PRC raises Taiwan Strait amid US visit
The Ukrainian counteroffensive’s slow, hard work continues
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping wrote an unprecedented congratulatory letter to the 15th Straits Forum, with the letter appearing a day ahead of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing. As the Straits Forum was held in mid-July of last year, it’s possible, and perhaps even likely, that the event was moved up to coincide with Blinken’s travel.
The counteroffensive continues to grind on. Russian forces are adjusting their tactics, are well entrenched, and hold an air power advantage. Ukraine’s forces appear to be making some headway, but only slowly and at cost.
Last week, I talked with WSJ about the appearance of Chinese armored vehicles in Chechnya. Beijing very likely didn’t approve the direct export of Tiger vehicles to Russia and was almost certainly unhappy with Kadyrov for publicly flaunting Chinese-made equipment at a military parade. PRC provision of artillery shells to Russia, either directly or via cutouts, is much more deniable, probable, and consequential than the supply of armored vehicles.
Finally, I wrote about Sino-Russian natural gas cooperation for The Diplomat. Liquefied natural gas and Central Asian natural gas are much more probable vectors of Sino-Russian natural gas cooperation than the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline.
I expect to have another update sometime this week. Thanks for reading.
Table of Contents
Potential PRC signaling over Taiwan
Taiwan
The war
The Chinese economy
The Chinese Military
Central Asia
1) Potential PRC signaling over Taiwan
On the occasion of the 15th Straits Forum, I would like to extend my warm congratulations to the convening of the forum, and extend my sincere greetings to the Taiwan compatriots and friends attending the forum!
The Straits Forum is an important platform to promote extensive exchanges between all walks of life on both sides of the Strait and to promote cross-strait non-governmental exchanges and cooperation. Compatriots on both sides of the strait communicate and make friends through the Straits Forum, strengthen friendship, improve well-being, and get closer and closer. It is hoped that the Straits Forum will continue to add vitality to the expansion of cross-strait non-governmental exchanges and the deepening of cross-strait integration and development.
The new journey of Chinese-style modernization has bright prospects. Only when the country is good and the nation is good will the compatriots on both sides of the strait be good. We will, as always, respect, care for and benefit Taiwan compatriots, continue to promote cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation, deepen cross-strait integration and development in various fields, jointly promote Chinese culture, and promote spiritual harmony between cross-strait compatriots. I hope that the compatriots on both sides of the strait will jointly grasp the general trend of history, stick to the righteousness of the nation, make contributions to promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and the great cause of the reunification of the motherland, jointly create the long-term well-being of the Chinese nation, and share the great glory of national rejuvenation!
Xi Jinping
June 17, 2023
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, June 17th
值此第十五届海峡论坛举办之际，我向论坛的召开表示热烈祝贺，向与会台湾同胞和各位朋友致以诚挚问候！
海峡论坛是促进两岸各界广泛交往、推动两岸民间交流合作的重要平台。两岸同胞通过海峡论坛交流交友交心，厚植情谊、增进福祉，越走越近、越走越亲。希望海峡论坛为扩大两岸民间交流、深化两岸融合发展不断增添生机活力。
中国式现代化新征程前景光明，国家好，民族好，两岸同胞才会好。我们将一如既往尊重、关爱、造福台湾同胞，持续促进两岸经济文化交流合作，深化两岸各领域融合发展，共同弘扬中华文化，促进两岸同胞心灵契合。希望两岸同胞共同把握历史大势，坚守民族大义，为推动两岸关系和平发展、推进祖国统一大业作出贡献，共创中华民族绵长福祉，共享民族复兴伟大荣光！
习近平
2023年6月17日
新华社北京6月17日电）
Comment: This was the top article on the PD’s Chinese-language section.
Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Chinese president, sent a congratulatory letter to the 15th Straits Forum on Saturday.
Calling the Straits Forum an important platform for people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to broadly engage in exchanges and promote cooperation, Xi expressed his hope in the letter that the forum will constantly inject vitality into people-to-people exchanges and the integrated development across the Strait.
We will continue to respect, care for and deliver benefits to the Taiwan compatriots, promote cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation, and advance integrated development in various fields, he said.
Xi called for joint efforts to promote the Chinese culture and forge closer bonds.
He called on people from both sides of the Strait to work together to keep pace with the trends of history, safeguard the overall interests of the Chinese nation and contribute to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the cause of national reunification.
The 15th Straits Forum was jointly held by the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, Fujian provincial government and 82 institutions and organizations from across the Strait. The forum's main conference commenced on Saturday in the coastal city of Xiamen.
Comment: This was the top article on the PD’s English-language section. Note the very significant differences in tone and substance between the Chinese and English-language versions.
It’s possible, and perhaps likely, that the PD article and potentially even the Straits Forum itself were timed to coincide with Sec. Blinken’s visit, which has been talked about for weeks. According to GTI’s John Dotson (below), 2022 was the first year that the forum featured the reading of an open letter issued in the name of Xi Jinping. This year’s letter has received much more prominence in authoritative PRC state media. The PRC may be using Sec. Blinken’s visit to underscore the importance of the Taiwan issue.
From July 11-13, the “14th Cross-Strait Forum” (第十四屆海峽論壇) was convened in the city of Xiamen, in China’s Fujian Province. First held in 2009, the Cross-Strait Forum is a yearly conference that serves as a centerpiece of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) calendar of united front outreach events directed at individuals and groups in Taiwan.
As a component of this effort, this year’s forum featured the reading of an open letter issued in the name of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平)—a new step, which possibly portends an increased public focus on Taiwan issues by Xi and other senior figures in the CCP hierarchy as the 20th CCP Party Congress approaches this autumn.
In China, Blinken Faces Clashing Agendas and a Question: Will Xi Show Up? – NYT
There’s much to talk about, but it’s not clear if it will be constructive. Meetings in Beijing will offer clues as to whether the two nations can smooth over tensions.
2) Taiwan
MAC rejects Fujian plan – Taipei Times
The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) yesterday said that Beijing was spouting futile propaganda after Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Huning (王滬寧) unveiled a plan to transform China’s Fujian Province into a showcase zone for “Taiwan’s economic integration into China.”
Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party could play spoiler in the 2024 election – likely to the DPP’s benefit.
Comment: I highly recommend this piece, especially for Russia hands who aren’t familiar with Taiwan. The ROC’s January 2024 election will very likely have implications for Ukraine.
Taiwan’s 2024 Election Campaigns See Early Stumbles – Brian Hioe for The Diplomat
KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih faced an unexpectedly difficult start to his campaign, while the DPP courted controversy with some legislative nominations.
Comment: I also highly recommend this piece.
Wu spoke after Pavel, and though the Czech president left immediately after his speech -- not meeting or speaking with Wu -- their presence at the conference marked the first time a Taiwanese minister and European head of state shared a room together.
3) The war
Russia, Learning From Costly Mistakes, Shifts Battlefield Tactics – NYT
Moscow’s forces remain uneven. But while bracing for a counteroffensive, they have improved discipline, coordination and air support, foreshadowing a changing war.
Ukraine’s Multiple Axes of Attack – War on The Rocks Podcast by Nick Danforth and Michael Kofman
On Monday, Nick Danforth sat down with Mike Kofman to discuss the latest from the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive. In this episode, Mike details the advances of Ukrainian forces to date, as well as their challenges and potential objectives. He also weighs in on the value and limitations of ongoing Western military support and warns against the dangers of excessive and unfounded optimism.
Counteroffensive Is Grueling and Costly, but Promising, Ukraine and U.S. Say – NYT
American and Ukrainian defense officials said the fight to dislodge dug-in Russian forces occupying southeastern Ukraine was expected to be brutal.
Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Begins: Shall the Leopards Break Free? – Jack Watling of RUSI for RUSI
The fighting so far has been tough. Russia’s initial fighting positions constituted fox holes and hand-dug trenches, but behind these were complex minefields of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines, covered by Russian UAVs and artillery. The main defence line, still 15–20 km from Ukrainian positions, has properly dug trenches and concrete-reinforced firing posts, tank obstacles, ground-laid cable to coordinate artillery strikes, and even more mines. Behind that are the reserve fighting positions of the third defence line.
The fighting will likely get tougher. As Ukrainian forces penetrate deeper into the defences, they will come into range of more Russian artillery firing posts. Moreover, their own artillery will be able to deliver fewer counterbattery missions, and the Ukrainian lines of advance will become more predictable, as they must follow the breaches identified in the minefields. As Ukrainian troops push forwards, they will also be covered by fewer air defences, and will likely come under greater attack by the Russian Aerospace Forces and aviation.
Chinese-Built Armored Trucks Make Appearance in Chechnya – WSJ
Ramzan Kadyrov’s video raises questions of whether Chinese equipment will be deployed in Ukraine
Comment: As I noted in this piece, the probability that the PRC is knowingly supplying these armored vehicles to Russia is quite low, as the high probability of detection (and subsequent risk of sanction) does not justify the (very limited) military value of these vehicles. Kadyrov likely procured “Tiger” vehicles from Central Asia or another export market, not China.
PRC provision of artillery shells to Russia, either directly or via cutouts, is much more deniable, probable, and consequential. Thank you to James Areddy and the WSJ team for reaching out, as well as to my colleague Kitsch Liao for bringing me up to speed very quickly on the particulars of this vehicle class.
Chinese air quality and natural gas demand
https://twitter.com/rongxiang/status/1670229295544008706
While it’s too soon to say if the CCP is willing to abide permanently lower air quality, or if rising air pollution is a temporary phenomenon, tolerating more urban pollution would reduce China’s willingness to import natural gas, and diminish its interest in the [Power of Siberia]-2.
China Natural Gas Traders Pause Spot Purchases as Prices Surge – Bloomberg
LNG prices jump by the most in six months to $11.58/mmbtu; China buyers stop inquiries, India companies cancel tenders
Baker Institute China Energy Map (v.2023) – Rice University’s Baker Institute
Comment: I’ve mentioned this to a few folks this week. A very useful resource.
4) The Chinese economy
China Holds Urgent Meetings on Economy With Business Leaders – Bloomberg
Economists, foreign executives asked for ways to grow economy; Tone of meetings described as pressing amid waning confidence
Comment: The level of incompetency in PRC economic policymaking has been astonishing over the past two years. Zero-COVID was manifestly a disastrous policy after effective vaccines were widely available to China, but Beijing’s failure to stop Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, or seriously push for a cease fire, is weighing on Chinese economic growth.
Yet effectively using economic coercion to shape China’s decisionmaking begins with accepting its limitations, of which there are many:
Western leaders would likely be wary of using crippling sanctions until it is too late for them to deter Beijing,
Beijing likely already believes sanctions would be used in a conflict and would therefore have incorporated these costs into its decision to pursue military actions,
the economic implications of any blockade or conflict could be so dire as to make sanctions potentially moot, and
calibrating and coordinating sanctions in response to Chinese activities that fall short of an outright invasion or blockade would be particularly difficult.
5) The Chinese Military
Another key view in Beijing is that Russia is China’s strategic partner. This status was further elevated on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russian President Putin and Xi met in Beijing and signed a joint statement on February 4, 2022. Throughout the war in Ukraine, China’s leaders have reiterated their stance, most recently during visits to Moscow by Xi and by China’s top foreign affairs official Wang Yi in early 2023.5 The two countries are unlikely to ever have a formal mutual-defense treaty, but intensified cooperation in many spheres—including military coordination, intelligence sharing, energy, and trade—will continue and even accelerate. Even before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia was the junior partner in the bilateral relationship, but Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power and coordinating at the United Nations. Most importantly, Beijing has a strategic need to keep Russia from internal turmoil or international setbacks that could result in the rise of a regime that is hostile to China. One of the greatest gifts to Beijing of the Sino-Russian rapprochement that started during the 1990s, and truly took off from the mid-2000s, was a passive 4,200-kilometer border that enabled China to focus military modernization on naval, rather than land, warfare for potential conflict with the United States and Japan over Taiwan, or with India or Vietnam over border and maritime sovereignty disputes, respectively. The fact that Russia had dared to commit an estimated 97 percent of its entire forces to the fight in Ukraine by mid-February 2023 and, thus, baring its far-eastern borders, is a testament to this.
In recent weeks, rampant misinformation has spread online about China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian. In late May, netizens began posting images online that purportedly showed large cracks in the Fujian’s deck. On Twitter, one of these posts racked up nearly one million views, and numerous follow-on tweets have been viewed tens of thousands of times. Even more digital ink was spilled over these claims as news reports began to spread the tweets.
These reports are false. There are no large cracks in the vessel’s deck.
6) Central Asia
The first meeting of the China-Central Asia Political Parties Dialogue was held in Beijing. Leaders of 26 major political parties from the five Central Asian countries attended the meeting and delivered speeches, including the deputy speaker of the lower house of the Kazakhstan parliament, and the deputy speaker of the Kyrgyz parliament.
As Russia and China grow closer, Central Asian leaders don’t have as much leverage—or independence—as they once did.
Comment: Sharp article.
Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.