Strikes on Iranian electricity infrastructure could trigger a water catastrophe

And set dangerous precedents for a Taiwan contingency

The U.S. and Israeli targeting of military and energy installations across Iran from Kharg Island, Iran’s hub for oil exports, to the South Pars gas field and petrochemical facilities at Asaluyeh, shows that the conflict is entering a new and potentially very dangerous phase. As coalition forces prosecute the war against Iran, they should reject targeting Iran’s water infrastructure across the natural gas-oil-electricity-water nexus. While Israel and the United States have a right to self-defense and to undertake proportionate responses, cutting off Iran’s water supply in the absence of a proportionate threat would destabilize not only Iran but the entire region, threatening U.S. security interests. In addition, it might set alarming precedents for a potential future U.S. – PRC standoff over Taiwan.

Image generated by ChatGPT 5.4

Iran’s water-electricity nexus

Iran used natural gas and oil to supply about 85 and 8 percent of power generation, respectively, in 2022. Decades of poor resource management have nonetheless left Iran chronically short of electricity – and water.

The Khamenei regime has pushed Iran’s grid to the edge of collapse, even before the latest iteration of the U.S. – Iran war. Regular power outages were already commonplace, with the country’s power deficit estimated at 13,000 MW in 2023, 18,000 MW in 2024, and projected to reach 25,000 MW in 2025.

Airstrikes by Israel are amplifying stress on Iran’s already-strained grid. Israeli strikes destroyed two Iranian natural gas pipelines in 2024, affecting infrastructure that supplies roughly 68 percent of the country’s energy and sparking electricity outages across five provinces. During the summer of 2025, Israeli strikes damaged oil storage sites, refineries, and power stations further. During the first week of March, Israel struck four additional oil storage facilities serving Tehran’s ten million residents, while there are unconfirmed reports that Iranian electrical transformers have been attacked. Today, on March 18^th, U.S. and Israeli forces attacked Iran’s South Pars natural gas field, the largest global natural gas field. This strike marks the first assault on gas infrastructure this year with the potential for lasting damage on Iran’s long-term production capacity.

Concerningly, any additional loss of electricity could prevent Iranians from using water pumping stations, accessing electric wells, or conducting basic hygiene via sewage treatment plants; the air strikes against a refinery also appeared to have contaminated Tehran’s sewage system. Prior electricity and water outages in the region have proved deadly: destruction of Iraq’s grid in the First Gulf War, and Saddam Hussein’s failure to rebuild the power system, led to thousands of deaths from cholera. Finally, water outages in Iran could also spark a food security crisis in Iran, as agriculture consumes over 90% of freshwater withdrawals. A water crisis in Iran could not only lead to a repeat of disease outbreaks, but it might also trigger a mass death event if Iranians are unable to access necessities like food and potable water.

Iran’s water crisis is not new, but the coalition should take care not to exacerbate it. Before the war, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned in November 2025 that Tehran might have to be evacuated due to insufficient drinking water. Accordingly, the Khamenei regime, recognizing its water vulnerabilities, will likely lash out violently if attacked, as Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, warned that an attack on the country’s power grid risks blacking out the broader region. In addition, the regime may use even the threat of external attacks on Iranian water infrastructure for its domestic propaganda purposes. While the U.S. should not refrain from acting in its own interest, it should also eschew needlessly escalatory measures, including attacking Iran’s water-related infrastructure, actions that would fall heaviest not on the Khamenei regime, but on the Iranian civilians and communities who depend on these systems for basic survival.

With this in mind, there is ample reason to believe that strikes on Iran’s electricity, far from galvanizing support for the coalition, would instead bolster political support for the Khamenei regime. Consider Ukraine’s recent experience. Russia’s targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure has inflicted immense pain on ordinary civilians, but it has failed to meaningfully degrade Ukraine’s military capacity and, in fact, has almost certainly stiffened Ukrainian resistance and produced a rally-around-the-flag effect for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Likewise, in Iran, any Israeli and U.S. targeting of civilian infrastructure may similarly rally support for the political leadership.

Indeed, the seminal analysis in the field of electricity’s role in conflict, Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems, published in 1994 by then-USAF Major Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., finds that “Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive, and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future.” While some technical conditions, such as precision guided munitions, have changed since 1994, structural factors – especially human psychology – have endured. Recent data and empirical studies suggest that striking electricity and water infrastructure would yield short-lived tactical objectives at the expense of strategic goals and would prove enormously counterproductive.

Iranian water-related infrastructure should be off-limits

Unfortunately, there are signs that Israeli and U.S. figures are contemplating widening attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure to include water-related facilities. On March 7^th, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) bombed an Iranian refinery and oil storage facilities near Tehran, sparking towers of flame across the city before the clouds rained down oil on Tehran residents. It bears noting that many of these same people bravely protested against the regime not long ago, especially since opponents of the Khamenei regime are disproportionately urban.

Furthermore, earlier this month, Israeli figures falsely claimed that the UAE targeted Iran’s water infrastructure, only to be met with furious denials from the UAE. Additionally, some Israeli media outlets appeared to hint that Iran’s natural gas power plants could be suitable targets. Finally, in comments to reporters, President Trump said “we could take apart their electric capacity within one hour and it would take them 25 years to rebuild it. So, ideally, we’re not going to be doing that.”

Targeting Iranian electricity and water infrastructure is reckless. Triggering a severe water crisis in Iran could collapse a country of 93 million individuals into a failed state. A collapse would threaten regional stability, necessitating a continued, long-term U.S. security presence.

If Iran becomes a failed state, however, the region will more likely enter a new phase of instability. A failed Iranian state would not serve American or Israeli strategic interests, as state collapse historically produces ungoverned spaces, protracted instability, and security vacuums that are far harder to manage than the adversary they replaced.

It isn’t difficult to imagine chaos emerging from a failed state. Iran’s collapse could perversely extend hostilities indefinitely, as dead-enders shift to decentralized resistance. Thousands of naval mines are stored across Iran; these weapons can be deployed on thousands of civilian craft, and a single mine incident can shut down the Strait of Hormuz for weeks. Accordingly, if Iran becomes a failed state, global energy markets could face stochastic oil supply and price shocks if “lone-wolf” Iranians with access to mines and other naval weapons take matters into their own hands.

Even leaving aside any normative considerations, killing tens of thousands of civilians would spark a backlash from the American public. There’s already precedent: amid Israel’s war in Gaza, Americans “now say they sympathize more with the Palestinians in the Middle East situation,” per Gallup polling. Among Americans aged 18-34, 53 percent sympathize more with Palestine, versus only 23 percent for Israel. If Americans see a water crisis break out in Iran, the consequences on public opinion could be profound.

Establishing civilian infrastructure as a legitimate target carries risks in a potential U.S. – PRC conflict

Like all wars, the U.S. and Israel war with Iran will shape future conflicts. That could include a potential U.S. – PRC conflict, most likely over Taiwan. U.S. and Israeli actions vis-à-vis the Iranian grid will likely inform PRC military planning for potential future operations, including against Taiwan, the United States, and other coalitional actors. If Beijing and DC ever come to blows over Taiwan, American and Chinese electricity grids and water infrastructure could feature prominently in the conflict.

Both China and the U.S. have vulnerabilities across the electricity-water nexus. Despite a 2035 mandate to install an islanded microgrid on every U.S. Army military installation, about 95 percent of U.S. military facilities rely on the civilian power network for electricity. Accordingly, PRC military planners might be tempted to paralyze civilian power infrastructure – or, at minimum, indicate a credible threat to the grid. Conversely, northern China is already vulnerable to water shortages, and its water shortfalls may grow over time. China’s continued expansion of the South-to-North Water Diversion project(南水北调工程) is occurring largely under the radar, but is easing northern China’s water-related vulnerabilities – and potentially, all else being equal, making Beijing more willing to undertake risks, including vis-à-vis Taiwan.

In the event of a confrontation over Taiwan, the PRC and the United States would each be tempted to target one another’s electricity and water infrastructure. Leaving aside the weighty – and potentially deadly serious – implications of any such approaches, U.S. and Israeli attacks on the Iranian grid may lay the groundwork for a new and dangerous type of warfare focused on electricity destabilization. When considering the wisdom of targeting the Iranian grid, policymakers should consider the precedents it might set for more consequential potential conflicts.

Israeli and U.S. interests are not served by weaponizing water in Iran

Finally, inflicting a water crisis on Iran would likely kill many of the people most opposed to the Iranian regime. If the IRGC and Basij are allowed to ration water and food, they will use the opportunity, where possible, to prioritize regime supporters, allow regime opponents to die, and reap major propaganda victories at home and abroad. If the Trump and Netanyahu administrations trigger a water crisis they could, perversely, strengthen the Khamenei regime’s grip on power and lay the groundwork for a strategic defeat today and a deadlier conflict tomorrow.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report. Kate Burnett, a Young Global Professional at the Global Energy Center, provided research assistance for this article. This analysis reflects Webster’s own personal opinions.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.