To weaken Maduro’s grip, pressure a linchpin: Havana’s counterintelligence networks

Cuban intelligence, regime elites, and Maduro himself aren’t currently incentivized to step aside.

The United States is once again edging toward escalation in Venezuela. About a dozen ships and 15,000 military personnel are in the region, the Trump administration has declared a quasi no-fly zone across Venezuela, U.S. forces have seized an oil tanker, and now President Trump has ordered a “total and complete blockade” of sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela. A large-scale military intervention in Venezuela would hold major implications for great power competition, weakening the Western alliance to the benefit of Beijing and Moscow.

Pro-interventionists have assured skeptics that Maduro can be replaced without large-scale military intervention, holding that coercive pressure will be sufficient to topple Maduro. Some proponents of limited strikes argue that Maduro’s support is brittle and that limited attacks – or even the threat of attacks – could trigger a palace coup. But Cuban counterintelligence personnel shape intra-elite incentives in the Maduro regime, rendering a swift or easy political transition via airstrikes highly unlikely. If “limited” airstrikes fail to dislodge the Maduro regime, mission creep becomes more likely.

Any Venezuela plan must grapple with the reality that regime elites and their Cuban supporters currently stand to gain nothing – and lose everything – in the event of a political transition. An easy overthrow of the Maduro regime via a pressure campaign in Venezuela is therefore highly unlikely, and any U.S.-led regime change effort will likely prove costly, entail significant U.S. casualties, require billions of dollars of investments, and distract from the Indo-Pacific, the primary strategic theater. Instead of its current approach, Washington should test whether a deal with Havana is possible. Though trust between Havana and DC is low, Cuba’s already severe and worsening energy crisis incentivizes the Díaz-Canel regime to make a deal. If Cuban counterintelligence personnel leave Venezuela, a regime transition becomes more plausible.

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Chavismo elites and Cuba aren’t currently incentivized to fold

Any plan to unseat the Maduro regime must understand its three pillars: Maduro himself, other regime elites, and, crucially, Cuba’s in-country security apparatus.

Cuba plays a major and underappreciated role in the Venezuela crisis. Venezuela’s Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence, or DGCIM, is deeply entwined with Cuban intelligence, according to Reuters reporting. Cubans on-the-ground currently have few incentives to surrender: not only would any in-country personnel likely face reprisals from the new government, but a successful regime change in Venezuela would likely embolden Washington to try the same approach in Cuba. Additionally, the density of Cuban security personnel in Venezuela, including in counterintelligence and intelligence, is unknown and hard to quantify, but credible reports suggest it is substantial or even large; in recent months, Maduro has increased the number of Cuban counterintelligence officers and even in his personal security detail. In-country Cuban security personnel increase the perceived cost of defection for senior Venezuelan officers and intelligence officials, limiting the prospect of large-scale military and security defections and increasing the risk that the Venezuelan force structures will take Maduro’s side in a crisis.

Still, Havana’s incentives are not set in stone. Its massive, devastating, and ongoing electricity failures could render it more willing to reach an understanding with Washington over Venezuela. Interestingly, Reuters reports that elements in the Cuban regime reached out to Washington about what a post-Maduro future might look like, although Havana denied the claim. Any successful regime transition in Venezuela will likely include dismantling the in-country Cuban counterintelligence presence and is an avenue the Trump administration should strongly consider.

While the Communist Party of Cuba fears that a transition in Venezuela could embolden the U.S. to pursue regime change in Cuba, the regime may also face existential risks from the ongoing electricity and economic crisis, and Caracas is increasingly less useful for Havana. Between January and November, Venezuela sent 27,000 barrels per day of crude and fuel to Cuba, down from 32,000 last year, according to Reuters. U.S. power sector technical cooperation and direct fuel supply, paired with coercive measures like interdicting oil shipments, may alter the Díaz-Canel regime’s incentives, as appropriate use of carrots and sticks may persuade the regime to weaken counterintelligence support for Maduro.

Non-Maduro Chavismo elites have few reasons to quit, and many reasons to continue, especially due to the presence of Cuban counterintelligence. These elites know they are unlikely to be included in any deal Maduro would strike with the opposition. Furthermore, even wavering elites considering defection are aware of the dangers: Venezuelan and Cuban counterintelligence services have publicly disrupted plots in 2019, 2020, and 2025, imprisoning (or worse) scores of defectors. The benefits of defection by non-Maduro regime elites are uncertain, the probability of detection is high, and the costs of capture would be profound.

Finally, Nicolas Maduro himself is disincentivized to flee the country: he would be at high risk of interception by Cuban counterintelligence or other regime elites before reaching the airport, and face imprisonment or worse. Cubans embedded in his counterintelligence networks and personal security details would very likely be tipped off and are incentivized to prevent defection and collapse of their most important ally. Furthermore, other regime elites would have every incentive to prevent Maduro from defecting, unless they were also included in any deal. Given pervasive intra-regime electronic and physical surveillance, from both the Cubans and the Venezuelans, such coordination seems extremely unlikely. Maduro and other elites are unlikely to defect under present circumstances.

As the three pillars of the regime have little reason to defect, and much to fear from each other, any attempt at regime change via coercion and limited air strikes will very likely fail under current conditions.

Accordingly, any U.S.-led regime change effort could easily become a years-long military intervention; trigger regional unease; and entail massive costs and huge tradeoffs for the Western alliance. Venezuela is geographically larger than Texas, has a population greater than Florida, and combines vast jungle with dense urban terrain. A dead-ender coalition could melt into the jungle or urban environs, disrupting Venezuelan society for years and potentially necessitating large-scale deployments of U.S. troops. If global diesel and food prices rise due to oil production outages in Venezuela and (potentially) Colombia, the West – especially Europe – will bear significant economic costs.

Proponents of military action hold that the regime will crumble in the face of limited airstrikes. They note, correctly, that most of Venezuela’s population does not support the Maduro regime or even actively hates it. While a Chavismo collapse is possible, a total regime breakdown is unlikely. A large swathe of the Maduro regime is deeply committed – and willing to die – due to ideology, fear of prosecution for crimes, and material self-interest. Furthermore, interventionists overestimate the role of public opinion in armed insurgencies. A rigorous quantitative RAND analysis in 2010 by Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki found that insurgent popularity is, at best, moderately correlated with outcomes; unpopular insurgencies can be sustained for years, as the U.S. has experienced in Iraq and especially Afghanistan, where the insurgency eventually prevailed. History suggests limited airstrikes will not produce the desired outcome, necessitating greater and more sustained military involvement.

Such military commitments would come at a very high opportunity cost, especially in the Indo-Pacific, the primary theater of geopolitical competition. According to the U.S. State Department, the region accounts for more than half of the world’s population, 60 percent of global GDP, and two-thirds of global economic growth. It’s also the region of the world’s most important military competition. Not only do 6 out of the 9 world nuclear powers reside in the Indo-Pacific, but the Chinese Navy totals 395 ships versus 296 American ships; Chinese shipyards are producing about half of all civilian orders. Virtually all Chinese naval capacity is dedicated to the Indo-Pacific; by contrast, U.S. ships tied down in the Caribbean by the Venezuela crisis are operating far from the main theater of competition.

Use opportunities in Cuba to improve Venezuela and the migration crisis

Let’s be clear: Nicolas Maduro is one of the world’s worst dictators, immiserating his country since ascending to power in 2013. But any plan to overthrow Maduro must account for on-the-ground realities in Venezuela and the immense risks that policymakers would undertake in the primary theater.

If the U.S. is to commit significant resources to Latin America, a tertiary theater, then proponents of toppling Maduro need to deliver a realistic plan for success. Such a plan will very likely require first undermining Cuban counterintelligence networks, the Maduro regime’s linchpin, and cutting deals with regime elites – not just Maduro. Such a plan will take time and resources. The current plan of regime change via limited military pressure in Venezuela is highly unlikely to succeed. Meanwhile, a large-scale military intervention could raise energy and food prices, triggering affordability concerns in the U.S. and globally. Rather than expecting an easy pressure campaign in Venezuela, the U.S. should be very wary of overextending itself given its greater needs elsewhere. The U.S. military and intelligence services are the best in the world and will execute lawful orders, but they shouldn’t be asked to rush headlong into an unwise, large-scale military intervention outside of the primary theater.

That doesn’t mean, however, that the U.S. should accept a Maduro dictatorship. Given the outsized role of Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence in Venezuela, the Trump administration should consider cutting a deal with Havana. Such a deal with Havana would not guarantee a successful regime transition in Venezuela, given the Maduro regime’s own security services. Still, the withdrawal of Cuban personnel would materially weaken the Maduro regime, altering the calculus of regime political elites, the force structures, and Maduro himself.

Washington should test —quietly and skeptically—whether Havana is willing to trade verifiable reduction of its security footprint in Venezuela for narrow oil and energy relief. In exchange for Havana removing its security personnel from Venezuela, Washington might loosen trade restrictions and extend electricity technical cooperation, grid components, and fuel shipments from the U.S. to the Cuban power sector. Given the lack of trust between the two sides, details around important issues such as sequencing, verification, and the confirmed safe passage transfer of Cuban personnel from Venezuela to Cuba need not be public and could be decided at unofficial Track 1.5 or Track 2 discussions between the United States and Cuba.

Havana’s growing desperation and metastasizing electricity and economic crisis may leave an opening for Washington. While both regimes are odious, Havana poses less of a risk to U.S. interests: over 1 million migrants and refugees have left Cuba since 2020, versus nearly 8 million migrants and refugees from Venezuela. Pressuring the Maduro regime and ensuring Venezuelans can safely return, over the medium-term, could substantially reduce migration pressures across the Americas.

Resolving the Venezuela contingency and the migration crises sweeping the Americas might just require the art of the deal, but that path runs through Havana, not Caracas.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report.

This article reflects his own personal opinions.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.