Xi-Putin relations are shifting, post-Prigozhin mutiny

The CCP's top ideologist met with Russian nationalists

There is circumstantial but strong evidence that the Prigozhin mutiny has altered Xi’s perceptions of Putin and led him to diversify and institutionalize ties with the Russian political elite. Almost immediately after the Prigozhin mutiny, Xi recharacterized bilateral relations, emphasizing the broad-based “interests of our two countries and peoples,” subtly but clearly suggesting a desire to de-personalize bilateral relations. In addition, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has begun deepening engagement with other actors in the Russian political system, including the so-called “systemic opposition.”

Wang Huning — fourth-ranking PBSC member, the CCP’s chief ideologist, and head of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and United Front apparatus that coordinates work with non-CCP political actors — met recently in Beijing with Leonid Slutsky, head of the (woefully misnamed) Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). The Wang-Slutsky dialogue appears to be the highest-level publicly reported interaction between the two political parties, while the two parties inked a memorandum institutionalizing cooperation. The CCP’s newfound engagement with the LDPR, an ultra-nationalist party with deep skepticism of China, is further evidence that Beijing is pragmatically hedging against a wide variety of outcomes in Russia’s domestic politics in the post-war era.

Xi regards Putin’s hold on power as much less certain than before

Xi is a student of the Soviet collapse and Russian politics. His father, Xi Zhongxun, studied the Soviet Union and managed Soviet experts; Xi is a committed Marxist-Leninist; and the Soviet Union’s disintegration profoundly influenced Xi’s worldview. Since rising to the pinnacle of leadership in the Chinese Communist Party, Xi has conducted more state visits to Russia than any other country, has met with Putin more than any other leader, and characterized his personal relationship with Putin as one of “best and bosom friends.” Given his deep engagement with Russia, Xi is watching Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and drawing key lessons.

Xi’s most immediate lesson from the war is that Putin’s hold on power is less secure than he previously anticipated. Xi and the CCP appeared stunned that Putin and his domestic security services were caught flat-footed by the Prigozhin Mutiny in June 2023. The CCP’s authoritative organs – Xi himself, the MFA, and the People’s Daily – were all slow to comment publicly on the crisis, while the PRC’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “the Wagner Group incident is Russia’s internal affair.” While this is standard diplomatic language, Putin likely expected more support from Beijing. The CCP’s reluctance to immediately and publicly back Putin at a moment of maximal danger suggests that Beijing was genuinely surprised by the mutiny and unsure of the outcome.

Xi’s perception of Putin has changed. While the two figures continue to backslap in public, Xi and the CCP have quietly hedged bets and diversified ties with the rest of the Russian elite, beginning with speaker of the Russian Federation Council Valentina Matvienko’s visit to Beijing in July 2023. The meeting was out-of-cycle, as bilateral inter-parliamentary commission meetings are typically conducted in September, both prior to and after COVID. The July 2023 meeting’s content was even more instructive than the timing, however.

At the Matvienko meeting, Xi stressed that Sino-Russian relations were a “strategic choice made by the two countries based on the fundamental interests of their respective countries and peoples.” In other words, Beijing maintained that the “strategic choice” enjoyed broad support larger than any one individual. While this formulation, ”发展中俄关系是两国基于各自国家和人民根本利益作出的战略选择,” echoed prior rhetoric, including the two sides’ March 2023 joint communique, Xi’s new formulation was richer and stronger than the joint statement.

A few items are worth noting. First, the July 2023 readout elevated the phrase “fundamental interests of the two countries and their peoples,” to a standalone sentence. In addition, the May 2024 statement placed this phrase first, which is significant, given word order’s importance in Chinese. Finally, the May 2024 joint statement’s claim that bilateral ties “will not be affected by any temporary matter or single event,” appears to be a reference to the Prigozhin mutiny. Although Beijing and Moscow have used this framing in 2017 and a similar formulation in April 2023, the timing is still notable.

Xi’s comments reflect a subtle but evident shift in framing from March 2023 to July 2023, after the Prigozhin mutiny. The March 2023 joint statement emphasized “respective national conditions (各自国情).” Beijing appears to use this phrase (各自) when delineating differences between its own interests and Moscow’s. This pattern was also seen in the run-up to the Iran war, when Wang Yi emphasized the “two countries’ respective and common interests” (两国各自和共同利益), seemingly highlighting contrasting approaches in Russia, a major energy exporter, and China, the world’s largest importer of energy.

Xi’s July 2023 comments took a markedly different tone, as he called bilateral relations a “strategic choice made by the two countries based on the fundamental interests of their respective countries and peoples.” The content, timing, context, and personnel of the July 2023 meeting all suggest that Xi sought to institutionalize the relationship and safeguard bilateral ties in the event of Russian domestic political turmoil.

Beijing is diversifying ties across the Russian political spectrum, beyond Putin

One of Beijing’s most important and long-standing outreach vectors has been via the United Russia Party. Not only is United Russia the ruling party (and therefore subject to the CCP’s ruling party dialogue), but it could plausibly form the nucleus of any post-Putin Russia. The CCP has deep ties with United Russia: the two parties held their 11th dialogue mechanism in November 2025 between the International Department of the CPC Central Committee (IDCPC) and the Chairman of United Russia’s Supreme Council, while then Vice-President Xi Jinping personally attended party-to-party talks in 2010.

Beijing has also recently stepped-up ties with a wide cross-section of Russian elites, including members of Russia’s “systemic opposition” parties. Russia’s “systemic opposition” parties enjoy limited autonomy from the Putin regime and do not actively oppose its rule. Nevertheless, the CCP recognizes that the shells of systemic opposition parties – the LDPR, A Just Russia, even the Russian Communist Party – may be important actors shaping a regime transition, or a post-Putin government.

High-level meetings between CCP leaders and “systemic opposition” figures include a December 2025 discussion with Sergey Mironov, the head of A Just Russia party. The Chinese Communist Party and Xi himself have long held meetings with the leaders of the Russian Communist Party, a relationship it values for ideological and symbolic reasons.

Meetings with the ultranationalist LDPR, which has traditionally expressed Sino-skepticism, are especially noteworthy and sensitive. The LDPR previously warned about Chinese investment, especially in the Russian Far East, where its geographic support has traditionally tilted (although Russian Far East voters have shifted towards the Communists since the 2020 arrest of former LDPR Khabarovsk Governor Sergei Furgal). Moreover, the LDPR’s former party leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, previously called for all Chinese migrants to be deported from the Russian Far East. The CCP traditionally eyed the LDPR warily and eschewed engagement.

That is changing. While CCP-LDPR ties were moribund for over a decade, they began deepening in November 2023, in the aftermath of the Prigozhin mutiny. Leonid Slutsky met with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, after the last major leadership meeting was held in 2019. Slutsky’s February 2026 meeting with Wang Huning appears to be the highest-level meeting between CCP and LDPR leaders in Beijing, and probably ever. Significantly, the two sides inked a cooperation memorandum.

The CCP’s decision to begin strengthening ties with the LDPR after the June 2023 Prigozhin mutiny reflects several factors. After Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the firebrand former head of LDPR, died in April 2022, the LDPR became less Sino-phobic overnight. The LDPR has also become more deeply intertwined with the Kremlin, which is now reportedly re-branding the ultranationalist organization as Russia’s “party of diplomacy,” to external far-right parties. While the LDPR rather awkwardly invited Prigozhin to the party’s convention in late 2022 (a request he heatedly declined, in characteristic poor judgment), the party backed Putin immediately amid the mutiny and remains in the Kremlin’s good books. Finally, the LDPR’s low recorded support levels – only 3.2 percent in Russia’s Presidential electoral-like event from 2024 – do not capture widespread nationalist sentiment. For instance, roughly 38 percent of Russians agreed that “ethnic Russians in Russia should have certain advantages over everyone else,” according to a March 2022 opinion poll by the independent Levada institute. Despite the LDPR’s somewhat precarious and disorganized position, Russian nationalism is alive and well. Beijing understands that nationalists in the political, military, and intelligence wings will likely play a major role in determining political order in post-Putin Moscow, and the LDPR serves an important institutional shell for the nationalist element in the Russian political system.

Skeptics will say that these moves from International Department of the CPC Central Committee (IDCPC) are just standard CCP United Front work and standard engagement with uncontroversial opposition parties. That critique would miss the step change in Beijing’s engagement with the LDPR, which called for deporting Chinese migrants, was frozen out by Beijing for over a decade, and has now received a meeting with Wang Huning, along with a signed inter-party cooperation memorandum, all within two years of the Prigozhin mutiny.

What the CCP’s actions vis-à-vis Moscow mean for the West

Beijing does not necessarily expect a regime transition in Moscow any time soon, but Xi’s institutionalization of ties with United Russia and systemic opposition political parties, especially the ultranationalist LDPR, suggests that Xi is pragmatically hedging against a variety of outcomes in post-war Russia. Western countries should be doing the same, including by paying closer attention to the competing individuals and factions in Russian domestic politics that will jostle for influence in a post-Putin Russia.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.