Special Report: Wang Yi calls Russian, Saudi counterparts as Beijing supports OPEC production cut
Beijing increasingly siding with Moscow, Riyadh despite its own economic interests.
Wang Yi called his Saudi counterpart on Thursday and praised the Kingdom’s drift from Washington, saying that China “appreciates Saudi Arabia's pursuit of an independent energy policy.” ( “中方也赞赏沙方奉行独立自主的能源政策”) The comments were an unsubtle reference to tensions between the Middle Kingdom and the West, particularly the United States, over Riyadh and OPEC’s production cut on October 5th, which raised oil prices and indirectly supported Putin’s energy-fueled war economy. Wang’s comments contradict the economic interests of China, the world’s largest importer of oil and energy. They also illustrate, however, that Beijing is willing to tolerate some (but not unlimited) economic pain for politically supporting Moscow.
Wang Yi also said that China supports “Saudi Arabia playing a greater role in international and regional affairs.” (“中方支持沙方在国际和地区事务中发挥更大作用”) This formulation is a potential reference to Riyadh’s apparent quest for BRICS+ membership in the wake of its spat with Washington and Brussels. While BRICS is of dubious economic content, Saudi’s entrance into the group could imbue it with political saliency.
Lavrov and Wang talk, reaffirm ties
Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s support for Vladimir Putin in a bilateral call, also on Thursday. In striking remarks, Wang said that “The Chinese side will also firmly support the Russian side, under the leadership of President Putin, to unite and lead the Russian people to overcome difficulties, eliminate disturbances, realize the strategic goals of development, and further establish Russia's status as a major power [great power?] on the international stage.”
[Note: the official PRC MFA translation was slightly different: “China will also firmly support Russia in rallying and leading the Russian people under the leadership of President Putin to achieve strategic development goals against all the odds and disturbance, and to further establish Russia's status as a major country on the international stage.” “
Here’s the original Chinese: “中方也将坚定支持俄方在普京总统领导下，团结带领俄罗斯人民克服困难、排除干扰，实现发展战略目标，在国际舞台上进一步确立俄罗斯大国地位。” While I’m only a proficient reader of Chinese – not an expert one, admittedly – 大国地位 literally translates as “big country status.” It seems that the PRC MFA is softening the translation a bit in order to make the content appear more palatable to external audiences.]
While Wang’s support for Putin was unsurprising, the mention of Russia’s international power was noteworthy. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is draining Russian influence nearly everywhere – perhaps especially in Central Asia. Wang’s comments suggest that Beijing that will continue to try to act with what Stephen Kotkin called “supreme tact, vehemently denying its own superiority—a studious humility that only helps it maintain the upper hand.”
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has been slow to translate Wang Yi’s meetings with his Saudi and Russian counterparts into English – or, for that matter, any of post-Congress activities since September 25th. While Wang Yi apparently paused his activities for a month due to the Party Congress, there is a two-day backlog in post-Congress translations. The most likely explanation is that the foreign ministry bureaucracy is still immersed in new ideological training from the Party Congress. The slowdown could also reflect extra caution about accurate translation due to the sensitivities of the content matter. Still, Beijing has previously used the language barrier before and may be slow rolling translations in order to lower Beijing’s profile on controversial topics.
Putin links Taiwan to Ukraine, again
During the Valdai International Discussion Club meeting, Vladimir Putin criticized the West, saying: “As a matter of fact, [The West] always seek to aggravate matters, which is nothing new, either. This includes the stoking of war in Ukraine, the provocations around Taiwan, and the destabilisation of the global food and energy markets.” At the PRC MFA press conference, and in response to a question on Taiwan from Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin said “We deeply appreciate President Putin’s statement.”
The order of Putin’s comments seems to rank his three most important audiences: domestic viewers, Beijing, and the global south, in that order. In August, Putin claimed U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan was a “part of the purpose-oriented and deliberate U.S. strategy designed to destabilize the situation and sow chaos in the region and the world.”
How will Beijing react if Putin backs himself into a corner in Kherson?
Finally, and in a rather surprising reversal from last week, Russian armed forces appear to be reinforcing Kherson, not retreating from it. While experts on the Russian military believed last week that there were signs of a possible Russian withdrawal from the militarily-vulnerable city of Kherson, Putin appears to be reinforcing the garrison.
Putin’s decision could very easily prove disastrous. If Ukrainian forces capture the Kakhovka hydro-electric dam on the Dnipro River, thousands of Russian soldiers could have no realistic way to retreat across to Russian-controlled territory. A mass surrender of Russian armed forces in Kherson could conceivably imperil Crimea and, more importantly for Putin, undermine his domestic political position, especially since Russia’s economic conditions are expected to worsen.
While the situation is in flux and behind the fog of war, there are growing concerns that Russian forces could explode the Kakhovka dam, which would unleash a horrific humanitarian and ecological disaster.
It’s not clear how Beijing would respond to a hypothetical dam explosion. Beijing’s visible embrace of Riyadh’s pro-Moscow production cut and its reaffirmation of support for Putin seem to provide a signpost, however.
v/r,
Joe Webster
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.