Although the article is in-depth, it’s important to know what the in-depth situation is in Russian and Chinese, as the Russian text is missing.
There’s a good reason that the movie: “Lost in Translation” resonates with diplomatic sources too…
Nonetheless, thanks for the article. I’ll look more into it, as although I’m a China expert and speak Chinese as a second language, having additional source material is helpful, and can connect the puzzle better.
I feel like this is a stretch, TBH… China is usually quite careful about keeping cordial and formal state-to-state and party-to-party relations so as not to give the impression of meddling. There are a few counter-examples but not many.
Valentina Matvienko has been a special envoy from Putin to China since at least 2006. And outreach to the minor Russian parties is in line with the United Front remit of the ILD, so the death of the rapidly anti-China leader Zhirinovsky could have offered an opening for a reset, No?
Finally although the Xi family was, as you correctly state, quite pro-Soviet Xi Zhongxun never studied in Russia, as far as I am aware. He traveled there two or three times on short diplomatic missions.
Thanks for your comment. The analytic disagreement is whether the LDPR reset, the out-of-cycle Matvienko visit, and accelerated systemic opposition engagement reflects routine PRC diplomacy or a shift. The pattern shows a likely shift even if some individual elements are routine. Xi's shifting rhetoric, along with fundamentals like his demonstrated history of pragmatic hedging and Putin's less-secure grip on power in post-war Russia, point in one direction.
The CCP typically engages cordially with formal state-to-state and party-to-party relations - including with both United Russia and the CPRF - thus making the lack of engagement with the LDPR even more striking. As you say, and as the piece notes, Zhirinovsky's death gave an opening for a reset and is a factor strengthening CCP-LDPR ties.
Matvienko's visit in July 2023 was out-of-cycle, as most bilateral inter-parliamentary commission meetings are typically conducted in September. So the meeting's content *and* timing are striking. It's unlikely that the two sides would have accelerated her visit for something other than the Prigozhin mutiny.
On Xi Zhongxun, you're right that he didn't study in the country per se and have corrected above. Xi Jinping's father managed the Soviet expert program in China and traveled to Eastern Europe and the USSR semi-regularly, as Joseph Torigian notes: "The reason it’s part of Xi’s life is, as you said, he was managing the Soviet expert program, and he was visiting Eastern Europe semi-regularly."
To clarify: I agree it’s very likely that VM’s July 2023 visit was to explain the Wagner “mutiny”… but did China’s support to Putin subsequently shift?
The main thing is that China, unlike the US, almost never drops contact completely with a foreign country bc any specific leader has gone down. (Again, a few exceptions but not many). So are you observing normal operating procedure or something truly new?
Anyway useful to explore the idea… interesting post ;)
Where is the Russian translation?
Although the article is in-depth, it’s important to know what the in-depth situation is in Russian and Chinese, as the Russian text is missing.
There’s a good reason that the movie: “Lost in Translation” resonates with diplomatic sources too…
Nonetheless, thanks for the article. I’ll look more into it, as although I’m a China expert and speak Chinese as a second language, having additional source material is helpful, and can connect the puzzle better.
I feel like this is a stretch, TBH… China is usually quite careful about keeping cordial and formal state-to-state and party-to-party relations so as not to give the impression of meddling. There are a few counter-examples but not many.
Valentina Matvienko has been a special envoy from Putin to China since at least 2006. And outreach to the minor Russian parties is in line with the United Front remit of the ILD, so the death of the rapidly anti-China leader Zhirinovsky could have offered an opening for a reset, No?
Finally although the Xi family was, as you correctly state, quite pro-Soviet Xi Zhongxun never studied in Russia, as far as I am aware. He traveled there two or three times on short diplomatic missions.
Thanks for your comment. The analytic disagreement is whether the LDPR reset, the out-of-cycle Matvienko visit, and accelerated systemic opposition engagement reflects routine PRC diplomacy or a shift. The pattern shows a likely shift even if some individual elements are routine. Xi's shifting rhetoric, along with fundamentals like his demonstrated history of pragmatic hedging and Putin's less-secure grip on power in post-war Russia, point in one direction.
The CCP typically engages cordially with formal state-to-state and party-to-party relations - including with both United Russia and the CPRF - thus making the lack of engagement with the LDPR even more striking. As you say, and as the piece notes, Zhirinovsky's death gave an opening for a reset and is a factor strengthening CCP-LDPR ties.
Matvienko's visit in July 2023 was out-of-cycle, as most bilateral inter-parliamentary commission meetings are typically conducted in September. So the meeting's content *and* timing are striking. It's unlikely that the two sides would have accelerated her visit for something other than the Prigozhin mutiny.
On Xi Zhongxun, you're right that he didn't study in the country per se and have corrected above. Xi Jinping's father managed the Soviet expert program in China and traveled to Eastern Europe and the USSR semi-regularly, as Joseph Torigian notes: "The reason it’s part of Xi’s life is, as you said, he was managing the Soviet expert program, and he was visiting Eastern Europe semi-regularly."
https://www.chinatalk.media/p/xi-zhongxuns-second-act
To clarify: I agree it’s very likely that VM’s July 2023 visit was to explain the Wagner “mutiny”… but did China’s support to Putin subsequently shift?
The main thing is that China, unlike the US, almost never drops contact completely with a foreign country bc any specific leader has gone down. (Again, a few exceptions but not many). So are you observing normal operating procedure or something truly new?
Anyway useful to explore the idea… interesting post ;)