Good point about depersonalization, and it's more than friendship. By building ties that don't depend on Putin, Beijing makes sure it keeps Russia as a junior partner whoever rules next. Courting elites, and a visa-free regime that helped bring a record two million Russians last year, isn't warmth; it's getting a foot in the door for what comes after Putin. China isn't making a friend. It's making sure it has the upper hand over Russia, whatever happens.
The depersonalization angle is intriguing, but I'm wondering: when Xi shifts toward institutionalizing the relationship rather than relying on Putin's personal role, does this actually make the partnership more stable long-term, or does it just mask deeper strategic divergences? Is institutionalization a sign of confidence in the relationship, or of hedging against dependence on an individual leader?
Good point about depersonalization, and it's more than friendship. By building ties that don't depend on Putin, Beijing makes sure it keeps Russia as a junior partner whoever rules next. Courting elites, and a visa-free regime that helped bring a record two million Russians last year, isn't warmth; it's getting a foot in the door for what comes after Putin. China isn't making a friend. It's making sure it has the upper hand over Russia, whatever happens.
Disconected from evidence.
The depersonalization angle is intriguing, but I'm wondering: when Xi shifts toward institutionalizing the relationship rather than relying on Putin's personal role, does this actually make the partnership more stable long-term, or does it just mask deeper strategic divergences? Is institutionalization a sign of confidence in the relationship, or of hedging against dependence on an individual leader?