at the pessimistic end of the range - Russian EW is eminently beatable.”
5. RIC (Russia-India-China)
China on Wednesday sought to downplay India soon overtaking it as the world's most populous nation, saying that it still has a "quality" workforce of close to 900 million people to provide a strong impetus for development.
https://twitter.com/DrIanHall/status/1649153998203789317
GT Voice: India’s population growth could turn into dividend or disaster – Global Times
Moreover, India's protectionist policies have made it difficult for its mass-employment, labor-intensive manufacturing industries to achieve substantial development.
Fundamentally speaking, as India adds 12 million people to the working-age population every year, if it cannot improve the quality of the workforce and create enough jobs, the so-called demographic dividend could become a demographic disaster.
Russia is unable to deliver vital defence supplies it had committed to India's military because of the war in Ukraine, the Indian Air Force (IAF) says.
Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.