Putin stepping back, not down?
Reverse Castling?
Putin’s health remains a mystery. Putin is showing little physical evidence of grave health problems: while he did cough at a COVID meeting on November 18th, he engaged at Valdai for nearly three hours, and the Kremlin announced that Putin’s annual marathon press conference would take place on December 17th. At the same time, actors in the Russian and Chinese systems *may* be hedging against Putin’s uncertain health, and the Kremlin does not appear to be discouraging legislation aimed at insulating ex-Presidents from criminal prosecution. There is some (limited and relatively weak) evidence that health concerns over Putin peaked in Beijing and Moscow around November 17th - 19th.
I suspect that Putin is keeping his options open and establishing various predicates for next moves, but it’s difficult to say what, exactly, those next moves may be. He may use a personal health crisis (or “crisis”) to deflect any personal responsibility for the COVID-19 economic/public health crisis, particularly if rollout of the Sputnik V vaccine falters – but he could also do something else entirely. If rising winter COVID cases appear ever more threatening to regime security, Putin could respond dramatically and unpredictably.
Putin faced an annus horribilis in 2020, but 2021 could be worse. On the domestic front, Russia’s COVID-19 public health and economic/financial crisis could extend well into 2021 – and possibly beyond. Popular and elite anger at Putin will likely rise; large-scale protests appear probable, particularly in the Far East. Much depends on Sputnik V and other Russian-made vaccines: the failure or even delay of a COVID vaccination program could severely threaten the regime’s domestic political position. Putin’s geopolitical environment is also increasingly unfavorable. US policy will shift on January 20th, 2021; Lukashenko’s position in Belarus is weak and will likely require greater infusions of Russian financial and security assistance; and Crimea’s water shortages are increasingly severe. This period is the most serious challenge Putin has faced in his 20+ years of rule.
Putin could respond to this challenge with something akin to a “Reverse Castling” (after the earlier “Castling” in 2011, where former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin swapped roles). Putin’s (temporary?) successor could then bear responsibility for COVID, any economic carnage, and, potentially, whatever repression is needed to maintain the clique in power. While behind-the-scenes rule would bring its own risks, Putin might find this option appealing since it could insulate his public approval ratings while still allowing him to return to formal power at a time of his own choosing.
The Russian legislation bill granting lifetime immunity for former Presidents is thought to benefit Putin and, to a lesser extent, Medvedev. But the real beneficiary of lifetime immunity might be a successor to Putin, who would be empowered (encouraged?) to brutally repress popular protests and Putin’s intra-elite opponents, absorb the backlash on behalf of Putin and the Collective Putin, and escape accountability through the lifetime immunity clause.
Mark Galeotti once said, memorably, that Putin “flees from failure.” A “Reverse Castling” maneuver would seem to allow Putin to maintain enough distance from any failures while still exercising power. But this is all admittedly highly speculative: the situation is changing rapidly, almost by the day, and even Putin probably doesn’t even know what he’ll do next. Much depends on the effectiveness and rapid deployment of Sputnik V and other Russian vaccines.
I’ll discuss Russian COVID dynamics more in the next edition of The Report, which will be in the standard format. Apologies for the delay in this special edition. The Thanksgiving holiday slowed things down, and I wanted to stew things over before publishing.
Table of Contents:
1) Putin’s health, legal machinations
2) Chinese state media and possible(?) indirect references to Putin’s health
3) Other analyses of Putin’s health
Photo: The Kremlin via Wikimedia
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1) Putin’s health, legal machinations
Ex-Russian president may become senator within three months after leaving office – TASS [Oct 31st]
“A former president of Russia will be able to run for a lifetime senator within three months after leaving office, the State Duma’s (lower house) Committee on State Building and Legislation said citing the bill on procedure of forming the Federation Council (upper house of parliament) submitted by President Vladimir Putin on Saturday.
"It is specified that a Russian president, who has ended his tenure, will acquire the status of a senator since the moment of sending an application, with all the required documents attached, to the Federation Council. The application may be submitted once within three months after the president leaves office," the statement says. "Along with this, the president whose tenure has ended before the given bill is adopted may file this application within three months since the day the law enters into force," the committee added.”
Russia’s lower house bolsters immunity guarantees for ex-presidents – TASS [Nov 17]
“Immunity of an ex-president can now be taken away if a criminal case is opened to investigate if they committed a serious indictable offence when in office. The procedure is initiated by the chair of the Russian Investigative Committee by submitting the relevant proposal to the State Duma which agrees to strip the immunity. The resolution is later referred to the Federation Council (upper house) which is to consider the issue within three months.
However, the amended constitution reads that president can be impeached, and ex-president can be stripped of immunity by the Federation Council only on the basis of charges of high treason or another grave crime, advanced by the State Duma and confirmed by the conclusion of the Supreme Court and the Russian Constitutional Court.
The proposed amendments stipulate that former president’s immunity can be taken away if the State Duma puts forward accusations of high treason or other serious indictable offence. They will have to be later confirmed by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court in accordance with due procedure. Based on these accusations, the Federation Council will decide whether to strip the immunity.
The State Duma and the Federation Council should secure two-thirds of votes in each chamber to present the accusations and strip immunity. The upper house will have three months to review the resolution. If it fails to do so, the accusations are considered rejected.
The former president facing these accusations can take part in the meetings of the both chambers reviewing the issue. The bill also clarified that former presidents cannot be prosecuted on criminal or administrative charges, detained, arrested, searched or interrogated. As of now, these restrictions are only linked to actions in office or investigations into cases related to fulfilling presidential duties.”
Russian Bill To Grant Ex-Presidents Lifetime Immunity Passes First Reading – RFE/RL
“Russia’s lower house of parliament, the State Duma, has approved the first reading of a draft bill that would grant sweeping lifetime immunity to former presidents. The legislation is part of a package of constitutional amendments approved in a referendum this summer that could potentially see President Vladimir Putin stay in power until 2036. The draft stipulates that any former head of state and their families obtain lifetime immunity from criminal or administrative charges. They also cannot be detained, arrested, searched, or interrogated.
The only exception is for treason, which must first be approved by the State Duma and the Supreme and Constitutional courts. Under the current law, former presidents are only immune from prosecution for crimes committed while in office.
The State Duma also passed a first reading of another bill that will grant ex-presidents a lifetime seat in the upper house of parliament, or the Federation Council, a position that also provides immunity from prosecution. Once the bills go through three readings in the State Duma, the legislation must be approved by the Federation Council before heading to Putin's desk for his signature.”
Putin’s health ‘absolutely fine’ — Kremlin – TASS [November 18]
“Russian President Vladimir Putin’s health is perfectly fine, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov told TASS Wednesday. "Absolutely fine," he said when asked about the leader’s health. Earlier on Wednesday, Putin held a meeting with government members and coughed a few times. The president apologized and continued the meeting almost without pausing.”
Putin’s annual press conference to be lengthy and informative, Kremlin says – TASS [Nov 27]
“Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov expects that the annual press conference of Russian President Vladimir Putin planned for December 17 will be long and informative, he told reporters on Friday when asked about the duration of the conference, considering that its format will be different due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. "Of course, we can assume that it will be a rather long and informative event," the spokesman said, adding that the duration of the conference cannot be determined exactly.”
2) Chinese state media and possible(?) indirect references to Putin’s health
China counts on Russia in fight against world hegemony - Chinese Foreign Minister – TASS
[Nov 18 19:19 Moscow Time, so 00:19 Beijing Time]
”Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during a telephone conversation with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, announced the desire of the Chinese authorities to join forces with Russia to fight global hegemony and the growing protectionism of individual countries, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced on Thursday. According to the statement, the Chinese side intends to continue interaction with Russia at a high level [bolded by The Report] to promote the Sino-Russian comprehensive partnership. China is ready to jointly oppose one-sided policies, protectionism and hegemonies of individual countries that deal a blow to international relations and the international order, the statement said
According to the Chinese Minister, Beijing is interested in strengthening political dialogue with Moscow, in close coordination of positions on important issues. He noted that China intends to take advantage of strong partnerships with Russia to combat the pandemic and restore the global economy.”
Comment: If you squint hard enough, you can see how the two sides *could* be emphasizing that the state-to-state relationship exists independently of Putin. But this is admittedly not very solid evidence.
[Nov 18 19:38 Moscow Time, or 00:38 Beijing Time]
“Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had a telephone conversation with State Council member and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on November 18.
The parties exchanged views on the Russia-China strategic partnership, which continues to expand steadily amid the challenging economic and sanitary-epidemiological situation. The parties focused on the schedule of upcoming meetings at the highest and high levels and separate issues of practical cooperation as part of implementing the leaders’ respective agreements on aligning plans to promote the EAEU and China’s Belt and Road initiative.
The ministers expressed satisfaction with tight coordination between Russia and China in multilateral platforms, primarily, the UN, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. They coordinated positions on important items on the international agenda, including the current state of affairs in Belarus and the Central Asian states, as well as preserving the Iranian nuclear deal.”
Comment: “Highest levels” is a clear reference to Putin, which contrasts somewhat with the Chinese side’s readout of the Wang-Lavrov call, but not Han Zheng/Belousov’s call (both are listed below)
[Nov 19, 05:21 Beijing Time]
“Han Zheng said that under the strategic guidance of the two heads of state[bolded by The Report], China-Russia investment cooperation has always maintained a good momentum of development. Since the beginning of this year, President Xi Jinping has had four phone calls with President Putin and reached a series of important consensuses on jointly responding to the epidemic, advancing the development of China-Russia relations, and pragmatic cooperation between the two countries. China is willing to work with Russia to implement the important consensus of the two heads of state, push the investment cooperation between the two countries to a higher level, and continuously enrich the comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation between China and Russia in the new era.”
“韩正表示，在两国元首战略引领下，中俄投资合作始终保持着良好发展态势。今年以来，习近平主席同普京总统先后四次通电话，就共同应对疫情、推进中俄关系发展和两国务实合作达成一系列重要共识。中方愿与俄方一道共同落实好两国元首重要共识，推动两国投资合作迈向更高水平，不断丰富中俄新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系内涵。”
Comment: Seemingly a flurry of bilateral activity on Nov 17th – Nov 19th. Putin had his coughing fit on the 18th.
Still, the China-Russia Investment Cooperation Committee does meet every November, so some/most/all of these interactions could have been planned and long-standing.
This statement explicitly mentions Putin as the head of state and avoids the side-stepping of the Wang-Lavrov call.
Wang Yi talks on the phone with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov – PD [Chinese language]
[Nov 19, 05:22 Beijing Time]
According to Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, November 18th.
On November 18th, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. Wang Yi congratulated Russia on successfully hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS video "double summit" and achieved fruitful results. Wang Yi said that China and Russia attach more importance to strengthening strategic cooperation than ever before and have played a mainstay role in international changes. The two countries persisted in running their own affairs well and successfully completed their respective domestic political agendas; jointly defended multilateralism and international fairness and justice, kept the bottom line of international law and basic norms of international relations; actively participated in international anti-epidemic cooperation and promoted political settlement of various regions Hot issues played a role as a global stabilizer. The strategic cooperation between China and Russia has continuously achieved new results.
Wang Yi emphasized that China is willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with Russia to jointly respond to the impact of unilateralism, protectionism, and bullying on international relations and international order, safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the two countries, and safeguard international fairness and justice.
Lavrov said that Russia supports the cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the "Belt and Road" initiative, and is willing to conduct close coordination with China on multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, the Security Council, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the BRICS to jointly maintain the stability of the international and regional situation, support countries in the region to combat extremism, and support the East Asia regional cooperation framework centered on ASEAN.
“据新华社北京11月18日电 11月18日，国务委员兼外长王毅同俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫通电话。
王毅祝贺俄方成功举办上海合作组织和金砖国家视频“双峰会”，取得丰硕成果。王毅表示，中俄比以往任何时候都更加重视加强战略协作，在国际变局中起到了中流砥柱的作用。两国坚持办好自己的事，顺利完成了各自国内政治议程；共同捍卫多边主义和国际公平正义，守住了国际法和国际关系基本准则的底线；积极参与国际抗疫合作，推动政治解决各类地区热点问题，发挥了全球稳定器的作用。中俄战略协作不断取得新成果。
王毅强调，中方愿同俄方肩并肩站在一起，共同应对单边主义、保护主义、霸凌行径对国际关系和国际秩序的冲击，维护两国正当权益，维护国际公平正义。
拉夫罗夫表示，俄方支持欧亚经济联盟同“一带一路”倡议对接合作，愿同中方在联合国、安理会、上海合作组织、金砖国家等多边平台开展密切协调，共同维护国际地区局势稳定，支持地区国家打击极端主义，支持以东盟为中心的东亚区域合作架构。”
Comment: Quick and dirty Google Translate above, as well as the original Chinese.
Again, there is no direct mention of Putin, although he attended the BRICS virtual summit. The two sides could be emphasizing that state-to-state relations exist independently of Putin.
Contrast this call with the September 12th exchange between Wang and Lavrov (below).
Wang Yi holds talks with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov – People’s Daily [Chinese-language] [Sep 12]
“Wang Yi said that since the beginning of this year, under the strategic guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Putin, Sino-Russian relations have withstood the test of the epidemic and international vicissitudes, the economic and social life of the two countries is recovering in an orderly manner, and the governance capabilities and levels of governance of the two countries have been further improved.”
“王毅表示，今年以来，在习近平主席和普京总统的战略引领下，中俄关系经受住疫情和国际风云变幻考验,两国经济社会生活正在有序恢复，两国的治理能力和治理水平得到进一步提升。”
Comment: Putin explicitly mentioned in the Chinese side’s September readout of the Wang-Lavrov call.
3) Other analyses of Putin’s health
Weird Scenes Inside The Kremlin – The Power Vertical
Comment: Brian Whitmore, Ilya Ponomarev, and Ilya Zaslavskiy suspect Putin may be feigning illness to smoke out opponents. They suggest Putin could be borrowing from Mao, who used the “let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” (百花齐放，百家争鸣) to identify his domestic opponents. They also pointed out that Putin could be learning from Turkmenistan’s ruler (below).
I’m not aware of a single expert on Russia who believes the “Putin-has-Parkinson’s” rumor. Most are skeptical that Putin is even ill.
President For Life? Turkmen Leader Signs Mysterious Constitutional Changes Into Law – RFE/RL
“Turkmenistan's authoritarian leader, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, has signed into law constitutional changes, the details of which remain largely unknown. State-controlled media reported on September 25 that Berdymukhammedov, who initiated the constitutional changes a year ago and has led a commission he established that prepared a bill of amendments, signed the legislation after the People's Council and lawmakers approved it. Turkmen citizens have yet to be informed about the exact changes to the constitution of the tightly controlled, energy-rich country, except that the single-chamber parliament, the Mejlis, will merge with the People's Council and become a two-chamber institution.
The People's Council (Halk Maslahaty) was created in 2017 on the basis of the Council of Elders. Berdymukhammedov is the body's chairman. Critics have said that Berdymukhammedov plans to use the constitutional amendments to secure his lifetime presidency and its eventual succession to his son and grandchildren.”
Turkmenistan tinkers with constitution in apparent transition strategy – Eurasianet
“Turkmenistan has adopted changes to the constitution that will see the creation of an upper house of parliament and the scrapping of a consultative body called the Khalk Maslahaty, or People's Council.
The amendments were approved with dizzying rapidity on September 25 – first by the Khalk Maslahaty itself, then by parliament, and then by President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. The Khalk Maslahaty will cease to exist in its current format, wherein around 2,500 people, including community elders and top officials, convened occasionally to promulgate policies of ostensible national importance.
TDH state news agency cited Berdymukhamedov as saying that approval of the amendments on the eve of celebrations for the 29th anniversary of independence, was a “magnificent historical event that will be inscribed in golden letters in the chronicles of our people.”
The new chamber will comprise 56 deputies with eight members apiece coming from the country’s five provinces and the capital, Ashgabat, and another eight being appointed directly by the president. The regional appointees will be elected in votes by members of their respective local representative bodies. The responsibilities of the Senate, which is also to be known as the Khalk Maslahaty, will extend to invoking national referendums and considering candidates to head the Supreme Court, the office of the Prosecutor General, the Interior Ministry and the Justice Ministry.”
Until next time,
Joe Webster
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.