Putin potentially seeking de-escalation pathways, in his own way
Gerasimov dodges attack, apparently
Putin may have found his scapegoat. With the invasion of Ukraine going poorly across nearly every possible dimension, there are credible rumors that Putin appointed the chief of the Russian general staff, Valery Gerasimov, to personally oversee Russia’s invasion efforts.
Dr. Eliot Cohen shared a very perceptive thread (which I strongly recommend reading in its entirety) into Putin’s potential thinking on the appointment.
Cohen is speculating, of course. As he notes, there is not even any confirmation that Gerasimov has indeed been sent to the frontline. Still, Cohen’s thesis is highly plausible and aligns with Putin’s historical patterns. Vladimir Putin is generally not a risk taker (with, obviously, some very important exceptions), flees failures and assigns blame to others, is a masterful and ruthless operator within Sistema, and prizes domestic political considerations.
As Cohen implies, it is entirely plausible that Putin will appoint Gerasimov, watch him fail to execute a nearly impossible task, publicize some corrupt act by the General, arrest the now-scapegoat Gerasimov, blame his erstwhile Chief of General Staff for the war’s shortcomings, and draw down fighting after some interval of time. If Putin creates a scapegoat he may signal an intent to de-escalate.
Besides Gerasimov’s appointment, there are other, structural reasons to believe that Putin seeks an exit. The Russian military is facing severe manpower and equipment shortages while the Russian economy is contracting rapidly – perhaps by over 12.4% in 2022. Moreover, sanctions and China’s COVID lockdowns are severely disrupting Russia’s supply chains, threatening its monotowns and constraining its ability to replenish military material. If Putin is receiving accurate information (which is not a certainty) he will likely be alarmed at the war’s potential effects on domestic politics. The end of the war may not yet be in sight (and some level of fighting could grind on for weeks, months, or even years) but Putin may be concretely seeking de-escalation pathways.
Of course, Valery Gerasimov needs to stay alive long enough for Putin to make him a scapegoat. There are credible reports that, astonishingly, the newly-appointed commander has come under attack in Ukraine only days after entering the country. Initial reports suggest that Gerasimov has been lightly wounded, although nothing - not even Gerasimov’s status as new commander in Ukraine - is verified, as of yet. Take everything with a grain of salt.
Russian history, unsurprisingly, provides some precedent for Putin if he seeks to employ Gerasimov as a scapegoat: Stalin blamed his generals for the Soviet Army’s disastrous performance against the Nazis’ Operation Barbarossa in 1941, purging General Dmitry Pavlov and other high-ranking Soviet officers. For the Russia hands/academics: are you aware of a good (English-language) source on the 1941 Red Army Purge? If so, please send me a note: editor@ChinaRussiaReport.com
The Report may publish an update during the week, depending on developments. Today’s edition is relatively short, despite the number of sections. Thank you for reading.
Table of Contents:
1. Russian military performance
2. Central Asia/Eurasia
3. China-Russia Defense/Security/Space Ties
4. China-Russia Energy Ties; EU Energy
5. China-Russia Political Ties
6. Taiwan: wind resources, energy resiliency, Sweden, UK
7. Chinese Economy, Lockdowns, Sanctions
8. Worth Your Time
1. Russian military performance
Russia’s army is in a woeful state – The Economist
“It was a big lift for us to get 50,000 people in the field,” recalled Admiral Foggo recently. “How did they do [massive exercises at Vostok]?” The answer, he eventually realised, was that they did not do it. A company of troops (150 at most) at Vostok was counted as a battalion or even a regiment (closer to 1,000). Single warships were passed off as whole squadrons. This chicanery might have been a warning sign that not everything was as it seemed in the Russian armed forces, even before they got bogged down in the suburbs of Kyiv.
China Sent Uninvited Spy Ship to Russian Vostok 2018 Exercise Alongside Troops, Tanks – USNI [2018]
Russia recently concluded the 2018 edition of the massive Vostok exercise series that included Chinese forces for the first time. At Moscow’s invitation, Beijing sent People’s Liberation Army soldiers, helicopters, tanks – and one uninvited Chinese surveillance ship.
A PLA Navy Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) shadowed Russian Navy assets for the length of the at-sea portion of the exercise while Chinese and Mongolian troops exercised ashore, a U.S. official confirmed to USNI News.
Comment: Despite their up-close encounters with Russian forces in Vostok and elsewhere, Chinese military intelligence still (apparently) failed to anticipate many of the Russian military’s eventual challenges in Ukraine.
But Moscow's problems go beyond the sheer number of tanks it has lost. Experts say battlefield images show Russian tanks are suffering from a defect that Western militaries have known about for decades and refer to as the "jack-in-the-box effect." Moscow, they say, should have seen the problem coming.
While far larger than the Ukrainians, the Russian forces are seen by Western and Ukrainian officials as demoralized and increasingly depleted following Moscow’s failed attempt at a quick victory after it invaded. In addition to mounting casualty figures, Russia has already deployed large parts of its military arsenal, including some of its most modern equipment, and has fired vast amounts of its rockets, artillery shells, and missiles.
2. Central Asia/Eurasia
Ukraine War A New Test For Chinese Power Across Eurasia – Reid Standish for RFE/RL
For Beijing, both crises have proved to be revealing tests about the scope and limits of Chinese foreign policy, particularly across Eurasia, where the SCO has been one of China’s main vehicles for engaging with Central and South Asia.
…
“In general, the war in Ukraine has deeply disappointed the Chinese and also largely derailed their goals for the SCO,” Haiyun Ma, a professor at Frostburg State University in Maryland who studies Beijing's relations with countries in Central and South Asia, told RFE/RL.
Relations with China strategically important: Azerbaijani president – People’s Daily
Azerbaijan-China relations are strategically important and have a lot of potential, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said [in Baku] Friday.
"I am very glad that the relations are developing very successfully," Aliyev said when answering a question about the cooperation between Azerbaijan and China during an international conference themed "South Caucasus: Development and Cooperation."
Highlighting the cooperation in the field of transportation and transit, he said Azerbaijan "already started to receive cargo from China, but not in big volumes because we clearly understand that China has the diversified supply routes through different sources. And we just tried to make our route more attractive."
"But recently we got several messages from Chinese companies that they want to increase the transportation of cargoes through the Middle Corridor," said the president. [Bolded by The Report]
Comment: Transportation of cargoes through the Middle Corridor would diminish trade transit through Russia, particularly if sustained over the medium or long-term. The PD’s publication of this interview is therefore notable. Also, Aliyev’s formulation that we “got” several messages seems rather informal, although there may be a translation issue.
3. China-Russia Defense/Security/Space Ties
Russian space chief to discuss cooperation on Moon with China by end of May – TASS
Last March, Dmitry Rogozin and head of the CNSA Zhang Kejian signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation in the creation of the international lunar station
4. China-Russia Energy Ties; EU Energy
A drop in Chinese photovoltaic firms may be a temporary blip, or it may signal that the industry is petering out. Meanwhile, China is building nuclear power plants and maximizing its use of coal, its only fossil fuel resource.
Comment: This could pressure Russian commodity exports. Much more to come on that topic in future editions.
In effect, the EU is proposing to cut around 100 bcm from its total its total gas consumption this year, and, though this is not stated explicitly, most or even all of this reduction would come from Russia. That amounts to more than a quarter of its 2021 consumption of 379.9 bcm in 2021 and more than two-thirds of the 145 bcm that the EU imported from Russia in 2021.
But just how this is to be achieved has yet to be determined, with the EU’s statement simply saying: “The Commission proposes to work with Member States to identify the most suitable projects to meet these objectives, building on the extensive work done already on national Recovery and Resilience Plans.”
Our own assessment is that the EU, if it pushes very hard indeed, may be able to replace some 75 bcm of Russian gas this year, with about half of it coming from a combination of around 30 bcm of increased liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and 8 bcm of pipeline gas and the other half coming from reduced demand and additional wind and solar capacity replacing some gas-fired generating capacity.
5. China-Russia Political Ties
U.S. should return to rational, pragmatic policy toward China – People’s Daily
Washington’s actions on the Ukraine crisis have proven that creating confrontation is the essence of the current U.S. policy toward China, according to Diao Daming, a research fellow with the National Academy of Development and Strategy, Renmin University of China.
“By using the Russia-Ukraine conflict to create division in the world, the U.S. attempts to cast China as a ‘common threat’ to the West so as to enlist its allies in confrontation with China at minimal cost, thus maintaining its hegemony and interests,” said Diao.
Falsehoods Spread by the U.S. on the Ukraine Issue: A Reality Check – People’s Daily
For some time, the United States and some other countries as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been spreading disinformation about China's stance on the Ukraine situation, and making groundless accusations to attack and smear China. The falsehoods, confusing right with wrong are an attempt to mislead the world. China's position on the Ukraine issue is above board, objective and fair.
6. Taiwan: wind resources, energy resiliency, Sweden, UK
Taiwan’s ‘biggest offshore wind farm’ generates its first power – CNBC
A large-scale offshore wind farm in waters off the coast of Taiwan has produced its first power, with those involved in the project describing the news as a “major milestone.”
In a statement Thursday, Danish energy firm Orsted said the first power at the Greater Changhua 1 & 2a facility was delivered on schedule following the installation of its initial set of wind turbines.
Ørsted kicks off offshore installation of Greater Changhua 1 & 2a Offshore Wind Farms
With all the permits and EIA approvals in place, Global offshore wind leader Ørsted is moving full speed ahead with full-scale offshore construction activities of the 900 MW Greater Changhua 1 & 2a Offshore Wind Farms. Ørsted will begin laying export and array cables and installing the offshore substations and foundations in 2021 and will proceed with wind turbine installation next year.
Located 35-60 km off the coast of Changhua County, the first large-scale and farshore offshore wind farms in Taiwan is scheduled to be finalized by 2022 and will provide clean energy to one million households.
Comment: Using a standard benchmark (i.e. that a 12 MW wind turbine can power 16,000 homes), for back-of-the-envelope calculations, this project could provide electricity for ~1.2 million homes in the ROC, although there are obviously many, many variables at play. Note that the Greater Changhua Wind Farms are to the west of the island, between the ROC and the PRC.
Global Wind Atlas – [Comment: The Wind and Solar Atlases are Useful for Understanding Renewables Resources, and Offshore Wind]
Comment: Navalists/military/security folks: note that Taiwan’s most economic wind resources are to the west of the island, in the Strait, and located near population centers. I’ll have more to say about the security implications of the ROC’s wind resources, soon.
Sweden votes to change name of Taipei office – Taipei Times
CROSS-PARTY SUPPORT: Following a visit of Swedish lawmakers this month, the Riksdag showed further backing for Taiwan in a call for a ‘House of Sweden’
US holds high-level talks with UK over China threat to Taiwan – FT
7. Chinese Economy, Lockdowns, Sanctions
The Only Five Paths China’s Economy Can Follow – Michael Pettis for Carnegie Endowment
There is increasingly a consensus in Beijing that China’s excessive reliance on surging debt in recent years has made the country’s growth model unsustainable. Aside from the economy’s current path, there are only four other paths China can follow, each with its own requirements and constraints.
The China cushion has deflated — Q&A with Stephen Roach – SupChina
So I argued that the world without China, in the post GFC period, would’ve been a world that was flirting with a possibility of lapsing back into global recession. The resilience of China, or the China cushion as I called it in my latest Project Syndicate piece, the China cushion was the only thing that stood between a weak post GFC recovery and a relapse back into global recession during that earlier period.
Fast forward to today, the cushion has no air in it. I mean, China’s growing at well below the post GFC pace, if it’s growing at all and you show me another source of resilience.
Inside China’s Zero-Covid Fortress, Xi Admits No Doubts – NY Times
As the lockdown of Shanghai and outbreaks in Beijing and elsewhere batter the economy, China’s leader keeps a distance from the politically charged issue.
As Beijing tightens COVID curbs, hard-hit Shanghai sees signs of life – Reuters
Beijing COVID outbreak enters 10th day; Shanghai reports 2nd day of zero cases outside quarantine areas; Shanghai starts to loosen curbs for some areas
China meets banks to discuss protecting assets from US sanctions – FT
Officials concerned that measures taken against Moscow could also be applied to Beijing
Few Western observers know China better than Joerg Wuttke. The president of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China has been living in Beijing for more than thirty years. Today, Wuttke is concerned. The 25-million metropolis of Shanghai has been in lockdown for a month, and China’s economy is suffering an enormous slump. “The supply chains are so interlinked that lockdown measures in one place have ripple effects on other regions,” he says.
Comment: Wuttke says Chinese GDP growth will fall below 4% this year amid rolling lockdowns through the Party Congress.
8. Worth Your Time
The records of their post–Cold War contemporaries can shed light on the nature of the most trodden pathways. Recent history suggests that older, longtime personalist authoritarians usually die in office and democracy is unlikely to follow. The regime they govern typically survives their departure or is succeeded by a new authoritarian regime, and while their prospects (in the near term at least) for democratization are generally dim, repression may ease for a time. Such longtime leaders have proven to be masters of the uncertain authoritarian political landscape, surviving in power despite constant threats to their rule. As such, the environments they leave in their wake are often void of the typical founding blocks of a healthy democracy, such as institutional checks on the executive, well-organized political parties that can challenge incumbents, and a vibrant civil society.
The New Nuclear Age Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. for Foreign Affairs
In developing a nuclear arsenal that will soon rival those of Russia and the United States, China is not merely departing from its decades-old status as a minor nuclear state; it is also upending the bipolar nuclear power system. For the 73 years since the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test, that bipolar system, for all its flaws and moments of terror, has averted nuclear war. Now, by closing in on parity with the two existing great nuclear powers, China is heralding a paradigm shift to something much less stable: a tripolar nuclear system.
Sanctions, drones, and bombings in Moldova: A China-Russia update – Joe Webster for SupChina
Both state-owned and private Chinese companies are generally complying with Western sanctions on Russia. Meanwhile, China’s embassy in Moldova appears unfazed by a series of bombings in the former Soviet state, which has its own problems with Moscow.
v/r,
Joe Webster
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.