Farewell, Alexander Lukashenko? (Round 2)
PRC embassy in Moscow scrubbed some Belarus-related content; PRC-Russia agricultural trade
Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko appears to be signaling his intent to step aside. On August 12th, Lukashenko proposed amending the country's Criminal Code to punish violence and threats against current and former presidents. Russia’s state-run TASS also reported Lukashenko’s interview with Rossiya-1 TV, where he explicitly said he was preparing to step down.
Lukashenko had an eventful week, warning that nearly a third of Belarusian troops were deployed on the border with Ukraine, perhaps to draw Kyiv’s attention and resources away from the Kursk offensive. Lukashenko also called for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine – something he has done since virtually the beginning of the conflict in 2014.
I don’t have much to add on Belarus’ domestic political machinations. I’m certainly not a Belarus hand (friendly reminder to new and newish subscribers: I don’t read/speak Russian). Nor is it clear if Moscow is pressuring Lukashenko to step aside: Putin has often pondered annexing Belarus, and it’s possible that he might seek to absorb Belarus as a “consolation prize” if he fails to subdue Ukraine. At the same time, Lukashenko is about to turn 70 and may be facing genuine health problems. As always, multiple things can be true at the same time.
It isn’t clear how Beijing regards these developments, but it’s worth revisiting one of the more striking episodes in PRC-Belarus relations.
Long-time readers may remember a January 31, 2022, article that focused on China’s posture towards Belarus. In early 2022, the Chinese Embassy in Russia began including Belarus-related updates in its Russia “related news” section. Below, you can see the screenshot from January 31, 2022:
Source: Chinese Foreign Ministry via China’s Embassy in Moscow; Author’s Contemporaneous Screenshot on January 30, 2022
The two highlighted articles from January 2022 included calls between Xi Jinping and Lukashenko, including one for the 30th anniversary of PRC-Belarus relations.
Including Belarus-related updates on the webpage of the MFA’s embassy in Moscow was striking in early 2022, not least because Russian and Belarusian forces were conducting joint drills amid the Beijing Olympics. It wasn’t clear what, if anything, Beijing was signaling about Belarus.
At some point – the timing isn’t clear – the MFA erased the Xi-Lukashenko phone calls from the PRC’s Embassy in Moscow. The same website (Russia Related News, or 俄罗斯 > 相关新闻) now doesn’t include a reference to Belarus during the same time period, although the other events remain.
Source: Chinese Foreign Ministry via China’s Embassy in Moscow （Related News Section： 相关新闻）; Author’s Screenshot on August 18, 2024
It’s not clear what happened. As the Report noted at the time, it’s possible that someone at the MFA made a careless error (Belarus translates as “White Russia,” or 白俄罗斯, whereas Russia is just 俄罗斯). The PRC’s Russia work can be sloppy sometimes: in what was almost surely a mistake rather than a signal, a commentary in the authoritative People’s Daily on October 30th, 2021 didn’t include Putin’s formal title.
With Taiwan-related tensions likely to increase in future years, the PRC’s authoritative external-facing apparatus needs to be conscientious and competent. Miscommunication by the PRC’s authoritative external-facing organs could lead to misinterpretation.
Of course, it’s also possible that Beijing is signaling something about Belarus.
I’d like to read more analysis on Luka’s potential step-down. If you’ve recently written on Belarus or plan to do so, feel free to drop me a line.
Other PRC perspectives on Russia
The Russian Federal Maritime Committee will be responsible for the strategic development of the Russian Navy, protecting Russia's national interests in the Arctic, and developing and supporting Russia's maritime activities.
Comment: Interesting that the PD noted this topic.
The Belgorod region has declared a regional state of emergency due to the escalating situation, with authorities considering elevating the emergency status to the federal level, the region's governor Vyacheslav Gladkov said on his Telegram channel on Wednesday.
PRC – Russia agricultural trade
This chapter explores Russia–China agri-food trade as part of that context, as part of a relationship marked by increasingly close rapprochement if not entente. However, in agricultural trade as in the broader political relationship, high-level declarative cooperation is tempered by the countries’ respective national and domestic priorities, which are not always aligned. China is and will remain an important trade partner for Russia to reach its main export goals for 2024. However, the chapter thus cautions there are a number of technical as well as political hurdles to enhance trade cooperation.
[I]ncreased trade and market access belies the reality that the ties between the two powers in this sector are still marred by a range of tariff and non-tariff barriers and mismatched rather than complementary market profiles. Moreover, the sector replicates many of the asymmetric dynamics that mark the broader economic relationship. To the extent that the sector has increasingly been considered by authorities in strategic terms, however, Sino– Russian trade in this sector proves a useful indicator of both the possibilities and the limits of the broader bilateral rapprochement.
Comment: Thank you, Jiayi, for sending these in.
Until next time,
Joe
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.