The Prigozhin mutiny and the PRC’s response

The mutiny could be the real deal; three propositions for Beijing’s long-term response

It’s unclear as of this writing if the Prigozhin mutiny will be a footnote in history, an earthquake that results in regime change, or something else. Prigozhin is incentivized to strike quickly, for a variety of reasons. The mutiny’s psychological shock has given Prigozhin the initiative; much of the siloviki has yet to choose sides but will prefer to side with which faction seems most likely to prevail; and he almost certainly lacks the logistical resources to sustain an insurgency in a small area of Russia. We’ll likely have a good sense of the mutiny’s durability within the next 72 hours.

Before the mutiny, I would’ve placed Prigozhin’s probability at ever becoming the leader of Russia at lower than 1 percent. His forces have made astonishing gains in the past several hours, however, and are now reportedly just 320 kilometers south of Moscow. The Putin faction is taking countermeasures, however, including tearing up roadways to slow the Prigozhin forces’ advance. The Putin faction is favored to win, but this could be the real deal. I would subjectively place Prigozhin’s probability of prevailing over Putin and becoming the new leader of Russia at around 10 percent. Indeed, Russian officials are taking this threat very seriously.

https://twitter.com/Mike_Eckel/status/1672627279061725184

Turning to the PRC, the following three (long-term) outcomes for Sino-Russian relations seem likely regardless of the outcome of the Putin-Prigozhin factional struggle.

1)      PRC security services will become much more active in Russia

The PRC appears surprised by the mutiny and now has reasons to worry about the political stability of its nuclear-armed neighbor. Instability in Russia threatens Beijing’s interests; PRC intelligence services, having supposedly failed to predict the invasion of Ukraine, struggle to understand the country’s politics; and a post-Putin Russia, especially a more nationalist one, could conceivably be lukewarm or even hostile to China.

Regardless of the outcome of the Putin-Prigozhin fight, PRC security services will very likely make Russia a higher intelligence collection priority. Beijing will increasingly focus intelligence resources, especially signals intelligence (SIGINT), on Russia. Since Chinese tech companies are firmly embedded in the Russian ecosystem, while Russian SIGINT defenses are porous, Beijing will very likely have good collection reach within Russia, although it’s not clear if Chinese security services are capable of synthesizing the information.

Owing to Beijing’s interests in maintaining a pro-PRC regime in Moscow, Chinese security services will also be tempted to intervene in Russian domestic politics. It’s possible they are doing so already.

2)      The PRC will increasingly assert its security leadership in Central Asia and other areas of the so-called “Near Abroad” that Russia has dominated in recent decades

Russia’s domestic political instability seems likely to persist for as long as the invasion of Ukraine continues, and probably for longer. Consequently, Beijing will accelerate its security, diplomatic, and economic role in the post-Soviet sphere, especially in Central Asia. Beijing has increasingly shown its willingness to assert regional hegemony, although it continues to try to soothe Moscow’s anxieties. Russia’s domestic political turmoil suggests its focus will turn inwards, limiting its ability to intervene in Central Asian security affairs or mediate territorial claims and water disputes. PRC hegemony in Central Asia will accelerate sharply as a result of the mutiny.

3)      Sino-Russia infrastructure megaprojects are less economically attractive

Russia’s domestic political turmoil reduces the economic attractiveness of its hydrocarbon megaprojects, such as the Power of Siberia-2 Russia-to-China natural gas pipeline. Domestic political instability in Russia will constrain its ability to fulfill contracts on time, while a post-Putin Russia could be hostile to China, especially if an ultra-nationalist or racial chauvinist rises to power. Beijing was already extremely skeptical of committing financing for Russian hydrocarbon projects, prior to the mutiny. Russian energy projects have become less appealing to China from an economic perspective.

Beijing may be willing to commit more financial and economic resources to Russia, however, to ensure Russia’s domestic political stability and the continuation of Moscow’s pro-PRC policy. Sino-Russian trade and investment flows have traditionally been laden with politics and symbolism (recall that negotiations over the Power of Siberia-1 natural gas pipeline dragged on for years, with an agreement signed only after the invasion of Crimea). While the attractiveness of Russia’s hydrocarbons has decreased due to its ongoing domestic political turmoil, Beijing might calculate that the geopolitical returns on any investments justify the cost.

I’ll have more on the PRC’s historical perspective on Wagner and Prigozhin.

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.