Special edition: Submarines and Russian strategic deterrence vis-à-vis the PRC
The Kanyon issue
Russia is developing the “Kanyon,” a submarine-deployed autonomous UUV (AUUV) equipped with a nuclear payload. Kanyon will function like a “nuclear torpedo” that can slip under missile defense systems and hold coastal cities at risk. This capability appears to be designed to hedge against improving missile defenses and safeguard Russia’s strategic deterrent vis-à-vis the United States – and the People’s Republic of China.
Russia recently announced that PRC security services attempted to acquire information about Russian submarines in at least two espionage cases. The disclosure was likely approved at the highest levels of the Russian security apparatus. Moreover, the announcement signals as a warning to Beijing: Moscow will impose costs if the PRC continues to conduct espionage against Russia’s ultra-sensitive submarine and strategic deterrent capabilities. The Russian national security community appears resolved to continue to hold Chinese cities at risk through its strategic capabilities. Russia’s development of the Kanyon capability and its strong reaction to PRC submarine espionage suggests that structural tensions in the bilateral relationship are just below the surface despite Xi-Putin bonhomie.
This special edition will only discuss submarines and Russian strategic deterrence vis-à-vis the PRC. I’ll post an update on Friday in the standard format. The next issue will focus on what’s happening in Belarus, with particular attention to China’s interests and actions in the crisis.
The Kanyon
If you’re not familiar with the Kanyon, this USNI Proceedings article by Lieutenant Commander Joshua M. M. Portzer of the U.S. Navy provides an outstanding overview:
“Russia has developed a submarine-deployed autonomous UUV (AUUV) that can travel thousands of miles and detonate a nuclear payload of several megatons in a foreign harbor—a capability that will be operational by the late 2020s. A strategic nuclear weapon that is deployed and detonated undersea is a true paradigm shift: Never before has a country’s nuclear kill chain remained exclusively undersea.
The “Kanyon” weapon system—also referred to as Status-6 or Poseidon—first emerged in footage on Russian television in 2015. It is a nuclear-powered (N)-AUUV that can travel thousands of nautical miles (nm) at approximately 100 knots and can operate at a depth of 1,000 meters. While it may carry a conventional weapons payload, its nuclear warhead is approximately two megatons. Russia designed it as a strategic weapon to take out ports and coastal cities. It may deploy on up to four submarines (modified Oscar II class) in both the Northern and Pacific Fleets, with each submarine carrying up to eight Kanyon weapons.”
Portzer frames the Kanyon as a threat to American interests – which it is, of course. But the Kanyon system will likely hold Bohai Bay and Shanghai at risk, not just DC and New York City.
Why Russia is developing the Kanyon: Strategic deterrence and technological advancements
Technological advancements are improving missile defenses, complicating strategic deterrence, and, from Russia’s perspective, necessitating investments in new weapons technologies. In addition to the Kanyon, Russia has invested a considerable fraction of its scarce defense resources into hypersonic missiles, so named because they travel several multiples faster than the speed of sound. Hypersonics are difficult to intercept due to their unpredictable trajectories in the upper atmosphere. Russia claims it has deployed a hypersonic called Avangard that can evade existing missile defense systems.
Russia has prioritized development of hypersonics and the Kanyon because increasingly capable missile defense systems could conceivably degrade its existing strategic deterrents. Radars and other sensors are becoming much more capable, improving existing missile interception methods and enabling new approaches. Railguns, for instance, could theoretically destroy missile projectiles at distances of over 100 nautical miles. The PLA claims to have developed an electromagnetic railgun capable of shooting low-cost artillery rounds at hypersonic speeds; the United States is developing a non-electromagnetic railgun. The railgun platform’s technological advances could conceivably nullify existing missile technology within a decade or two. Similarly, the U.S. Navy has designed a 150-kilowatt Solid State Laser—Technology Maturation Laser Weapon System Demonstrator (LWSD), which has shot down a small drone in sea trials. Although lasers’ effective ranges could constrain many applications, future land-based lasers will be able to power sources well in excess of 150-kilowatts, conceivably threatening strategic deterrents within a decade or two.
While Russia’s land-based Strategic Rocket Forces remain the “mainstay” of its nuclear triad, according to the CRS, submarines will likely play an increasingly important role in its future strategic deterrence plans. Russian military planners appear to be developing the Kanyon system in case 1) hypersonic development proves unsuccessful; 2) future anti-missile interception becomes much more effective; or 3) both. It’s also worth noting that the Kanyon capability faces risks from future submarine detection technologies (in what Bryan Clark refers to as the “hider-finder competition”) or telecommunications jamming, but Russian military planners may believe that an all-underwater capability could bridge several years or decades of deterrence capability gaps.
Chinese espionage against Russian submarines
The Chinese security complex appears eager to better understand Russian submarines, perhaps because of the Kanyon program. There have been at least two cases of Chinese security services purportedly targeting the Russian submarine complex in recent weeks.
According to a June 15th Meduza article, “78-year-old Arctic specialist Valery Mitko sold classified information about Russian submarines to Chinese intelligence.” Mitko taught at Dalian Maritime University in NE China starting in 2016. Before he was arrested in St. Petersburg, Mitko was accused of passing submarine detection technology to China. Later in the month, the Russian customs service announced that a scrap dealer attempted to sell over 100 tons of steel from a decommissioned nuclear submarine to a Chinese buyer. The Russian customs service could have said that a generic foreign buyer sought to obtain the sensitive material illicitly, it’s naming-and-shaming of the PRC is significant. It’s also notable that Russian state media did not shy from reporting on the Mitko case.
How did the FSB catch Mitko, assuming that his arrest is substantive and not mere dramaturgy? Unless Mitko and/or his handlers made serious mistakes, the FSB likely didn’t uncover his behavior through counterintelligence methods: even the FSB faces resource constraints and can’t continuously monitor every Russian who has access to sensitive information. If Mitko fell under suspicion, it was likely because Russian security services used offensive capabilities (hacking, surveillance of Chinese facilities and individuals, spies inside the Chinese government, etc) to uncover leaks and find the Chinese mole. Mitko’s arrest is a tacit acknowledgment that Russia is also spying on China.
Why is the outside world learning of an espionage case between two countries with supposedly friendly relations? The Meduza article was extraordinarily well-sourced: the Mitko family went on the record with the Meduza reporters, who obtained copies of his medical records. The FSB did not suppress the story, although it could have done so very easily.
There are three main explanations for why the FSB allowed the Mitko story to come to light. First, “low-level” (but highly ideological or personally ambitious) FSB officers in the St. Petersburg office could have directed and publicized the arrest. This scenario is highly unlikely, however. Russia’s relationship with China is arguably the most sensitive aspect of its foreign policy, and even the most ideological or reckless low-level FSB operative would be very careful to stake his or her career on this issue without a krysha – that is, support from higher levels.
It’s much more plausible that “mid-level” security clans in the siloviki publicized the incidents due to bureaucratic incentives or policy preferences. As Mark Galeotti wrote in Putin’s hydra, Russian security services compete with one another for bureaucratic resources, prestige, personnel – and economic rents. The FSB was intimately involved in the public release of both the Mitko and scrap metal cases. It also has an institutional interest in publicizing counterintelligence successes. High-level FSB officials (perhaps even Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the FSB) might have allowed public reporting even over the objections of other actors in the securitariat, such as the Foreign Ministry or the Kremlin. It’s also worth noting that microeconomic incentives could reinforce bureaucratic motivations. The FSB (along with other Russian security services) runs criminal networks in Europe and elsewhere to generate off-the-books revenue streams for operations (and personal enrichment, often). It could be that some FSB clan is upset that the CCP’s anti-corruption campaign broke up, say, one of their cross-border cigarette smuggling rings in the Far East and retaliated by publicizing a Chinese spy’s arrest.
The most likely possibility, however, is that higher-ups wanted to publicize the incidents. Russia’s relationship with China is extraordinarily sensitive, as are submarines and its strategic deterrent. While the FSB would have restricted knowledge of the investigation to preserve its secrecy, it’s extremely likely that the Mitko matter rose to the attention of the Russian Security Council. Moreover, the back-to-back public announcements of investigations into Chinese submarine espionage further indicates policy coordination at a very high level. It appears that powerful actors in the Russian security apparatus wanted to publicize the Chinese espionage cases and discourage the PRC from taking any further actions that could threaten its current and future strategic deterrent.
Whatabout the early warning system?
In October 2019, Putin announced that Russia would help China create an early warning system to detect missile launches. While the announcement is politically significant, it may have limited practical significance. An early warning system would appear to do little to enhance China’s ability to interdict Russian hypersonic weapons, at least for now. It would also provide no protection against the Kanyon capability, which relies entirely on an undersea kill chain.
Limits of partnership
Russia’s announcement of the submarine espionage cases and development of the Kanyon capability suggests it remains committed to strategic deterrence vis-à-vis the PRC. While China and Russia are drawing closer in many respects, it’s worth remembering that the “comprehensive strategic partners of coordination for a new era” still aim strategic capabilities at one another.
Until next time,
Joe Webster
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.