Putin likely to employ limited coercive diplomacy in coming weeks
Unlikely to severely escalate in Ukraine until after Duma elections
James Sherr of ICDS has written an outstanding and persuasive piece on Putin’s potential aggression in Ukraine. Sherr writes that “a localised escalation, dramatic and devastating, leading to the deployment of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ on the current demarcation line, is probably the most realistic option [for Putin’s next move in Ukraine].”
Zhang Hanhui, the PRC Ambassador to Russia, delivered what appears to be a public – but conditional – declaration of support for Putin’s next moves in Ukraine. The PRC, to the great annoyance of the Putin Collective, has largely abided by the West’s Crimea and Donbas-related sanctions. Will that be the case if the West implements new sanctions?
How will the timing of the Fall Duma elections affect Putin’s military diplomacy? Recent history doesn’t provide much of a guide: Putin’s approval ratings rose sharply in the wake of the 2008 and 2014 invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, respectively, as the Russian military secured quick victories and suffered only minimal losses against relatively weak and disorganized opponents. Ukrainian military capabilities have increased considerably since 2014, however, so Putin may not be able to count on a similar rally-round-the-flag. Putin will surely canvass elite and popular opinion before deciding.
On balance, however, Putin appears unlikely to attempt a major military escalation until after the Duma electoral event in September, given the probability of substantial military casualties and Putin’s pattern of implementing unpopular policies only after politically significant dates (i.e. he instituted the highly unpopular pension reform only after Russia’s 2018 Presidential electoral event). Still, as Sherr writes, a localized escalation in the next few weeks seems likely.
Three factors loom large in Putin’s decision making: Russia’s next Presidential electoral event in 2024, Crimea, and the Russian economy. The Crimean water issue is not yet a crisis for Putin, but it does appear unsustainable, and he likely prefers to resolve the issue well before 2024. If the Russian state cannot ensure basic living conditions in Crimea, protests on the peninsula are extremely likely, which could delegitimize Putin in the eyes of Russian elites and the public.
The Russian economy could present an even graver challenge for Putin over the medium term. The US and Iran have announced indirect talks on returning to their 2015 nuclear deal. If the two sides reach an agreement, Iranian crude export volumes will likely rise, directly reducing Russian export earnings by billions of dollars every year. Perhaps more importantly, a return to the JCPOA could enable a “sanctions swap.” The US may strengthen sanctions against Putin while relaxing them vis-à-vis Iran (and potentially even Venezuela), limiting costs to the United States’ allies. The Kremlin is clearly worried by the possibility of stronger sanctions and lower energy export earnings from a revitalized JCPOA. A future edition of The Report will discuss the Russian economy at greater length.
The next few weeks could prove rocky. Hold fast.
Table of Contents:
1) Ukraine
2) Chinese perspectives on developments in Ukraine
3) China-Russia
4) Authoritarian Political Influence Campaigns
5) Context related to Ukraine
6) Russia
1) Ukraine
Rumours of War: Another Russian Surprise in Ukraine? – James Sherr for ICDS
“Since the signing of Minsk-II, several war scares have erupted, none of them plausible and none of which bore fruit. The latest brandishing of sabres is different. Russia is losing the political initiative, yet it retains formidable military power. The combination of political necessity and military opportunity is never auspicious.
Given these factors, what is least and most likely to happen? Of all possible scenarios, the annexation of Donbas is the least likely…
The launch of full-scale military operations analogous to the Russian combined arms offensives of summer 2014/winter 2015 is less unlikely but still implausible.
A localised escalation, dramatic and devastating, leading to the deployment of Russian ‘peacekeepers’ on the current demarcation line, is probably the most realistic option. [bolded by The Report] In the view of Sergiy Garmash, its aim would be to create a ‘new reality’ and ‘reformat’ dynamics in the region. It would have the merit of preserving existing territorial arrangements, at least outwardly, yet it would allow for the revival of military operations ‘at any moment required by Moscow’. Moreover, it is the one military option that fits observable evidence: the movement of forces from Russia and the mobilisation of local reserves…
Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu’s recent weekend in the taiga with Putin suggests that such an operation might be weeks away or less.”
Comment: This is the best analysis on recent developments Ukraine that I’ve read. I recommend reading it in its entirety. Sherr’s concern is highly noteworthy: he is not only one of the best analysts on Russia foreign policy but has also been consistently skeptical, until now, of Putin’s desire to escalate in the Donbas.
Russia's Military Buildup Near Ukraine Is an Intimidation Tactic – Michael Kofman for Moscow Times
“These actions do not appear to be regular exercises, nor are they necessarily a prelude to an offensive. The activity is exemplary of coercive diplomacy, a Russian effort to use hard military power in an effort to pressure Ukraine politically, and equally signal to Ukraine’s partners in the West.”
Biden holds first call with Ukraine's Zelensky as Russia tensions escalate – Axios
“What they're saying: The White House said Biden "affirmed the United States’ unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of Russia’s ongoing aggression," and that the two leaders discussed the importance of anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine.
Behind the scenes: "The Ukrainian side is very pleased with the call and sincerely believe President Biden prioritizes restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its Western integration," a source close to Zelensky told Axios' Jonathan Swan.”
Ukrainian politicians won’t get away with what they do in Donbass, says Russian lawmaker – TASS
Ukraine’s leaders have gone too far in their rhetoric about the conflict in Donbass, which is fraught with grave consequences, and they won’t get away with their actions in Donbass, speaker of the Russian State Duma lower parliament house, Vyacheslav Volodin, said on Sunday.
Kiev to view Europe’s stance as carte blanche for military operation in Donbass – senator – TASS
Kiev will consider Europe’s silent position as carte blanche for a military operation in Donbass and restoring territorial integrity by force, Deputy Speaker of the Russian Federation Council (upper house of parliament) Konstantin Kosachev said on Sunday, commenting on a joint statement by the top French and German diplomats on Donbass.
‘Disgraceful’: Diplomat blasts Europe for ignoring segregation policy in Baltics, Ukraine – TASS
“European countries look the other way when it comes to the disgraceful policy of outright segregation pursued by the Baltic states and Ukraine, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin told TASS on Friday.
"Undoubtedly, we had no choice but to draw the attention of the [UN Human Rights] Council [at the 46th session] to this inadmissible situation in the 21st century when European countries that had suffered from the ideology of fascism are turning a blind eye to the disgraceful policy of outright segregation based on the principle of ethnic and religious affiliation pursued by the Baltic states and Ukraine," the senior Russian diplomat pointed out.
Russia jointly with the states that are parties to the Non-Aligned Movement raised before the UN Human Rights Council the pressing issue of the illegitimate nature and the negative effect of unilateral coercive measures, including in the context of Ukraine’s water blockade of Crimea, on human rights, he stressed.”
US President Joe Biden, during his first telephone conversation with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy, supported Kiev's steps towards NATO membership. This was announced on Friday, April 2, at the office of the Ukrainian president following a telephone conversation between the leaders.
"Joe Biden expressed support for Ukraine's progress in gaining NATO membership," the statement said.
Comment: The most charitable reading of this article’s headline and contents suggests that Izvestia mistranslated the substance of the call.
Could Putin invade the Baltics next? – Leon Aron for The New European
Should Putin want to launch another short, victorious war, there is no shortage of potential targets. At least five neighboring countries are obvious candidates. Three of them – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – are the sites of “frozen conflicts” that can be easily thawed by Russian troops or their proxies inside those countries or on their borders. Another, Belarus, is half of a formal “Union State” with Russia.
2) Chinese perspectives on recent developments in Ukraine
中国共产党始终代表中国最广大人民根本利益…中国共产党的领导是实现中华民族伟大复兴的根本保证… 但近百年历史证明，坚持中国共产党的领导，中国人民就能形成强大合力，战胜各种挑战，开辟新的天地，走向光辉未来。
中国共产党的百年历史也是中俄关系历经无数考验和磨炼、逐渐成熟并步入新时代的发展史。今年不光是中国共产党建党100周年，也是《中俄睦邻友好合作条约》签署20周年。双方已商定将条约延期，并赋予其新的时代内涵。这是中俄关系的里程碑，更是新起点。作为世界上互信程度最高、协作水平最高、战略价值最高的一对大国关系，团结如山的“中俄组合”不仅为两国民众带来巨大福祉,也始终是世界和平稳定的中流砥柱。我们坚信，在两国元首的战略擘画和引领下，新时代中俄全面战略协作伙伴关系内涵会越来越丰富,根基会越来越深厚,前景将越来越广阔，也将为两国各自发展振兴和世界繁荣安宁作出更大贡献！
The Communist Party of China has always represented the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people... The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the fundamental guarantee for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation... However, nearly a hundred years of history have proved that by adhering to the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese people can form a strong joint force, overcome various challenges, open up new horizons, and move toward a glorious future.
The 100-year history of the Communist Party of China is also the history of the development of Sino-Russian relations that have gone through numerous trials and trials, gradually matured and entered a new era. This year is not only the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, but also the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. The two parties have agreed to extend the treaty and give it new era connotations. This is a milestone in Sino-Russian relations and a new starting point. As the relationship between a pair of major powers with the highest degree of mutual trust, the highest level of cooperation, and the highest strategic value in the world, the united "China-Russia combination" not only brings great benefits to the people of the two countries, but also remains the mainstay of world peace and stability. We firmly believe that under the strategic planning and guidance of the two heads of state [bolded by The Report], the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation in the new era will become more and more enriched, the foundation will become deeper and deeper, and the prospects will become broader and broader, make greater contributions to their respective development and revitalization and world prosperity and tranquility!
Comment: Zhang appears to be delivering a public but conditional expression of support for Putin’s next steps in Ukraine: while he praises the heads of state, his speech notably doesn’t mention Putin by name and doesn’t commit the PRC to any course of action. It’s noteworthy that Zhang only begins to address Russia-related topics after spending four paragraphs extolling the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
Zhang appears to be suggesting that the CCP’s bottom line is to advance the interests of the CCP (which is, according to Zhang, the fundamental guarantee for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation).
According to Xinhua News Agency, Moscow, April 1st, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Peskov said on April 1 that the military forces of NATO countries and other forces are becoming more active in the border areas of Russia, which forces Russia to remain vigilant. Russia is taking necessary measures to ensure its border security.
According to the TASS news agency, Peskov made the above remarks when answering to the media a question from Russia on the reasons for the increase in troops in the border areas between Russia and Ukraine. He said that the Russian side mobilizes troops in its own territory according to its own decision, and does not pose a threat to anyone, and no one should be worried about it.
据新华社莫斯科4月1日电 俄罗斯总统新闻秘书佩斯科夫4月1日说，北约国家及其他势力的军事力量在俄边境地区正变得更为活跃，这迫使俄方保持警惕。俄罗斯正采取必要措施确保本国边境安全。
据塔斯社消息，佩斯科夫在向媒体回答俄方向俄罗斯乌克兰两国边境地区增兵原因的提问时作出上述表示。他说，俄方根据自己的决定在本国境内调动军队，不对任何人构成威胁，也不应该有谁对此感到担心。
3) China-Russia
China-Russia economic and trade cooperation progresses steadily – People’s Daily [Chinese-language]
“Statistics show that the bilateral trade volume between China and Russia has exceeded 100 billion U.S. dollars for three consecutive years, and China has become Russia's largest trading partner for 11 consecutive years…
In December 2020, the middle section of the Sino-Russian East Route Natural Gas Pipeline [Power of Siberia] was put into operation. China's Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region uses clean natural gas from Russia for heating. In the whole year of last year, Russia transported 4.1 billion cubic meters of gas [0.4 Bcf/d] to China through the Eastern Natural Gas Pipeline…
The Russian coal export market has also shifted eastward in recent years. In 2020, Russia will export 122 million tons of coal to the Asia-Pacific region…
In 2020, Chinese-made smartphones will rank first in sales in the Russian market, and exports of other Chinese electronic products to Russia have also achieved rapid growth. The exports of notebook computers and tablet computers have increased by 39% and 29% respectively…
According to data from the Ministry of Commerce of China, the trade volume of agricultural products between the two countries reached US$5.55 billion in 2020, a record high. Among them, China’s imports were US$4.09 billion, an increase of 13.7%. China has risen to become Russia’s largest export market for agricultural products and meat.”
Q: What do you think are entailed in the essence of the new era in terms of China-Russia relations?
A: The treaty was a significant landmark in Russia-China relations. To understand its importance one just needs to compare Russia-West and Russia-China relations. The Russia-West border is getting more and more militarized while the Russia-China border is getting less and less militarized. We have no territorial disputes and our trade and political relations are moving forward. We may need to rethink the treaty in the future due to the fact that Sino-Russian relations are getting closer to alliance relations. This alliance may be flexible; however, the quality of relations now is different than we had even 10 years ago. And this new quality needs a reflection in the legal framework of our relations.
Q: Both China and Russia stress partnership rather than an alliance, but both do face real security threats from the US-led West. How can China and Russia cooperate in providing mutual security support?
A: Sino-Russian relations are still not an alliance, but they are more than partnership. Both sides should carefully work on the parameters of new relations to address common security challenges. I would not exclude the alliance in the future, especially if the pressure from the West is growing up.
China – Russia Bilateral Cooperation in Africa – RIAC
“Nevertheless, the joint report provides convincing evidence that Russia and China have taken close and even coinciding stances on the fundamental issues of global politics. There are no irreconcilable differences between the two countries. Moreover, they do not even have significant differences in their respective visions of the African continent, or in how they perceive the risks and opportunities involved in interacting with African partners. It would be no exaggeration to say that Russia and China do not compete for influence in Africa, but, on the contrary, they are capable of complementing each other.”
“In the Arctic, Russia and China’s interests are converging around resource extraction projects, the expansion of the Northern Sea Route, and the enhancement of operational awareness and security cooperation. The increasing synergy in the Arctic will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: First, Beijing is working with Moscow to improve its military capabilities. Second, Russia is increasing its economic reliance on China in the Arctic in ways that may raise Moscow’s willingness to back Beijing’s priorities in other regions and on other issues to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Beijing.”
4) Authoritarian Political Interference Campaigns
‘Children in cages’: America’s border crisis on its doorstep – People’s Daily
“In concrete jungles, the gleaming windows of a skyscraper can give the building a sense of superficial fancifulness, but they also create a perilous trap: their brightness results in nearly a billion birds being killed every year in the U.S. alone. Likewise, the Beacon of Light, with its mirage of false hope, has attracted tens of thousands of unaccompanied children (UACs) to its borders. Little did those kids know that what awaited them was a waking nightmare - detention in a cramped camp-like location, sleeping on mats under foil blankets, and separation from their parents - a traumatic and disturbing scene to behold.”
Comment: Stimulating the Syrian refuge crisis was a hugely important, albeit underestimated, vector in Putin’s 2016 interference campaigns targeting Brexit and the US Presidential election. Issues surrounding refugees are among the most polarizing of issues and it is very noteworthy that both Putinist *and* PRC propaganda organs are amplifying this content.
Social collapse in Syria will trigger a large refugee wave to EU, warns Moscow – TASS
“A social and economic meltdown in Syria will lead to irreversible ramifications and a new wave of refugees heading towards the EU in particular, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said Tuesday when speaking at the ministerial part of the international donor conference on Syria held online between March 29 and 30.”
Syria can collapse if conflict stays frozen, Russian top diplomat says – TASS
"It is fraught with a collapse of the country, which would be particularly tragic not just because of the Kurdish factor that will immediately acquire regional dimension. There could be unpredictable consequences. Therefore, we are making every effort to avoid it. But I agree with you that it does look like a frozen conflict," he said when asked about the state of the conflict in Syria.
US’s political correctness taken to absurdity not to end well, says Lavrov – TASS
“"Probably, everyone wants to get rid of racism, and we never doubted that. We were the pioneers of the movement for equal rights of people of any skin color. But there is a risk of reaching the other extremity, what we observed during the BLM events and the aggression displayed against white people, white US citizens," he noted. Lavrov noted that the US seeks to spread this approach across the entire world… "They have colossal capabilities for that," he added.”
5) Context related to Ukraine
“In the Russian view, force must be used cheaply, deniably when necessary, and with emphasis placed on retaining agility, which requires holding the bulk of its forces in reserve. Military objectives are emergent, subjugated to a political and diplomatic strategy, and force is meant for coercion rather than conquest. This approach stems from a healthy fear of commitment that could result in overextension, quagmires, and offer opportunities for opponents to counter. It is driven by a cognizance of Russia’s limits in terms of economic and human resources, together with a recognition that opposition in the international system could be substantial, namely the United States and its network of allies.”
“All cases of the Russian use of force since 2014 share a fundamental similarity: Moscow deployed its military in order to achieve a policy goal. Tactical military objectives were driven by the policy mission; put differently, there have been no purely military goals. Russia’s use of force is thus best understood as a means of coercion…
First, and most importantly, the use of force has come after other non-kinetic means have been tried and are seen to have failed. Put differently, the use of force is a last resort. Russia tries to achieve its objectives using diplomacy, economic pressure, threats, etc., and only when it still has not succeeded does it resort to the military tool. In the six months before the invasion of Crimea, Moscow threatened and then implemented economic sanctions (July-September 2013), offered a whopping $15 billion in economic assistance (December 2013), and engaged in diplomacy with the West (the February 21, 2014 agreement) prior to using the military. In Syria, Moscow had engaged in extensive diplomatic outreach, conducted arms transfers, and even attempted to organize the opposition before concluding that the only means of getting a settlement on its terms was to use the military to change the balance. A key implication is that we should see Moscow’s failures to get what it wants as warning signs for potential use of force….
[Moscow] only has intervened when the stakes are perceived to be high relative to other regional or global crises.
Comment: Defense Minister Shoigu is believed to have opposed the 2014 military interventions in Crimea and the Donbas. It’s unclear if the Russian military apparatus will be enthusiastic at the prospect of facing a much more capable Ukrainian military in 2021.
Ukraine's deadliest day: The battle of Ilovaisk, August 2014 – BBC
“Hundreds of soldiers died as the Ukrainian army and volunteers retreated in a column from the eastern town of Ilovaisk on 29 August 2014. Ukrainian veterans are adamant the Russian army was there, even though Moscow has always denied claims that regular Russian forces took part in the battle.”
Comment: Per Sherr’s argument, which I find highly convincing, Putin likely seeks a repeat of Ilovaisk, when Russian conventional forces inflicted a severe and politically significant defeat on the Ukrainian military but were able to immediately de-escalate. Putin likely would have even less deniability this go-round, however.
Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine – Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer for RAND
“In August 2014, the situation became critical for the separatists, as the territory under their control shrank and Ukraine edged closer to regaining control of the border and encircling them completely. A wedge was being driven between Donetsk and Luhansk, threatening to separate the two putative breakaway republics. On August 24, Russia abandoned an effort to mix in conventional weaponry, such as tanks and air defense, in support of the separatist forces. Instead, it switched to conventional operations, invading with perhaps 4,000 regular troops (accurate figures are unavailable) and defeating Ukraine’s military at the Battle of Ilovaisk.”
“Russia now intervened decisively. Up to 6,500 Russian troops, organized into battalion tactical groups, invaded Donetsk oblast. They decimated a large Ukrainian force at Ilovaisk, southeast of Donetsk; Ukraine lost several hundred soldiers and many of its armoured vehicles. The ATO [Anti-Terrorist Operation] never recovered from this shattering reversal. DNR [Donetsk People’s Republic] and LNR [Luhansk People’s Republic] units, again supported by regular Russian forces, regained much of the lost territory in subsequent days. Poroshenko felt impelled to seek an immediate ceasefire.
Yet the humiliation of Ilovaisk ended Poroshenko’s hopes of setting the terms of a political settlement. With his administration reeling, three clauses were inserted into Minsk-1 at Russia’s insistence, calling for: (1) the adoption of a ‘law on special status’ that would temporarily decentralize power to occupied Donbas; (2) on this basis, the holding of local elections; and (3) ‘an inclusive nationwide dialogue’. These provisions stopped short of constitutional change but did recast the debate: ‘The political clauses of Poroshenko’s peace plan envisioned that the abnormal situation in Donbas be rapidly brought back to normal. Minsk-1 provided that the existing abnormal situation be regulated and prolonged, albeit temporarily.’ Instead of being dissolved, the DNR and LNR would now be elements of a future political settlement.”
Russians and Ukrainians Turn Sour on Each Other – Poll – Moscow Times [Feb 2020]
“The latest survey showed 42% of Russians having a “good” or “very good” opinion of Ukraine; while 49% of Ukrainians had a “good” or “very good” opinion of Russia, a double-digit drop from the last poll, conducted in September 2019. The last study had shown that 56% of Russian respondents had positive opinions of Ukraine, while 54% of Ukrainian respondents had positive opinions of Russia…
The share of Russian respondents who viewed Ukraine negatively rose from 31% in September to 47% in the latest poll. The share of Ukrainian respondents who viewed Russia negatively increased from 34% in September to 39%.”
Comment: It’s important to separate trend-vs-level analysis. Despite the negative trend, in Feb 2020 about 42% of Russians had a good or very good opinion of Ukraine. Military tensions with a relatively popular neighbor could unsettle Russian domestic opinion, and quickly.
6) Russia
Russia’s Weak Strongman – Timothy Frye for Foreign Affairs
“More important, Russian politics follow patterns common to a subset of authoritarian regimes that political scientists call “personalist autocracies.” Studying this type of system, rather than studying the man himself, is the best way to understand Putin’s Russia.
Without strong formal institutions to legitimate his rule, Putin relies on great personal popularity to deter challenges from elites and keep protesters off the street…
Since 2018 [eds note: amid pension reforms], Putin’s popularity has wavered. His approval ratings remain in the mid-60s, but Russians express far less trust in him than they have in the past. In a November 2017 poll, when asked to name five politicians they trusted, 59 percent of respondents named Putin; in February 2021, just 32 percent did so. During the same interval, support for a fifth Putin term fell from 70 percent to 48 percent, with 41 percent of Russians surveyed now saying that they would prefer he step down….”
Russia’s Excess Death Toll Hits 422K – Moscow Times
Russia recorded almost 30,000 excess deaths during February, the country’s statistics agency announced Friday — a figure which takes Russia’s total excess fatality count since the start of the coronavirus pandemic above 422,000.
Comment: Down from ~56,000 excess deaths in January. Russia’s COVID case numbers have risen in recent weeks, likely due to more infectious strains becoming more prevalent.
Until next time,
Joe Webster
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.