China’s Russia Strategy After the Xi–Putin Meeting: Depersonalize, Institutionalize, Insulate

Beijing is reframing the China–Russia relationship around political systems, "traditional friendship" and historical memory. It’s a hedge against a post-war reckoning in Moscow.

Beijing is working to institutionalize ties with Moscow and hedge against potential shifts in Russian domestic politics. During Xi’s visit to Moscow last week, both he and authoritative state media emphasized the two sides’ “traditional friendship” (传统友谊) and - more provocatively - their “fighting friendship” 战斗友谊 in World War 2.

These formulations aren’t new. “Traditional friendship” 传统友谊” has been used in state media and MFA statements since at least the 1950s to describe ties with North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and various African states. “战斗友谊” (combat or fighting friendship) has been invoked in reference to countries that fought alongside China or the PLA—particularly the Soviet Union during World War II and North Korea during the Korean War. For instance, Xi mentioned “fighting friendship” during his 2015 Victory Day visit to Moscow.

The novelty lies not in the words themselves, but in their growing prominence and frequency. “Traditional friendship” (传统友谊) is increasingly used more systematically and visibly in high-level diplomacy with Russia, including joint statements, Xi’s signed articles, and People’s Daily editorials. The shifting emphasis reflects Beijing’s broader effort to depersonalize the relationship and reduce reliance on Putin by highlighting societal links.

This new emphasis on institutionalizing ties became more pronounced after the Prigozhin mutiny in June 2023. When Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko visited Beijing the following month, Xi first described Sino-Russian ties as a “strategic choice made by the two countries based on the fundamental interests of their respective countries and peoples.” (发展中俄关系是两国基于各自国家和人民根本利益作出的战略选择). In context, Xi and the CCP were clearly signaling to Russia’s political elite their intent to sustain close ties with Moscow, regardless of who holds power.

Indeed, the PRC likely sees a medium-term leadership transition in Russia as increasingly plausible—though not necessarily likely. Putin’s grip remains firm for now, bolstered by elite and public support for the war and a formidable techno-surveillance apparatus. Still, a post-war reckoning could challenge his rule. With nearly one million casualties and hundreds of billions in lost economic growth, failure to achieve even his minimal objective of demilitarizing Ukraine could seriously erode his legitimacy.

While Putin is a highly skilled domestic political operator and could remain in power for years, Russia’s domestic political post-war outlook is increasingly uncertain. Beijing is institutionalizing ties with Russia’s political system to insulate the bilateral relationship from potential upheaval.

ChatGPT 4o image prompt: Please make a graphic of Xi Jinping and the CCP aiming to institutionalize their relationship with the broad Russian political ecosystem. Include the PRC and Russian flags in the background but make all the Russian figures blank.

Joint Statement

Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Further Deepening the China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination in the New Era on the Occasion of Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War and the Founding of the United Nations – People’s Daily [Chinese-language; machine-translated]

The two sides agreed that the two peoples forged a profound fighting friendship [战斗友谊; bolded by The Report] and mutual assistance in the World Anti-Fascist War, laying a solid foundation for the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination between China and Russia in the new era. At present, with the joint efforts of both sides, China-Russia relations have reached the highest level in history and continue to develop steadily and in all directions, setting an example for building a new type of international relations and becoming a model for cooperation between the world's major powers and each other's largest neighbors.

Over a long period of time, China and Russia have formed extensive common interests, and the overall development goals of the two countries are mutually consistent, forming a solid foundation for cooperation in various fields between the two sides. China-Russia relations have unique strategic value and strong endogenous driving force. They are not directed against any third party, nor are they subject to any third party. In the face of an international situation full of changes and chaos, the two sides will maintain strategic determination, always regard each other as priority partners, and jointly resist any attempt to interfere with and undermine the traditional friendship and deep mutual trust between China and Russia [bolded by The Report], help each other's development and revitalization, and inject stability and positive energy into the world.

…

The Russian side reiterated its commitment to the one-China principle, recognizing that there is only one China in the world, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China, and that the government of the People's Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing all of China. The Russian side opposes any form of "Taiwan independence" and firmly supports the measures taken by the Chinese government to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity and achieve national reunification.

China supports Russia in safeguarding its national security, stability, development and prosperity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and opposes external interference in Russia's internal affairs.

The two sides will be guided by the diplomacy of heads of state, fully implement the important consensus reached by the two heads of state, continue to maintain close high-level exchanges, and ensure the high-level operation of the government, legislature and inter-party exchange mechanisms.

The two sides reiterated that the close relationship between the Chinese and Russian militaries is of special significance, which will help the two countries to more effectively defend their sovereignty and national interests and effectively respond to traditional and non-traditional threats and challenges. The two sides will continue to strengthen military and military technical cooperation to benefit the people of China and Russia and safeguard global and regional security. The two sides will further deepen military mutual trust and cooperation, expand the scale and scope of joint military exercises, regularly organize joint maritime and air patrols, strengthen exchanges and cooperation under bilateral and multilateral frameworks, and promote China-Russia military cooperation to a higher level. [bolded by The Report]

…

[The two sides will] continue to consolidate the comprehensive energy cooperation partnership, support business entities in implementing cooperation projects in the fields of oil, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, civil nuclear energy, coal, electricity, renewable energy [bolded by The Report], etc., maintain the stable operation of relevant cross-border infrastructure, and promote smooth energy transportation.

….

In order to prevent the two peoples' contributions in fighting against Japanese militarism and Nazi Germany from being forgotten, China and Russia will continue to resist any attempt to mislead young people. In order to protect traditional moral values, correct historical perspectives and cultural identity, continue to pass on moral norms, continue the friendly traditions of the two peoples [bolded by The Report], and enhance mutual understanding, the two sides agreed to:

Strengthen educational cooperation, improve the legal basis for cooperation, further expand cooperation in the fields of general vocational education, secondary vocational education, vocational education and training, and between the two countries' universities, strengthen relevant cooperation within the framework of multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, expand the scale of mutual exchange of students, and promote Chinese teaching in Russia and Russian teaching in China. Continue to support the two countries' first-class universities in formulating and implementing joint teaching plans and scientific research. Support the development of alliances of similar universities in China and Russia, jointly carry out academic exchanges, and hold scientific research conferences and other scientific and educational activities.

….

The two sides pointed out that one of the strategic risks that urgently needs to be eliminated is that some nuclear-weapon states are expanding their military alliances in sensitive areas around other nuclear-weapon states, exerting pressure by force or carrying out hostile acts that threaten the fundamental security interests of other countries. The two sides condemned some nuclear-weapon states for developing an unrestricted global multi-layered anti-missile system, deploying land-based medium- and short-range missiles targeting other nuclear-weapon states abroad, and promoting the so-called "extended deterrence" and "nuclear sharing" arrangements that are extremely destructive, undermining regional stability and global security. The two sides oppose all kinds of provocative actions that raise tensions and strategic risks against nuclear-weapon states.

….

The two sides highly appreciated the prospect of further strengthening the comprehensive cooperation among China, Russia and Mongolia and building the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, and will actively promote the implementation of key cooperation projects and matters under the corridor.

…

Both sides advocate maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic region and preventing military and political tensions in the region.

Comments: There are eight mentions of “tradition” (传统) and two mentions of friendship (友谊)，up from 5 and 0, respectively, in the two sides’ 2022 joint statement.

Other takeaways: there was no explicit mention of Ukraine in the section discussing each country’s “core interests,” although Beijing is of course supporting the Kremlin’s invasion in many ways. There was no explicit mention of Power of Siberia-2, even in the Mongolia section. The Arctic’s inclusion in the readout is noteworthy given that the subject is something of a sore point.

Traditional friendship [传统友好]

All walks of life in Russia are eagerly looking forward to President Xi Jinping's state visit to Russia and his attendance at the celebrations commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War – People’s Daily (俄罗斯各界热切期待习近平主席对俄罗斯进行国事访问并出席纪念苏联伟大卫国战争胜利80周年庆典)

They expect that under the strategic guidance of the heads of state of Russia and China, Russia and China will deepen their traditional friendship, firmly defend the results of the victory of the Second World War, and jointly maintain global strategic stability and international fairness and justice.

俄罗斯各界人士热切期待习近平主席对俄罗斯进行国事访问并出席在莫斯科举行的纪念苏联伟大卫国战争胜利80周年庆典。他们期待在俄中两国元首的战略引领下，俄中深化传统友好，并坚定捍卫二战胜利成果，共同维护全球战略稳定和国际公平正义。

Comments: “Traditional friendship” again.

Though the article claims to reflect “all walks of life” in Russia, its core message highlights elite consensus in favor of close China–Russia ties. By interviewing Rusian senior officials and foreign policy figures, Beijing appears intent on deepening and institutionalizing relations beyond Putin. Interviewees included, in this order:

· First Deputy Chairman of the International Affairs Committee,

· the special representative of the Russian president,

· the former deputy secretary-general of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

· the Russian ambassador to Germany(!),

· the First Deputy Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Duma,

· a Russian think tank scholar

While the notion of a historically friendly relationship isn’t entirely groundless, the narrative lacks nuance. The Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed in 1689, indeed was the first time the Qing dynasty acknowledged another state as an equal. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the PRC exchanged blows in 1969 during the Sino-Soviet border conflict.

Russia-China cooperation in the field of green and low-carbon has great potential – People’s Daily 俄中绿色低碳领域合作潜力巨大

"China-Russia relations continue to deepen, and the results of bilateral cooperation are benefiting the people of both countries [bolded by The Report]," said Oleg Deripaska, Russian Chairman of the Ecological Council of the China-Russia Committee for Friendship, Peace, and Development [The Report note: Deripaska is also the former CEO of Rusal, is sanctioned by the U.S., and holds significant financial stakes in metals, energy, and infrastructure]

…

Deripaska stated that with joint efforts from both sides, the scale of cooperation is continuously expanding, maintaining a positive trend of stable quantity and improving quality. In recent years, China has made remarkable achievements in the field of green development, particularly in solar and wind power, and it possesses abundant renewable energy resources, the world’s largest electric vehicle market, and a complete upstream and downstream industrial chain. As a result, China has become a global leader in energy investment.

…

“Russia can learn from China’s experience with supply-side structural reforms to foster a mature green energy market. There is great potential for China-Russia cooperation in the green and low-carbon sector.”

….

[Deripaska] noted that simplifying visa procedures and enhancing connectivity between the two countries will facilitate further flourishing of cultural exchanges. “People-to-people exchanges play an increasingly important role in enhancing mutual understanding and consolidating traditional friendship between our two peoples,” he said. [bolded by The Report]

“俄中关系不断巩固，双边合作成果惠及两国民众。” 中俄友好、和平与发展委员会生态理事会俄方主席奥列格·杰里帕斯卡日前在接受本报记者采访时表示.

….

杰里帕斯卡表示，在俄中双方共同努力下，两国合作规模不断扩大，保持了量稳质升的良好态势。近年来，中国在绿色发展领域取得显著成就，尤其是在光伏、风电等领域取得了长足发展，拥有丰富的可再生能源和全球最大的电动汽车市场及上下游配套产业链，成为全球能源投资领域的领先者。

…

“俄罗斯可以学习中国供给侧结构性改革经验，促进成熟绿色能源市场的形成。俄中绿色低碳领域合作潜力巨大。”

….

人文交流对于促进两国人民相互了解、巩固两国传统友谊日益发挥着重要作用”。

Comments: Again, PRC media seeks to underscore broad elite support for bilateral relations between China and Russia. Deripaska’s comments hew so closely to PRC formulations of “interests of both our peoples” and “traditional friendship” that the interview seems staged or at least highly scripted.

Oleg Deripaska is also one of the only “climate-forward” figures in the Russian political elite. As Thane Gustasfon writes in Klimat, “Rusal’s overseas expansion made it a major emitter of greenhouse gases, and an increasingly visible target… as the global campaign against climate change gained momentum…. Inside Russia, Deripaska became an energetic campaigner for a more active policy to control emissions, against the resistance of most of Russian industry.” It’s worth noting that Rusal’s aluminum production is co-located with renewable hydropower, reducing its overall emissions and increasing its competitiveness ahead of potential global carbon tariffs. The energy transition may also shift Russia’s domestic political economy in ways that benefit Deripaska.

The article is also notable due to Deripaska’s stake in Norilsk Nickel, which produces 99% of Russia’s nickel and 17% of the global Class 1 nickel vital for Chinese EVs, battery storage, and dual-use military systems. Norilsk is also relocating a copper smelter to China amid sanctions, though Russian copper reportedly faces growing competition from Indonesia.

Deripaska may be a bellwether for Russia’s openness to Chinese advanced energy tech like EVs, solar, and batteries. Russia has been conspicuously slow to adopt these technologies, partly because of its incumbent technologies. Russia’s hydrocarbon sectors—oil, gas, and coal—remain central, alongside a robust hydropower and nuclear sector. Given that Russia’s energy sector will compete with Chinese advanced energy technology imports, both abroad and in Russia’s own domestic market, the energy transition may become an increasingly contentious issue in China-Russia relations.

Short Video | The Enduring Source of China-Russia Intergenerational Friendship – People’s Daily [微视频丨中俄世代友好的不竭源泉]

This is a period of history that the Chinese people, the Russian people and the people of the world will never forget.

这段历史，中国人民永远不会忘记，俄罗斯人民永远不会忘记，世界人民也永远不会忘记。

Comments: The emphasis on intergenerational friendship is another attempt to institutionalize the bilateral relationship.

Xi's upcoming visit to deepen China-Russia ties, bolster global peace – People’s Daily [English-language]

In 2024, bilateral trade rose to 244.8 billion U.S. dollars, making China the largest trading partner of Russia for 15 consecutive years. In December 2024, the China-Russia east-route natural gas pipeline was fully completed. Cooperation in emerging sectors such as the digital economy, e-commerce, bio-medicine, scientific and technological innovation, as well as green energy [bolded by The Report] continues to expand.

The two countries' long-lasting friendship [bolded by The Report] has grown increasingly popular among the two peoples. The mutual visa exemption agreement for group tours has encouraged more robust two-way travel. Hundreds of cultural events have been held in succession with the framework of the China-Russia Year of Culture.

Comments: More emphasis on “long-lasting” friendship (I translate “传统” as “traditional” but the PD apparently does not). As a side bar, the PRC didn’t mention the Power of Siberia-2 natural gas pipeline. Advanced energy technologies – advanced batteries, heat pumps, building efficiency improvements, solar, etc – and the trend of rising temperatures are reducing north China’s natural gas demand, all things being equal, while LNG markets appear oversupplied for at least the rest of the decade, diminishing Beijing’s interest in Russian pipeline natural gas.

The economic relationship, including in autos, is becoming highly imbalanced. Beijing’s growing economic and financial influence in Russia could spark a backlash in the post-war period. The EU may have an opportunity to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow by imposing higher tariffs on Chinese-made ICE vehicles. This measure would mechanically redirect Chinese auto exports to the Russian market, further pressuring Russian automakers struggling to ramp up production. I’ll write more about this soon.

Xi’s signed article in Russian media; reflections on World War 2

Full text of Xi's signed article in Russian media – People’s Daily [English]

We must uphold a correct historical perspective on WWII. China and the Soviet Union were the principal theaters of that war in Asia and Europe respectively. The two countries served as the mainstay of resistance against Japanese militarism and German Nazism, making pivotal contribution to the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. The Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression began the earliest and lasted the longest. United as one under the banner of the Chinese united front against Japanese aggression, which was advocated and established by the CPC, the Chinese people launched a relentless struggle against and defeated the brutal Japanese militarists. With immense sacrifice, they carved out an immortal epic of heroic resistance and ultimate victory against Japanese aggression. In the European theater, the Soviet Red Army advanced like an iron tide with unwavering fortitude and valor, crushed Nazi Germany's ambitions and liberated millions from its brutal occupation, writing an epic of victory in the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War.

….

This year also marks the 80th anniversary of the restoration of Taiwan. Taiwan's restoration to China is a victorious outcome of WWII and an integral part of the postwar international order. A series of instruments with legal effect under international law, including the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, have all affirmed China's sovereignty over Taiwan. The historical and legal fact therein brooks no challenge. And the authority of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 brooks no challenge. No matter how the situation on the Taiwan island evolves or what troubles external forces may make, the historical trend toward China's ultimate and inevitable reunification is unstoppable.

China and Russia have all along firmly supported each other on issues bearing on our respective core interests or major concerns. Russia has reiterated on many occasions that it strictly adheres to the one-China principle, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory, it opposes any form of "Taiwan independence," and it firmly supports all measures of the Chinese government and the Chinese people to achieve national reunification. China highly commends Russia's consistent position.

Special Report: Xi Jinping: A firm supporter, defender and promoter of world peace and development- People’s Daily 特稿丨习近平: 世界和平与发展的坚定支持者、维护者、推动者

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War and the World Anti-Fascist War.

Comment: No specific mention of Western contributions, although the European and Pacific theaters are mentioned later.

… President Xi Jinping has repeatedly reiterated that China adheres to the path of peaceful development and will never seek hegemony, expansion, spheres of influence or pursue an arms race, no matter how developed it is.

Comment: This formulation “never seek hegemony, expansion, spheres of influence or pursue an arms race, no matter how developed it is” isn’t new – Xi raised it virtually at the Boao forum in 2021.

今年是中国人民抗日战争、苏联伟大卫国战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利80周年。

…

习近平主席多次重申，中国坚持走和平发展道路，无论发展到什么程度，永远不称霸、不扩张、不谋求势力范围，不搞军备竞赛。

Until next time,

Joe

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.

Shipbuilding and a Shifting Maritime Balance

A look at U.S. shipbuilding efforts, China's dual-use fleet, new maritime sanctions, and why battery breakthroughs matter for military competition.

This update will focus on shipbuilding. At the Atlantic Council we’ll be holding a public event on May 1^st at 10 AM featuring Senator Mark Kelly, Senator Todd Young, and Congressman John Garamendi on the SHIPS for America Act. I’m looking forward to seeing some of you there.

Retired Captain Thomas Shugart just started a navalist Substack, The Shugart Update. The first post examines “Chinese global maritime power—its scale, its origins, and its implications for free societies.” Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs of CSIS recently launched a report, Ship Wars: Confronting China’s Dual-Use Shipbuilding Empire that “offers a detailed policy roadmap for how Washington can disrupt China’s military-civil fusion strategy, erode China’s market dominance, and increase shipbuilding capacity within the United States and key partner countries.” I also recently wrote an analysis for ChinaTalk on how the PRC civilian fleet could enable a distributed, real-time radar and sonar sensor network around Taiwan and conduct drone strikes, mine-laying, and other operations.

An update on the PRC’s rhetoric surrounding “两国和两国人民的根本利益” [The fundamental interests of the two countries and their peoples]. The PRC initially adopted this rhetoric following the Prigozhin mutiny, as The Report noted at the time. Since then, the PRC has repeated this formulation for other, non-Russian countries, including (at least) Nauru. Finally, the authoritative People’s Daily Chinese-language service eliminated its Russia-related section a few months ago. Interestingly, only five countries are now covered by the PD’s world affairs update: Japan, the United States, South Korea, and Australia/New Zealand (grouped together).

I plan to write analyses on China-Russia economic ties and 两国和两国人民的根本利益 over the next month or so, although I haven’t decided the best format for both pieces. I’ll also likely publish analyses on AI and energy, U.S. dual-use trade, and shipbuilding for the Atlantic Council. Thank you for reading the China-Russia Report. I look forward to seeing some of you soon.

Picture (ChatGPT 4o prompt): A picture of a submarine, a destroyer, a container ship, unmanned surface vessels, and First-Person View (FPV) quadcopters

Shipbuilding

Strengthening US shipbuilding: Congress’s role in maritime revitalization

Senator Mark Kelly, Senator Todd Young, and Congressman John Garamendi discuss the SHIPS for America Act and its implications for the future of US national security.

Event: Thu, May 1, 2025 • 10:00 am ET 1400 L Street NW Floor 11 Washington, DC 20005

Comment: Public event with Senator Kelly, Senator Young, and Representative Garamendi.

Ship Wars: Confronting China’s Dual-Use Shipbuilding Empire – Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs for CSIS

“This CSIS report explores the close ties between commercial and military shipbuilding in China, focusing in particular on the role that foreign firms are inadvertently playing in facilitating the expansion and modernization of the PLAN. Utilizing data accessed through intelligence platforms S&P Global and Datenna, as well as satellite imagery and other open-source materials, this study categorizes each of the 307 Chinese shipyards active from 2019 to 2024 into four tiers that reflect their degree of integration with the country’s military industrial ecosystem:

Tier 1 (Very High Risk): CSSC-owned shipyards known to produce warships for China’s navy.

Tier 2 (High Risk): CSSC-owned shipyards that build commercial ships but maintain close ties to military projects, personnel, and state funding mechanisms.

Tier 3 (Moderate Risk): Shipyards owned by other state firms besides CSSC, which can be mobilized to support national security needs.

Tier 4 (Lower Risk): Private or foreign-owned shipyards that have limited documented military involvement but are subject to China’s regulatory and political control.”

Blue Planet, Red Planet: a New World of Contested Maritime Power – Thomas Shugart for The Shugart Update

“A collective democratic loss of maritime control over much of the globe’s oceans could mean a threat to the historical underpinning of the modern free world as we know it, with consequences that may be difficult to foresee. On our current trajectory we may find out someday that maritime power, like oxygen, is something we have long taken for granted, but whose absence causes us to be able to think of little else.”

USTR Order

USTR Section 301 Action on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance – United States Trade Representative

“Today, USTR took targeted action to restore American shipbuilding and address China’s unreasonable acts, policies, and practices to dominate the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. These responsive actions come after a year-long Section 301 investigation, which included USTR convening a two-day public hearing, receiving nearly 600 public comments, and consulting with government agency experts and USTR cleared advisors.”

Comment: See below for the impacts on specific ports (source: author’s calculations + the Census Bureau)

The Allies and Shipbuilding

US will propose dual-use shipbuilding to Japan, navy chief says – Nikkei Asia

To counter China, allies should explore 'all options' to boost capacity, Phelan says

South Korea Hopes Shipbuilding Will Give It an Edge in Trade Talks – NYT

As it faces the possibility of a 25 percent tariff on its exports, South Korea has taken notice of President Trump’s stated goal to revive U.S. shipbuilding.

Why U.S. Naval Power Needs Asian Allies - Choi Kang Peter K. Lee of Asan Institute for Policy Studies for War On The Rocks

“On the other hand, the United States appears unwilling to embrace a collective approach to naval shipbuilding and sustainment with its allies and partners to compete with China. Decades-old protectionist legislation, “buy American” quotas, and technology transfer restrictions continue to limit meaningful industrial cooperation with allies. Whether and how the United States resolves this dilemma will determine the outcome of U.S.-Chinese naval competition, and with it the future of the United States in the Indo-Pacific.”

The PRC’s Shipbuilding-Drone-Battery Nexus

Overcoming a Chinese Dual-Use ‘People’s War’ Invasion Fleet – Joe Webster of the Atlantic Council for ChinaTalk

“China is easily the world’s largest civilian and military shipbuilder, accounting for over half of all merchant vessels constructed in 2023, as measured by gross tonnage. Its fishing fleet is estimated to exceed 560,000 vessels, with its deep-water fishing fleet comprising about 3,000 ships. It has also constructed 50% more tons of military ships over the last decade than the United States, according to analysis from US Navy Captain (ret.) Thomas Shugart.

…

China’s civilian fleet also holds latent subsurface military potential, as it could launch potentially thousands of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). These UUVs could employ active sonar capabilities to monitor the Taiwan Strait and nearby waterways for submarines, as well as conduct mine-laying or mine-countermeasures missions. This is not a far-fetched scenario: China is already using nominally civilian cargo ships to target subsea fiber optic cables around Taiwan. (China’s larger deep-sea vessels are better suited for launching UUVs, which are heavier and bulkier than airborne drones.)

Finally, the Chinese civilian fleet could enable a targeting mesh for the Chinese military by providing real-time radar data. While shipborne civilian radars are weaker than military-grade radars, their open-array radars nonetheless range from 64 to 96 nautical miles; larger ships with greater on-board power and higher mastheads can “see” farther. Next-generation solid-state radars — distinct from solid-state batteries — offer significant performance improvements over traditional magnetron radars. While each civilian vessel has only limited radar coverage, the Chinese navy could theoretically aggregate information from each ship to build a real-time, composite picture of maritime domain awareness, especially when used in conjunction with other platforms like commercial satellite imagery. This information could enable the PLA to track and target coalitional surface fleets.”

Major Advances in E.V. Batteries Are Announced by Chinese Company – NYT

CATL, the world’s largest maker of batteries for electric vehicles, described breakthroughs that could make E.V.s more competitive with gasoline-powered cars.

Comment: Battery breakthroughs in energy density and charging are happening on an almost monthly basis. Don’t sleep on this: batteries already have major military implications and their role is only becoming more important. CATL was listed as a Chinese military company by the U.S. DoD in January – very likely because they were helping the PLAN deploy an advanced battery on a diesel-electric submarine.

Batteries as a Military Enabler – Joe Webster of the Atlantic Council/China-Russia Report for War On The Rocks

“Solid-state batteries offer even greater capabilities than lithium-ion batteries, including greater energy density, capacity, and range. Crucially, solid-state batteries are advantaged over lithium-ion batteries at preventing fires, which are a major risk aboard submarines. While solid-state batteries have yet to be commercialized due to cost and technical challenges, military customers — including in China — are not as price-sensitive. The development of solid-state batteries could therefore offer substantial performance improvements for both diesel-electric submarines and unmanned systems below, on, and above the surface.”

Winning the Battery Race: How the United States Can Leapfrog China to Dominate Next-Generation Battery Technologies - Varun Sivaram, Noah Gordon, and Daniel Helmeci for Carnegie Endowment

“[T]he main thrust of the U.S. policy response to the battery crisis must be the urgent commercialization of next-generation technologies where the United States can actually enjoy a competitive advantage. Doing so will be a tall order, but it is achievable at reasonable cost. The United States should redouble funding for research and development (R&D), target incentives and public financing for demonstrating and scaling up commercial production of next-generation batteries, and use public procurement to create protected markets for innovative technologies to gain a market foothold.”

Until next time,

Joe

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.

Europe or Russia?

The costs of a “Reverse Kissinger”

In recent weeks the Trump administration has clarified, somewhat, its thinking on a “reverse Kissinger,” or where the U.S. aims to drive a wedge in the China-Russia axis or even detach Moscow from Beijing. In an interview with Breitbart News, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said:

I don’t know if we’ll ever be successful at peeling [Russia] completely off a relationship with the Chinese. I don’t think having China and Russia at each other’s neck is also good for global stability because they’re both nuclear powers. But I do think we’re in a situation now where the Russians have become increasingly dependent on the Chinese, and that’s not a good outcome either if you think about it. I mean, the idea that somehow – the big story of the 21st century is going to be U.S.-Chinese relations, and if China become – and if Russia becomes a permanent junior partner to China in the long term, well, now you’re talking about two nuclear powers aligned against the United States. And even 10 years from now, five years from now, if this trend continues, we could find ourselves in a situation with – where whether Russia wants to improve its relations with the U.S. or not, they can’t, because they’ve become completely dependent on the Chinese because we’ve cut them off.

Secretary Rubio recently issued another statement on Friday, saying “If it is not possible to end the war in Ukraine, we need to move on.”

As the New York Times noted, it’s unclear whether Rubio meant the U.S. would abandon efforts for a 30-day ceasefire or broader commitments to Ukraine. Still, there are troubling signs: Secretary Hegseth is only meeting virtually with Ukraine’s defense group; Vice President Vance has expressed deep hostility toward Europe; and President Trump has blamed Kyiv for Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, the U.S. is imposing major tariffs on European democracies —but not on Russia or Belarus—despite minimal trade, sending a striking signal. Finally, the U.S. is levying major tariffs against the European Union – and other democracies – without applying the same taxes to Russia or Belarus. While U.S. trade with these two countries is negligible and already subject to sanctions, the symbolism is nevertheless striking, and suggests that the U.S. is willing to side with Russia over European democracies, at least on discrete issues.

This potential pivot toward Russia would harm U.S. interests. Even leaving aside shared values or longstanding cultural ties, the U.S. shares concrete economic, financial, and military ties with Europe that vastly exceed anything Russia can offer. Alienating Europe in pursuit of Moscow would be a costly mistake.

Comparing U.S. economic ties with Europe and Russia

The U.S. conducts vastly more trade with Europe than it does with Russia. It isn’t close. The European Union and the United States conducted nearly $1 trillion in total goods trade last year; U.S. – Russia trade, conversely, totaled only $3 billion.

Even at its 2013 peak, U.S.–Russia trade was modest and offered few unique benefits—mostly medium-sour crude oil, which can be sourced from elsewhere.

Sources: US Census Bureau, Author’s Calculations

Additionally, the United States and Europe conducted nearly $450 billion in bilateral services trade in 2023, the latest year for which data was available. While bilateral trade balances hold little relevancy, the U.S. runs a sizable services trade surplus with the European Union of over $75 billion USD.

Sources: BEA, Author’s Calculations

Lifting U.S. trade and investment restrictions on Russia would have minimal impact, as Russia’s economy is small and distant. The EU’s GDP alone is nine times larger.

Sources: IMF WEO, Author’s Calculations

Broadly defined to include the EU, UK, EFTA states, the Western Balkan states in NATO, and Ukraine, Europe’s 2024 GDP reaches $24.7 trillion—over ten times Russia’s.

Sources: IMF WEO, Author’s Calculations

Russia is weak; Europe is strong

The reality is that Europe is a far more powerful and consequential actor than Russia ever will be. While Russia undoubtedly punches above its weight in international affairs, and Europe often lacks initiative, economic gravity is inescapable.

Despite urgent needs for fundamental defense reforms and rearmament, Europe is a powerful security actor. Take military expenditures. In 2024, and before Germany’s rearmament campaign, NATO Europe and Canada accounted for $430 billion USD in defense expenditure. Janis Kluge of SWP estimates the Russian defense budget at 130 billion euros (~$147 billion USD), if measured at the current exchange rate (Kluge notes Russian defense spending is much higher if purchasing power adjustments are applied). Furthermore, European defense spending is set to surge, especially after Germany, the largest European economy, announced massive investments. Defense spending doesn’t fully measure capability, but European defense investments will easily outpace Russia’s.

The Russian military may also suffer qualitative disadvantages in any conventional fight with Europe. While it is very difficult to assess latent combat capabilities until they are put to the test in a specific scenario, there are real questions about the quality of the Russian military. Russian forces’ performance in Ukraine was deeply flawed across various dimensions, including command and control, combined arms operations, air operations, logistics, and more. While Russian forces have adapted after learning painful lessons, many of their battlefield successes have stemmed from manpower advantages.

Russia would very likely lack a manpower advantage in any hypothetical conflict with NATO. European NATO countries (i.e. every NATO power, with the exception of Canada, Turkey, and the United States) have a combined population of about 512 million; Russia’s total population stands at about 146 million, and its military-aged male population has been wracked by the invasion of Ukraine.

Finally, Russia has historically suffered far more casualties than it has inflicted, at least when fighting Western powers. For instance, during the Winter War invasion of Finland, the Soviet Union likely suffered about 333,000 casualties, or about six times as many casualties as Finnish forces. Similarly, in Ukraine, Russian forces have sustained about 900,000 casualties – likely far more than they have inflicted.

Russia retains its nuclear deterrent and, despite its manifest problems, a formidable conventional military. Yet it is a relatively weak Great Power when compared to the United States, the PRC, or Europe. The Russian economy is fairly small (albeit a significant player in energy markets), and Russian armed forces are no longer clearly a first-rate military power.

Potential European responses

Washington’s current policymaking climate shows growing interest in greater alignment with Moscow, driven partly by shared skepticism toward democracies. Accordingly, given the limited shared values between Brussels and DC, European actors must adopt pragmatic approaches and appeal to U.S. self-interest. Namely, Europe must underscore the continent’s significant economic and financial power and its growing military capabilities.

Some ways to impress an optics-gripped U.S. policymaker include holding a military parade to show martial prowess. This approach has yielded success before, including in 2017 when President Macron hosted President Trump on Bastille Day. Additionally, European powers could publicize defense-related actions (and there are many such examples to draw on, such as a French frigate’s recent shoot-down of a Houthi drone).

Finally, in addition to standard trade measures, Europe might consider retaliating against U.S. social media companies if DC continues to drift towards Moscow. There is a growing backlash against social media, including a growing belief that smartphones – and associated social media applications – are contributing to a host of negative outcomes, including a decline in literacy rates, political polarization, and overall unhappiness. Europe may face growing calls to ban social media platforms anyway, but if Washington pivots to Russia at the expense of Europe, Brussels may apply greater scrutiny to U.S. social media companies.

Choose Europe, not Russia

Even setting aside any consideration of values, Europe is wealthy and powerful; Russia is poor, weak, and firmly tied to the PRC. Turning away from Europe to pursue Russia would severely damage U.S. national interests.

Until next time,

Joe

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.

Attempting a "reverse Kissinger" will fail

But it might just shatter the Western alliance

As you’ve likely seen by now, the US and Russia conducted bilateral negotiations over Ukraine in Saudi Arabia, all without any European participation – including from Ukraine. According to the Washington Post, today the US has also voted with Russia, North Korea, Belarus, and 14 other Moscow-friendly countries Monday on a resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and calling for its occupied territory to be returned that passed overwhelmingly in the U.N. General Assembly on Monday.”

It’s not clear what the strategy is. Some are wondering if the Trump administration is attempting a “reverse Kissinger,” whereby the U.S. creates a wedge in the China-Russia axis by extending sanctions relief and other measures to Moscow, detaching it from Beijing.

This approach is highly unlikely to succeed in driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, at least in any meaningful way, and will alienate US allies and friends across Europe and beyond.

Why a reverse Kissinger won’t work

The US won’t be able to detach Russia from China. The convergence between Moscow and Beijing is real, primarily motivated by politics, and only weakly tied to economics.

Economic fundamentals have not deterred Russia from rupturing ties with the West. Russia’s economic and cultural center of gravity are all in “European Russia,” or west of the Ural Mountains. About 75% of Russians live west of the Ural Mountains, while EU member states accounted for 57% of Russian exports and 46.5% of Russian imports in 2013, before Putin’s illegal annexation of Crimea damaged Western-Russia trade. While Russia has a complicated historical relationship with the West, to say the least, it was nevertheless recently a part of various European cultural institutions such as Eurovision, the European division for World Cup qualification, and more. Until very recently, Russian elites like Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Peskov sent their children to study or live in Europe. Despite the straightforward economic logic of bolstering trade and investment with Europe, not to mention deep and longstanding cultural ties, Moscow has utterly rejected the West.

While Moscow and Beijing benefit from stable borders, energy trade, and diplomatic alignment, their partnership is primarily driven by mutual hostility toward the West, especially the U.S. Indeed, Moscow’s anti-Western antipathy is perhaps even more pronounced than Beijing’s, as revealed by its willingness to adopt junior status in the partnership with China.

While Russian leaders have traditionally prized autonomy and sovereignty, Russia economic and security dependence on China is stark. China accounted for over half of Russian imports in 2023 and continues to have an outsized economic role, especially if indirect trade via Central Asia and Belarus is taken into account.

Russia is also providing China with some of its most closely-guarded military technologies in exchange for Beijing’s implicit support in the invasion of Ukraine. Although there are some indications that Chinese security services continue to conduct espionage against Russian aerospace and defense firms, Moscow is nevertheless integrating Chinese technology into critical military and intelligence applications, including 5G and satellite communications. Moscow is deepening its full-spectrum partnership with Beijing, despite the manifest risks.

The Kremlin tolerates dependency on China because it believes it is at war with the West. Putin and most of the Russian leadership have made a strategic choice to align with Beijing despite the considerable risks this poses to Russia’s autonomy.

Additionally, while Putin and the Russian elite regard the Trump administration’s pivot to Russia very favorably, they doubt the staying power of US – Russia ties. Over 85 percent of Americans have an unfavorable view of Russia, according to a July 2024 Pew poll. Americans – including its President – are undoubtedly fickle, and a pro-Putin figure like Tucker Carlson could very well become the next US leader. Still, Russian leadership won’t divorce Beijing for a very likely temporary arrangement with the United States. Wedging Beijing and Moscow via economic outreach to the Kremlin is highly unlikely to succeed.

At what cost?

Even seeking détente with Moscow at the expense of Europe will prove costly for the United States. Even leaving aside abstract matters such as shared values or longstanding cultural ties, Europe is vital for tangible US security interests. US – European Union total trade in goods and services stood at $1.4 trillion in 2023, with the US enjoying a $77 billion surplus in services; European allies are some of the world’s leading technological powers, boosting the US in the all-important artificial intelligence competition with China; and European military and intelligence assets are important force multipliers across the world.

Concretely, détente with Russia at the expense of Europe could impose discrete costs on US oil and gas exporters, as Russia and the US directly compete in global and European oil and gas markets. US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters may be particularly impacted, as more than half of all US LNG exports are directed to Europe.

Most alarmingly, the betrayal of Ukraine and the corrosion of NATO and the US-led alliance system would substantially raise the probability of armed conflict between nuclear-armed powers across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Given that Russia has launched the largest land war in Europe since Nazi Germany, US allies in Europe will be understandably unnerved if DC makes major concessions to Moscow over the heads of Kyiv, Brussels, and other European capitals. In the face of uncertain US commitments, European countries may consider a more aggressive nuclear weapons posture; some European states may ultimately acquire the ultimate deterrent. Vladimir Putin is largely rational, on his own terms, and would attempt to undermine Europe indirectly (perhaps including in the 2027 French election) rather than attack it directly. Still, the risk of miscalculation and military confrontation is not low, particularly as Putin ages and grows ever-more disconnected from reality.

The erosion of the global, US-led alliance system will also hold disastrous consequences for US interests in the Indo-Pacific. If Ukraine is thrown to the wolves, US allies in the Indo-Pacific will doubt the staying power of US commitments. They will become more likely to acquire their own independent strategic deterrents, seek accommodation with the PRC, or perhaps both. While it seems increasingly appropriate for Japan and the Republic of Korea to acquire independent nuclear weapons, given the geopolitical realities they face, any accommodation with Beijing could enable the PRC to supplant the United States as the world’s most powerful country, with disastrous consequences for US interests – and the future of global constitutional democracy.

The China-Russia partnership won’t break any time soon

No amount of personal charisma can disentangle the deep ties between China and Russia. While the two sides do not share identical interests, Moscow and Beijing both fundamentally value their bilateral partnership as a means to check their main adversary, the United States, as well as other countries in the constitutional democracy orbit.

Moscow chooses to be junior partner in the China-Russia axis because it regards the arrangement as uniquely valuable. Moreover, aiming at détente with Moscow while it seeks to subjugate a European democracy with brutal military force cannot but alarm US allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Attempting a “reverse Kissinger” at the expense of US-Europe ties won’t detach Moscow from Beijing, but it might break the Western alliance system.

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.

Central Asia and Belarus’ role in militarily-sensitive trade

Tiers 2 (Additional electronics items), 3.B (mechanical components), and 4.B (CNC machines).

This is the second article in a series on China-to-Russia trade of military-significant "Common High Priority List" (CHPL) items. The first article focused on direct trade; this one examines indirect trade via Central Asia and Belarus.

Russia is increasingly prioritizing Tier 4.A goods (equipment for manufacturing, testing, and producing electric components), with most of the $120 million in Chinese Tier 4.A exports to Russia, Belarus, and Central Asia over the past three months going directly to Russia ($112 million). However, rising Chinese Tier 4.A exports to Central Asia and Belarus suggest Russia may be building alternative trade routes. Imports to Central Asia and Belarus remain elevated, almost certainly supporting indirect China-to-Russia trade of sensitive items.

CHPL categories:

The U.S., EU, UK, and Japan have compiled the “Common High Priority List,” or CHPL, of 50 items that are most relevant for Russia’s war effort. The CHPL of militarily-sensitive items is divided into four tiers, per the U.S. Department of Commerce:

·         Tier 1: Items of the highest concern due to their critical role in the production of advanced Russian precision-guided weapons systems, Russia’s lack of domestic production, and limited global manufacturers.

·         Tier 2: Additional electronics items for which Russia may have some domestic production capability but a preference to source from the United States and its partners and allies.

·         Tier 3.A: Further electronic components used in Russian weapons systems, with a broader range of suppliers.

·         Tier 3.B: Mechanical and other components utilized in Russian weapons systems.

·         Tier 4.A: Manufacturing, production and quality testing equipment for electric components, circuit boards and modules.

·         Tier 4.B: Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine tools and components.

Central Asia and Belarus: CHPL relative imports

Chinese exports to Central Asia and Belarus have surged since the beginning of the invasion and remain highly elevated. Note that the sharp initial decline in exports this year is almost certainly attributable to Lunar New Year: Chinese monthly global exports dropped from $307 billion in January 2024 to just $220 billion the next month.

Source: PRC GACC, Author’s Calculations

Chinese CHPL exports to Central Asia and Belarus have stabilized in absolute terms but are driven by Tier 3.B, which includes items such as ball bearings and other mechanical components.

Source: PRC GACC, Author’s Calculations

Central Asia + Belarus’ imports of Tier 4.B items (Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine tools and components) is astonishing, in proportional terms: shipments have increased 20-fold since the beginning of the conflict. The vast majority of these imports are, of course, presumably transshipped to Russia.

Source: PRC GACC, Author’s Calculations

Of the ~$32 million USD of Chinese Tier 4.B exports shipped to Russia, Belarus, and Central Asia, on average, over the past three months, about $9 million of these shipments was sent via the “indirect route” of Central Asia and Belarus.

Turning to other Tiers, we observe that Chinese exports to Central Asia and Belarus remain well above pre-war levels.

Crucially, Chinese exports of Tier 1 semiconductor components to Central Asia + Belarus rose sharply in the post-invasion period and remain elevated. Additionally, imports of some sub-tier categories (such as ball bearings, for instance) have risen sharply. Finally, note that – just as with Russia – exports of Tier 4.A goods (electric components, circuit boards and modules) have risen sharply in recent months.

Source: PRC GACC, Author’s Calculations

Finally, Belarus + Central Asia have grown in importance for meeting bloc-wide imports of CHPL goods since the beginning of the conflict. In the chart below, for instance, you can see that while Belarus and Central Asia accounted for 10% of China’s total Tier 2 exports to the Russia-Central Asia-Belarus bloc in January 2022, that figure has risen to 33% in September 2024, the latest period for which data is available.

Russia appears to be sourcing a substantial fraction of CHPL goods from Central Asia and Belarus, especially for the following Tiers: 2 (Additional electronics items), 3.B (mechanical components), and 4.B (CNC machines).

Source: PRC GACC, Author’s Calculations

China and Russia continue to directly conduct most of their trade in militarily-sensitive goods. Still, Central Asia and Belarus continues to serve as a cutout for substantial indirect China-to-Russia trade, including for sensitive items.

Until next time,

Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.