PLAN skips or downplays naval exercises with Iran and Russia ahead of potential Gulf conflict?
Moscow backs Tehran symbolically, and possibly materially
A February 20th article in the People’s Daily noted that combined naval exercises between Russia and Iran had concluded. The article omits any mention of Chinese participation in the exercises. This is potentially very significant, as the annual China-Russian-Iran Maritime Security Belt exercises were scheduled for around this time and feature Chinese participation. Let’s be clear: the three sides may still formally hold trilateral drills soon. It remains unclear whether the Russia-Iran bilateral drill that concluded on February 20 constitutes the 8th Maritime Security Belt exercise or not; a formal trilateral exercise may still occur.
Still, if Beijing did, in fact, skip or downplay the exercises, that tells us something important about its willingness to risk ties with Washington or the Arab powers. Conversely, if it does participate in the exercises, either publicly or non-publicly, it will indicate a level of symbolic and potentially material support for Tehran that Washington and Arab capitals should find discomforting. Finally, Russia’s participation in combined naval exercises with Iran should be understood by the Trump administration as yet another indicator of Moscow’s deep hostility. Washington should respond in kind. Due to Moscow’s support for the United States’ military adversary in the Gulf, the Trump administration should tighten sanctions on Russia and deepen military and economic support for Ukraine.
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Trilateral Maritime Security Belt exercises (or not?)
Iran, Russia and China hold their annual Maritime Security Belt trilateral exercises around this time of year. China last skipped these exercises in 2021 amid fallout from the 2020 India-China border skirmishes. If Beijing decides to skip the 2026 exercises – or at least not publicize its role ahead of a potential conflict between Tehran and Washington – that is telling and important.
If Beijing did indeed cancel its participation in the exercises, the decision was undertaken at the last minute. In a February 17th interview with the Russian outlet AIF, Nikolai Patrushev, Assistant to the President and Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board, said “The “Maritime Security Belt 2026” exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, to which Russia, China, and Iran dispatched their ships, also proved to be timely and relevant.”
Patrushev and Iranian outlets named China as a participant in pre-exercise announcements. After the recent exercises started and concluded, however, Chinese authoritative media, Russian official communications, Iranian state media, and independent Russian outlets have all described a bilateral Russia-Iran exercise – not a trilateral drill. No authoritative Chinese, Russian, or Iranian government source appears to confirm Chinese participation in the exercises; RFE/RL also noted that “Beijing does not appear to be involved in the current drills.”
Turning to Russia, Moscow’s participation in the drills constitutes more than just symbolic support for Tehran. Although Russian vessels did exercise with the Iranian Navy in July 2025, in a show of token support for Tehran, the two sides rarely hold bilateral naval exercises. Therefore, Moscow’s decision to go-ahead with bilateral exercises in February 2026 amid potential U.S. strikes against Iran is significant, as it is already complicating U.S. military operational planning. As Tom Shugart and other military experts noted to The War Zone, Russian (and potentially Chinese) ships’ sensors could give Tehran advanced warning of an incoming attack. In a worst-case scenario, Russia’s regional military assets might provide airborne or naval targeting data to Tehran, or provide other signals intelligence.
Conversely, if the Chinese navy has indeed skipped the exercises, it likely indicates that Beijing doesn’t want to be seen supporting Tehran directly ahead of a potential U.S. – Iran confrontation. If, on the other hand, Beijing did participate in exercises, but is attempting to downplay its role, then it may be trying to have its cake and eat it too, as its participation might bolster Iran while preserving deniability. Even Beijing’s non-public participation in the exercises would offer Tehran symbolic and material assistance while limiting the PRC’s exposure to Washington’s wrath.
Punish Moscow, Eye Beijing Warily
The Gulf crisis poses complicated questions for Western interests. On the one hand, the Khamenei regime is tyrannical and dangerous. It has repeatedly attacked U.S. forces via deniable proxies, seeks to acquire nuclear weapons, poses risks to regional stability, and has massacred thousands of peaceful protesters. The Khamenei regime’s demise would be highly constructive for the West, the region, and the Iranian people. At the same time, military intervention in Iran poses considerable strategic, economic, and diplomatic risks. Furthermore, the Trump administration has yet to define its objectives in Iran, nor has it obtained Congressional approval for military action – although the U.S. constitution does provide the executive branch with some maneuver room. Leaving aside the very important question of whether or not the U.S. should escalate in Iran or not, any Chinese and, especially, Russian military presence in the Gulf amid the conflict threatens Western interests. Chinese or Russian participation in naval exercises with Tehran should be understood as a signal of hostility.
If the PLAN did participate in the exercises, or does, then Western security services should consider naming and shaming Beijing. Calling out China-Russian-Iran trilateral exercises that Beijing might wish to conceal would create awkwardness for the PRC’s regional diplomacy and attempt to play all sides. In addition, underlining the PRC’s symbolic or material support for Tehran as U.S. forces are in harm’s way would decrease the probability that Washington seeks unwise strategic accommodations with Beijing in the AI competition or over Taiwan.
Moscow’s recent actions in the Gulf demand consequences. In a worst-case scenario, Russian naval assets may provide important signals intelligence to Iranian forces, which would imperil U.S. airmen, sailors, and soldiers. At minimum, Moscow’s decision to undertake joint exercises is a symbolic show of support for Tehran and will bolster the Khamenei regime’s confidence. It is yet another indication, if any were needed, that Moscow is deeply hostile to the United States. Given Moscow’s support for Tehran, Washington should step up its support for Ukraine, including by providing air defense systems, intelligence support, long-range strike platforms, and more. This support could be decisive, especially since Ukraine may be winning the war of endurance. Let’s be clear: U.S. support for Ukraine is a matter of self-interest. Russia’s defeat in Ukraine would not only benefit Washington’s global strategic interests, including in the Gulf, but would also strengthen the commercial interests of U.S. oil and gas exporters at the expense of their Russian competitors.
Russia, an oil exporter, and China, the world’s largest oil importer, have structurally different interests in an Iran conflict. The West should be attuned to these interests, widen fissures where feasible (while acknowledging that a Reverse Kissinger remains extremely implausible), and respond to Moscow’s hostility with reciprocal measures.
Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.