Most troops at Ukraine’s border since 2014
Quad+France exercises; Lavrov vists Delhi
Russian troops continue to mass along Ukraine’s borders. The probability of some kind of large-scale military action appears to be rising.
As discussed in the previous edition of The Report, Putin has announced that he will address the Federal Assembly on April 21st and virtually attend the White House’s climate change summit the following day. He appears to have decided on some course of action, although his next steps remain unclear.
The Kremlin’s decision making is presumably being driven largely by non-public information: domestic popular and (especially) elite opinion, Crimea’s water levels, military balances in Donbas, etc. I am most curious about Crimea’s water inventories: the Kremlin’s calculus could shift dramatically if Crimea’s water supply can cover two years of demand versus, say, only two months.
There have been some interesting RIC (Russia-India-China) developments: the Quad + France held an exercise in the Bay of Bengal, Lavrov visited New Delhi and Islamabad, and New Delhi and Taipei appear to be deepening cooperation.
The Report will publish shorter (but more frequent) newsletters going forward. Thank you to everyone who wrote in with your preferences.
1) Ukraine
2) RIC (Russia-India-China)
3) China-Russia
4) Russian domestic politics and economy
5) China & Russia Vaccines
1) Ukraine
The build-up of Russian troops near the border with Ukraine is the largest concentration seen since 2015, according to a report from the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) published by The Insider. Using open source data, CIT’s analysts tracked the movements of Russian troops and determined that they’re headed towards the Crimean Peninsula and the vicinity of Voronezh. According to CIT, these transfers are indicative of strategic military exercises, not local ones. However, the analysts also underscored that these aren’t signs that a Russian invasion of Ukraine is imminent.
Comment: Trenin enjoys close ties with the Kremlin and often appears to be an instrument in its management of international expert and popular opinion. Here he is on February 23, 2014, with a NYT op-ed saying “Why Russia Won’t Interfere”
Kiev may also believe that a new conflict will have a high cost for Russia. Even in the event of the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Moscow is unlikely to go beyond the existing boundaries of the DPR and LPR. New sanctions will be imposed against Russia. Perhaps the Ukrainian leadership also hopes for good luck. Even tactical successes in Donbass will strengthen the Ukrainian position.
However, this scenario is still extremely risky for Kiev. In recent years, Russia has shown that it is ready to take decisive action. Force can be used without undue hesitation. Moscow understands that the West will side with Ukraine in any scenario. But political support is one thing, and military intervention is quite another. The United States and its allies are unlikely to agree to such an intervention. Even the supply of lethal weapons will have its limits…
Apparently, the Ukrainian leadership does not intend to bring the matter to a direct clash. It is escalating the situation, trying to attract the attention of Western partners and gain points for the future. Most likely, the Kiev authorities initiated the current manoeuvres of their own accord, and they are not the result of the "insidious game" of the West. However, the American and EU diplomats may well use such manoeuvres to put pressure on Russia. The main threat is the loss of control over the situation, should the symbolic whipping turn into a real conflict. In the end, full-scale military operations in Donbass in the near future are not the baseline scenario. Russia is a strong adversary; the risk of big losses for Ukraine are great. Accordingly, it is hardly worth considering a scenario of a sharp tightening of sanctions against Russia. No radical aggravation—no radical sanctions.
Crimean Bridge protected from air, land and water — National Guard chief – TASS
The waters adjacent to this major transport artery are patrolled by National Guard boats while combat swimmers inspect the bridge supports underwater, TASS was told
Comment: I agree with Snegovaya that a conflict wouldn’t boost Putin’s approval ratings. The Kremlin likely understands the risks of a conflict, but they may believe they have no choice.
Russia's Military Buildup on the Ukrainian Border, with Maxim Samorukov and Michael Kofman – Brussel Sprouts Podcast [Kofman’s discussion of the water shortage/seize Kherson oblast scenario begins at 27:51]
[Paraphrasing] Kofman: “[an invasion of Kherson oblast] looks pretty easy to people with crayons on a map… but seizing one part of a country may solve one problem but create a whole host of other dilemmas… quickly you find out that this entire region depends on electricity from other parts of Ukraine, depends on food and other thing from other parts of Ukraine, and quickly you find out that taking this region is not sustainable… you will earn yourself a whole set of new problems”
Comment: The Canal seizure isn’t probable; a Land Bridge to Crimea is even less likely. But I also wouldn’t dismiss either possibility, especially without knowing more about Crimea’s water inventories.
Yes, invading Kherson and seizing the canal would create a host of new problems for the occupiers, including electricity and food supply. But these problems could likely be resolved in a matter of weeks and could very well prove more manageable, over the long term, than Crimea’s water issue.
To solve the electricity problems from newly acquired territories, Putin could string new transmission wires from the Russian grid (assuming excess capacity can be found in/squeezed from SE Russia's electricity market). Establishing/augmenting interconnections with the Russian grid could be completed relatively quickly, probably in a matter of weeks. Over the medium-term (i.e. 12-36 months or so), Russia could construct local coal plants, making the occupation more “sustainable.” Note that electricity dynamics make a winter invasion unlikely.
Food can be shipped into the occupied zone from anywhere, and seizing the canal could restore Crimea's water access and even revitalize Crimea agriculture to some degree (over the medium-term).
Some early, non-military indications of an imminent invasion could therefore include a stockpiling of Russian electricity generation/transmission assets/construction crews/food, etc.
Would solving the new electricity and food security problems generated by an invasion prove highly expensive for the Kremlin? Yes, especially since the Kremlin would likely face unprecedented sanctions, considerable military resistance, sabotage from Ukrainian stay-behinds, etc. But the Kremlin may regard this scenario as more appealing than standing by *if* the Crimea's water reserves are about to dry up, which could cause all sorts of hell for the Kremlin domestically.
2) RIC (Russia-India-China)
Vaccine from India, weapons for Pakistan - what Lavrov discussed in New Delhi, Islamabad – TASS
Moscow welcomes recent steps by Pakistan and India on normalizing bilateral relations and hopes that New Delhi will manage to find ways of settling its border standoff with Beijing, the Russian chief diplomat said. In general, Moscow is ready to "facilitate in every possible way" a peaceful resolution of conflicts in South Asia.
Comment: Very informative thread
Measuring up to the China challenge is likely to keep Indian policymakers engaged for the foreseeable future but some signs are emerging of late of an interesting approach. The coordinated steps, though seemingly unrelated, are free of exaggerated respect towards China’s delicate sensibilities. Perhaps the Galwan tragedy has created space for a perceptible shift in India’s behaviour as we see hints of greater flexibility and an appetite for calculated risk-taking…
Third, the Quad-plus formulation — a flexible grouping of like-minded nations — opens up possibilities for regional powers to be a part of the maritime architecture. Many of these nations who have a running dispute with China, may be encouraged to join a Quad-plus grouping. The other possibility that arises is that Quad or Quad-plus formulations hog the limelight, allowing ASEAN nations such as Malaysia, Philippines or Vietnam to engage in bilateral or even minilateral exercises with the Quad powers while staying under the radar.
Comment: Very comprehensive and insightful, I learned a lot from this article
First, India is sticking to its decades-old “one China” policy, so it is implausible to push for that decision to change. Although India has never included Taiwan in its acknowledgement of the policy — in written form at least — and since 2010 has stopped mentioning the policy in joint statements and other official documents, its adherence remains unmoved. However, there is a need to explore suitable and effective alternatives so that the “one China” policy does not obstruct the path to a higher degree of India-Taiwan partnership…
Even though Taiwan-India relations require greater attention, the two nations are reaching out to each other. In Taipei, the appointment of Tien Chung-kwang (田中光), former representative to India, as deputy minister of foreign affairs is a welcome move, while in New Delhi, an encouraging step would be to include Taiwan in its Act East Policy. Dialogue between senior officials should be initiated in areas such as policymaking, cybersecurity and the Indo-Pacific region.
Therefore, India needs to build a strong and robust partnership with the US to effectively contain China. India thinks that the presence of the US in South Asia would help maintain a balance of power in its favor. Without access to the US’ advanced weaponry and technology, India cannot modernize its military. The US’ changed policy toward Pakistan has also emboldened India to forge closer ties with Washington.
While the “China factor” has spurred profound bilateral cooperation between India and the US, the two sides have also taken calibrated moves to improve their relationship with Taiwan — which under the leadership of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has emerged as an anchor of the “anti-China crusade.”
This in turn opens a new avenue for cooperation between Taipei, Washington and New Delhi.
Comment: Framing this initiative as an “Anti-China crusade” is cringe worthy.
With China becoming a country of global consequence, we need to understand the Sinic world better. And Taiwan knows China best, which is why cooperation with Taipei makes strategic sense for New Delhi. Plus, with the troop disengagement process in eastern Ladakh stalled, Beijing clearly doesn’t respect ‘One India’. There is no reason then for India to be overly sensitive about China’s territorial claims. Add to this the China-Pakistan axis that aims to strategically hem in India. If Beijing insists on treating Islamabad as its ‘iron brother’, it may be time for New Delhi and Taipei to elevate their relationship and forge their own fraternity as well.
It is for the first time that Indian warships shall be participating in La Perouse exercise, and this now completes the QUAD force representation in the French led naval exercise.
India all set for France's La Pérouse naval drill. Here's all you need to know – Hindustan Times
India and three other members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the United States, Australia, and Japan, is all set to take part in the 'La Pérouse' joint naval exercise, organised by France and scheduled to take place from April 5-7 at the Bay of Bengal.
Quad-plus-France drill is publicity stunt, won’t strengthen loose group – Global Times
Despite the first Quad summit held on March 12 dominating headlines of global media reports, it is evident that its members are loosely knit with temporary purposes and interests. The fact can hardly be changed even if Indian media outlets are busy hyping up the Quad-plus-France military exercise, which will take place in the Bay of Bengal from April 4 to 7, in an attempt to show off the group's military cooperation.
3) China-Russia
On the 6th, Ukrainian President [Volodymyr] Zelensky urged NATO to advance the process of accepting Ukraine as soon as possible, saying that this is the "only way" to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov warned that day that the above-mentioned actions would only aggravate the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
In April 2014, a large-scale conflict broke out between Ukrainian government forces and civilian armed forces [note: this is the official Russian line too] in the Donbass region.
China has become the largest sovereign creditor of post-Soviet countries after Russia, according to a World Bank report. In total, Beijing bankrolled the former USSR republics to the tune of $6.6 bln. China issued most of the loans to Belarus ($3.5 bln), Kyrgyzstan ($1.8 bln), and Tajikistan ($1.1 bln). According to experts interviewed by Izvestia, the myth of China's imperial ambitions, including in the post-Soviet space, is exaggerated, therefore, from a political point of view, the risks for Russia from it are not very high. However, as far as commercial activity goes, it is likely that China will elbow Russian business out of these countries.
China is gradually becoming the most important partner for Central Asian countries, says Alexander Gabuev who chairs the Russia in Asia-Pacific program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. This is a completely natural trend that has been gaining momentum in recent decades. From a geopolitical point of view, the strengthening of China in the post-Soviet space is unlikely to pose a serious threat to Russia, although Moscow’s cultural influence is decreasing, it is still quite large, moreover, the states themselves are warier of China than Russia.
4) Russian domestic politics and economy
No foreign leaders to be invited to Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 — Kremlin – TASS
"No. This is not a jubilee year. No foreign guests will be invited," Peskov said when asked if invitations to the Victory Parade would be sent to foreign leaders.
Comment: Not sure why the Kremlin isn’t inviting foreign leaders this year (they did in 2020, despite the pandemic). Maybe Lukashenko/other FSU leaders can’t make it because of popular and elite politics at home? Or are they staying away because of a possible conflict involving Ukraine?
Belarusian leader confirms plans to attend Victory Parade in Moscow – May 2020 TASS
Russia May Be Carbon’s Last Refuge – Clara Ferreira Marques for Bloomberg
Ruble Slides on Ukraine Conflict Fears – Moscow Times
The ruble has lost 2% against the U.S. dollar since the start of the week and is now trading at 77.7 against the currency — its lowest level since the U.S. election last November. Concerns over Russia’s apparent military buildup near the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine and on the Crimean peninsula have led to a sharp increase in the possibility of the simmering conflict escalating, analysts say.
Russia Inflation Hits Four-Year High, Adding to Rate-Hike Pressure – Bloomberg
Russian authorities keep situation with ruble rate under control — Kremlin – TASS
The spokesman was answering a question whether a sharp depreciation of the ruble, similar to the "Black Tuesday" of 2014, could repeat itself due to the situation in Donbass
Zoom Bans Sales to Russian Government, State Firms – Kommersant – Moscow Times
Experts interviewed by Kommersant linked the ban to risks of U.S. sanctions and difficulties complying with Russian legislation, which Moscow began enforcing in full in recent years.
Five Russian video communication systems can be alternative to Zoom – TASS
Kremlin affirms neither Putin, nor his administration use Zoom for official purposes – TASS
Both President Vladimir Putin and his presidential staff do not use Zoom video service for official purposes, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters on Wednesday.
Earlier, Kommersant daily reported that Zoom Video Communications had prohibited its distributors from selling its online conference services to government agencies and state-owned firms in Russia and former Soviet countries. The newspaper cited a letter by RightConf, Zoom’s distributor in Russia and the CIS, to its partners dated March 31. According to the letter, Zoom Video Communications Inc. is revoking its Russian partner's authorization to sell services to state agencies and companies with government beneficiaries. Reports say that RightConf CEO Andrei Petrenko confirmed the authenticity of the letter to Kommersant. He also specified that the restrictions apply not only to Russia, but also to CIS countries. That said, Petrenko said that his company would continue working according to existing contracts.
5) China & Russia Vaccines
Chile’s lauded vaccine rollout fails to save it from Covid surge – FT
Comment: Sinovac effectiveness after one jab may be just 3% (rises to 56% after the second shot).
EU regulator to probe ethical standards of Sputnik vaccine trials – FT
Russia may meet COVID-19 inoculation targets by autumn — top sanitary doctor – TASS
"We would like this [vaccination of 60% of adult Russians - TASS] to happen by autumn for several reasons: first of all, the country has the relevant capabilities and, secondly, as we said earlier, by autumn there will be an increase [in incidence]," [Head of the Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing Anna Popova] said in an interview with the Komsomolskaya Pravda radio station.
Until next time,
Joe Webster
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.