Xi, Putin hold planned video call amid US-Iran talks

Putin and “momentary international developments”

Putin and Xi conducted the second high-level bilateral meeting in a week, only three days after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Russian Security Council head Sergei Shoigu in Beijing in advance of the meeting.

While the meeting was pre-planned, it very likely was concerned with developments in the Middle East, especially the prospect of a regional war involving Iran. According to Axios, U.S. - Iran talks are collapsing, significantly raising the probability of armed conflict in the Middle East. In his earlier conversation with Shoigu, Wang appeared to allude to different perspectives on the Iranian issue (and potentially Beijing’s growing commercial links with non-U.S. but Western powers, which typically are also oil/energy importers), as he distinguished between “respective and common interests.”

China, the world’s largest energy importer, and Russia, one of the world’s largest energy exporters, have structurally different interests in energy markets. China would face worsening terms of trade in the event of major, sustained global energy production outages. Conversely, Russian energy exports could benefit enormously – although Moscow does not wish to be seen stimulating unrest in the Middle East, given its important political, defense, and commercial ties there.

Both Xi and Putin appeared to allude to different interests, potentially over the Iran issue, although Putin sought to downplay any potential frictions.

In the Kremlin’s English-language readout, Putin said: “I am confident that they will remain resilient and will continue to steadily develop across all sectors regardless of momentary international developments.” This reference to “momentary” developments may be Putin’s way of suggesting that any U.S. – Iran conflict will be sharp and short, much like the June 2025 intervention.

Xi Jinping appears much more wary of a conflict, for his part, owing not least to China’s current dependency on oil imports from the Middle East. In a bilateral call with Putin, Xi stated:

“Since the beginning of the year, the international situation has become increasingly turbulent. As responsible major countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia have an obligation to promote the international community’s adherence to fairness and justice, firmly defend the achievements of the victory in World War II, resolutely uphold the international system with the UN at its core and the basic norms of international law, and work together to safeguard global strategic stability.”

Xi also conducted a call with the White House, although the Chinese readout focused on Taiwan – not the Middle East. The White House has not apparently issued a readout of the meeting. President Trump’s Truth Social post about the call, meanwhile, focused on Taiwan (and potential U.S.-China trade purchases), but did mention Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – and the “current situation with Iran.”

Finally, the Kremlin also reported Russian Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov’s commentary following the bilateral call. According to the Kremlin:

“Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping agreed that it is necessary to maintain permanent bilateral consultation mechanisms across all channels – the security councils, foreign ministries, and defence agencies – to complement their personal communication, that is, the direct dialogue between the leaders. This pertains to the swift alignment and coordination of approaches on current matters, including sensitive ones, to ensure timely responses to emerging challenges and threats.”

I’ve included the full read-outs below, along with in-line commentary. Thanks for reading.

Videoconference with President of China Xi Jinping – The Kremlin

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, my dear friend.

I am delighted that the good tradition we have established – to hold face-to-face conversations at the beginning of the year – carries on. This offers us an opportunity to sum up the results of the preceding period and outline our plans. Moreover, we are having this conversation on a symbolic day. According to the Chinese calendar, today is Lichun, which signifies the beginning of spring. This is when cold weather starts receding, and nature enters the renewal and awakening phase. But in terms of Russia-China relations, it can be argued with complete certainty that spring continues throughout the year, no matter the season.

I would like to personally wish Happy New Year 2026 to you and through you to the entire friendly Chinese nation. Please also accept my greetings on the Spring Festival, which will signal the beginning of the Year of the Fire Horse. As far as we know, this horse stands out by its strength, energy and determination to move ahead. This is also what makes the relations between our two countries so special. I am confident that they will remain resilient and will continue to steadily develop across all sectors regardless of momentary international developments. [bolded by The Report]

Russia and China have forged an exemplary comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. This year, we will be marking the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. Of course, efforts to fulfil its provisions meet the core interests of our two nations and help enhance the comprehensive and truly inclusive cooperation between Russia and China. Importantly, they help improve the wellbeing of our people.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to reaffirm our resolute support for all our joint efforts to ensure the sovereignty and security of our two countries, their social and economic prosperity, and the right to choose their own development path.

I would like to say a few words about the results of last year. I believe that we properly celebrated the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II in Moscow in May and in Beijing in September. The fact that we did this together has demonstrated to the world our solidarity and Russia and China’s readiness to uphold historical truth and carefully preserve the memory of the heroism of our countries’ people, who sacrificed tens of millions of lives to restore peace on the planet. China’s Presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which culminated in the Tianjin summit, produced significant practical results.

During our talks in Moscow and Beijing, we held detailed discussions on the main spheres of our relations and mapped out ambitious tasks for the further deepening of bilateral cooperation. Our governments are working energetically every day to implement these agreements.

Economic cooperation continued to develop steadily in 2025. Despite a minor decline, which I would describe as an adjustment of indicators, our bilateral trade has been considerably above $200 billion for three years in a row. [Comment: Also because Russia imposed restrictions on Chinese auto imports]

Russia is the leading supplier of energy resources to the People’s Republic of China. Our energy partnership is mutually beneficial and truly strategic. We maintain an active dialogue in peaceful nuclear research and are promoting high-tech projects, including in industry and space exploration. According to our data, agricultural trade has increased by over 20 percent. [Comment: The vast majority of Chinese energy consumption is produced at home, although Russia may very well be the largest energy exporter to China]

We are satisfied with the growth of our humanitarian exchanges. The cross years of culture were a success, and the more than 400 vibrant events held within their framework gained widespread attention among our people. We have not stopped there, of course. In particular, in the next few days, the Chinese New Year will be widely celebrated in Moscow and other Russian cities, which has become a good tradition here, while the residents and guests of Beijing will learn more about Russian traditions of seeing off winter during the Moscow Maslenitsa (Pancake Week) festival.

The cross-years of education have begun. Currently, over 56,000 Chinese students are studying in Russia and over 21,000 Russian students in China. There are dozens of Russian-Chinese educational institutions and university associations. We also maintain significant potential for further expansion in this area – especially since the age of innovation and advanced information technologies dictates the need for training experts in new and cutting-edge specialisations.

Visa-free travel certainly promotes growing business and humanitarian contacts. I appreciate your efforts regarding this initiative, which we eagerly supported. As far as I know, the relevant authorities have not had any considerable issues since visas were abolished.

Regarding international affairs, the ties between Moscow and Beijing in foreign policy remain an important stabilising factor amidst growing turbulence in the world. We are ready to continue the closest coordination on global and regional agendas, both bilaterally and within all the multilateral frameworks: the UN, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and others, where the Russian-Chinese tandem plays an essential role. We wish our Chinese friends success and promise all necessary support during China’s chairmanship of the Asia-Pacific [Economic] Cooperation forum.

My dear friend, once again, Happy New Year and Happy Spring Festival! I wish you personally good health, prosperity and “success in tens of thousands of undertakings,” and to the friendly Chinese nation peace and prosperity.

Thank you.

President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping (retranslated): President Putin, my old and dear friend! It is a great pleasure to meet with you once again, even if by videoconference, at the start of this new year.

I note that today, according to the lunar calendar, is Lichun – the beginning of spring. As you rightly mentioned, this first of the 24 solar terms heralds the return of spring and symbolises new beginnings and hope. It is therefore a most fitting and symbolic day for our discussion, as we look to chart an ambitious new course for the advancement of our bilateral relations.

I would like to thank you for sending Comrade Shoigu to Beijing recently for consultations with Comrade Wang Yi on international and regional issues in preparation for our meeting. He has briefed me on the content of their discussions. Today, I look forward to a thorough exchange of views with you on our major strategic priorities.

Over the past year, our two meetings have helped steer China-Russia relations into a new phase of development. We solemnly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory of the global anti-fascist coalition, reaffirming our shared resolve to uphold the outcomes of World War II and the principles of international justice.

Our bilateral trade is growing both dynamically and steadily, while collaboration in new frontier sectors is accelerating.

The successful Years of Chinese and Russian Culture have taken our cultural and humanitarian ties to new heights, and people-to-people exchanges are more vibrant than ever.

Furthermore, through the SCO Summit in Tianjin and the SCO Heads of Government Council meeting in Moscow, we have strengthened our multilateral coordination. This allows us to continue our vital work in fostering a multipolar world order and a more just and equitable system of global governance.

The year 2026 marks the first year of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan. China is committed to further expanding high-standard opening-up and stands ready to share the fresh opportunities of its new development stage with all countries, including Russia.

This year also marks the 30th anniversary of our strategic partnership, the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation, and the commencement of the China-Russia years of education.

It is therefore imperative that we seize this historic opportunity. By continually deepening our strategic coordination and jointly shouldering our responsibilities as major countries, [Comment: appears to be a reference to the Middle East/Iran] we can ensure that China-Russia relations continue their steady and sustained advancement on the correct long-term trajectory.

Commentary by Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov following Vladimir Putin’s videoconference with President of China Xi Jinping – The Kremlin

Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov: Friends, I would like to brief you on the substantive negotiations between President of Russia Vladimir Putin and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, held via videoconference.

These negotiations took place today and concluded just over an hour and a half ago. In recent years, such contacts have become a well-established tradition of communication between the heads of state. This marks the sixth such conversation, which traditionally occurs at the beginning of the year, ahead of the Lunar New Year, or, as it is known in China, the Spring Festival.

The discussion lasted one hour and twenty-five minutes. Simultaneous interpretation was provided, of course, and the leaders, in a friendly and trusting manner, summarised the outcomes of the past year and thoroughly discussed plans for the development of Russia-China relations in the current year. Significant attention was also paid to the most pressing international issues, particularly given the extremely tense and volatile situation that has emerged in a number of regions across the world.

In this context, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping agreed that it is necessary to maintain permanent bilateral consultation mechanisms across all channels – the security councils, foreign ministries, and defence agencies – to complement their personal communication, that is, the direct dialogue between the leaders. This pertains to the swift alignment and coordination of approaches on current matters, including sensitive ones, to ensure timely responses to emerging challenges and threats. [bolded by The Report]

It was agreed to intensify such professional dialogue. In this vein, incidentally, consultations were held on February 1 in Beijing between Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Yi. The heads of state discussed the information received following these consultations.

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping once again noted that the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between our two countries are at an unprecedented level, are based on equality and mutual benefit, are not directed against any third parties, and are not subject to short-term political considerations. [Comment: This could be reference to Iran, but may also refer to Beijing’s growing commercial ties with Western countries, especially European ones]

We support each other on key issues affecting our national interests. In the face of external challenges, our countries act, as our Chinese friends put it, back to back, and can rely on one another.

The leaders expressed satisfaction that last year Russia and China fittingly marked the anniversaries of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.

I would like to emphasise that Xi Jinping was the principal guest in Moscow at the Victory Day Parade on May 9, while Vladimir Putin was the principal guest at the commemorative events in Beijing on September 3. Both Russia and China intend to continue upholding historical truth and preserving the memory of the heroism of our fathers and grandfathers in those harsh years.

Overall, in 2025 the leaders of the two countries maintained frequent and productive contacts, and such interactions – personal contacts in particular – will naturally continue, and with no lesser intensity.

I would also note that on July 16, Russia and China will mark an important date: the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. This foundational document for international relations, which remains fully relevant and in tune with the spirit of the times, has been automatically extended for a further five-year period.

During the conversation, President Xi Jinping invited Vladimir Putin to pay an official visit to China in the first half of this year. The invitation was accepted with gratitude, and the dates and details will be agreed separately.

The Chinese leader also invited the President of Russia to take part in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, to be held in November in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen. Russia supports the work of China’s APEC chairmanship, and our President will, of course, be ready to attend the meeting in Shenzhen.

Incidentally, there are plans to hold bilateral meetings during other international events, in particular, those held by the SCO and BRICS.

Plans for this year also include numerous contacts at other high levels, including between our governments, parliaments, the Presidential Executive Office and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, security councils, ministries, departments and political parties.

During their conversation, the leaders paid considerable attention to trade and economic cooperation. It was also mentioned that despite a minor decline due to a number of objective and subjective factors, bilateral trade has been considerably above $200 billion for three years in a row. It is common knowledge that China remains our leading foreign trade partner, while Russia holds fifth place among China’s trade partners. [Comment: Bilateral economic trade totals have been constrained by China’s purchasing of heavily-discounted oil, along with Russia’s restrictions on Chinese exports, especially vehicles. Expect greater economic tensions in any post-war period to weigh on bilateral political ties.]

During the conversation, the leaders formulated the task of working to further develop trade and economic ties, in particular, in energy. Russia is the leading supplier of oil and pipeline gas to China. [Comment: Energy trade could also weigh on post-war ties. China is unlikely to need or desire additional Russian natural gas volumes; Chinese refineries are constrained by how much Russian crude oil they can process (although they could continue to add to Chinese oil storage inventories). Conversely, Chinese exports to Russia of the “new three” – solar, batteries, and EVs – stand at very low levels and could surge if Russia’s political economy barriers are eased]

It is noteworthy that the leaders emphasised the importance of working in innovative spheres, including those associated with artificial intelligence. We supported China’s initiative for creating a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation.

Both sides expressed high appreciation for the Chinese idea of a visa-free regime, which Russia supported. They noted with satisfaction that 2026 and 2027 have been declared the Cross Years of Cooperation in Education.

Overall, the humanitarian track of bilateral cooperation is developing very energetically to the benefit of our countries and is promoting rapprochement between them.

Regarding foreign policy issues, the President of Russia and the President of China emphasised the importance of Russian-Chinese cooperation at multilateral platforms, such as the UN, the SCO, BRICS, APEC and G20.

The sides reaffirmed the common course for creating a just multilateral world order based on international law.

Overall, Moscow and Beijing have been working in coordination with each other on the international stage. It was pointed out that the sides’ positions on the overwhelming majority of international issues are similar or fully coincide. [Comment: Implication, of course, is that they do not always align] Of course, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping also exchanged views on their countries’ relations with the United States. Their approaches almost fully coincide, which is evident from their attitude to the US President’s initiative for creating the Board of Peace.

Russia and China stand for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation based on the principles of international law and the UN Charter.

The President noted that the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is due to expire tomorrow, February 5. As you know, on September 22, 2025, we suggested extending the key quantitative limits for one year on a voluntary basis. However, there was no official response from the United States. Vladimir Putin emphasised that in this situation, we will act in a balanced and responsible manner based on a careful analysis of the overall security environment. Russia remains open to finding a way to ensure strategic stability through negotiations.

The leaders were informed about the contacts our countries had with the Donald Trump administration and believe that there is a window of opportunity in this regard. In particular, the President of China voiced his support for the ongoing talks in Abu Dhabi within the trilateral working group on security matters. President Vladimir Putin shared his latest assessments of the efforts to reach a peaceful settlement in the Ukraine conflict.

As I have noted, the agenda covered many other international matters too, with a special emphasis on the tense situation surrounding Iran. [bolded by The Report] Vladimir Putin informed his counterparts about the January 30 meeting at the Kremlin with Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani.

The leaders also sought to coordinate their approaches regarding the situation with Venezuela and Cuba and spoke in favour of ensuring that our countries maintain cooperation with Caracas and Havana at the current level.

On regional topics, the leaders exchanged views on the situation in the Asia-Pacific. The President of China talked about Beijing’s relations with Tokyo, while President Vladimir Putin once again spoke out in support of China’s principled position regarding Taiwan, reaffirming Russia’s commitment to the One China policy.

Overall, this was a direct and trust-based conversation, which offered the two leaders an opportunity to reaffirm their strategic and principled priorities for working together during the upcoming cycle.

Cooperation between Moscow and Beijing operates as a powerful, constructive and stabilising factor in the world, while the Russia-China nexus effectively enhances global security, and benefits the Global Majority, as well as the people of both Russia and China.

I would like to emphasise on a special note that the conversation between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping took place in a genuinely friendly atmosphere. They ended the conversation by wishing each other every success, happiness, and wellbeing in the coming year.

Xi Jinping Holds Video Conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin – People’s Daily, Chinese-language readout via machine translation

BEIJING, Feb. 4 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping held a video conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on the afternoon of February 4.

Xi Jinping extended his best wishes for the Lunar New Year to President Putin and the Russian people, noting that today, coinciding with the Chinese Lunar New Year’s Eve (Lichun), symbolizes the return of spring and represents a new beginning. He expressed his willingness to work with President Putin on this auspicious day to jointly chart a new blueprint for China-Russia relations. Putin stated that as spring arrives and all things revive, Russia-China relations will also flourish and move forward with vigor. He wished President Xi Jinping and the Chinese people a happy Lunar New Year, full of energy and boundless success.

Xi Jinping pointed out that our two meetings over the past year have guided China-Russia relations into a new stage of development. The two countries solemnly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory in the World Anti-Fascist War, demonstrating their firm resolve to defend the fruits of victory in World War II and international fairness and justice. Bilateral economic and trade exchanges maintained a steady momentum. The “China-Russia Year of Culture” concluded successfully, taking cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two countries to a new level, and people-to-people exchanges became even closer. The two sides successfully hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Tianjin Summit and the Moscow Prime Ministers’ Meeting, strengthening multilateral cooperation and continuing their commitment to building a more just and equitable global governance system.

Xi Jinping emphasized that this year marks the start of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, and China will more proactively expand high-level opening-up, sharing new development opportunities with countries around the world, including Russia. This year also marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Russia strategic partnership of coordination, the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between China and Russia, and the launch of the China-Russia Year of Education. Both sides should seize this historic opportunity, maintain close high-level exchanges, strengthen pragmatic cooperation in various fields, and ensure that China-Russia relations continue to develop along the right track through deeper strategic cooperation and a more proactive and responsible approach as major powers.

Xi Jinping stated that since the beginning of the year, the international situation has become increasingly turbulent. As responsible major countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia have an obligation to promote the international community’s adherence to fairness and justice, firmly defend the achievements of the victory in World War II, resolutely uphold the international system with the UN at its core and the basic norms of international law, and work together to safeguard global strategic stability. [Comment: Potential allusion to Iran]

Putin stated that in the past year, Russia and China jointly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory in World War II, firmly upholding the world peace won by the Russian and Chinese people through immense sacrifices, and defending historical truth. Cooperation between the two countries in trade, energy, science and technology, agriculture, and other fields has deepened and become more practical; cultural exchanges have become increasingly close; the Year of Culture was a complete success; and the mutual visa exemption policy has made travel between the two peoples more convenient. Looking ahead to the new year, Russia is full of confidence in Russia-China relations. Both sides should continue to firmly support each other in safeguarding national sovereignty and security, achieving economic and social development and prosperity, promoting cultural exchanges in education, culture, and other fields, and benefiting the people of both countries. Faced with a complex and volatile international situation, Russia is willing to continue strengthening strategic cooperation with China on multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and BRICS, injecting positive energy into international affairs. Russia will actively support China in hosting the APEC Leaders’ Informal Meeting in Shenzhen.

The two heads of state also exchanged in-depth views on international and regional hotspots of common concern. [Comment: Also likely an allusion to Iran]

Wang Yi participated in the event.

Xi Jinping speaks with US President Donald Trump – People’s Daily, Chinese-language readout translated via machine translation

Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 4 - On the evening of February 4, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke by phone with US President Donald Trump.

Xi Jinping pointed out that in the past year, we maintained good communication and successfully met in Busan, steering the course of China-US relations and receiving a warm welcome from the people of both countries and the international community. I attach great importance to China-US relations. In the new year, I am willing to work with you to continue to guide the ship of China-US relations through storms and ensure its smooth progress, and to accomplish more significant and beneficial things. The US has its concerns, and China has its concerns. China is true to its word and delivers on its promises. As long as both sides uphold the principles of equality, respect, and mutual benefit and move towards each other, we can find ways to resolve each other’s concerns. This year, both China and the US have many important agendas. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan has begun, the US will celebrate its 250th anniversary, and both countries will respectively host the APEC Leaders’ Informal Meeting and the G20 Leaders’ Summit. Both sides should, in accordance with the consensus we have reached, strengthen dialogue and communication, properly manage differences, expand pragmatic cooperation, and refrain from doing good because it is small, nor from doing evil because it is small. We should do things one by one, continuously build mutual trust, and find a correct path to get along, so that 2026 will be a year in which the two major powers of China and the United States move towards mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation.

Xi Jinping emphasized that the Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-US relations. Taiwan is Chinese territory, and China must defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity; it will never allow Taiwan to be separated from China. The US must handle arms sales to Taiwan with extreme caution.

Trump stated that both the United States and China are great nations, and the U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world. He said he has a great relationship with President Xi Jinping and deeply respects him. Under his and President Xi’s leadership, the U.S. and China have engaged in positive interactions in areas such as trade and economy. He welcomed China’s success and expressed the U.S.’s willingness to strengthen cooperation with China to promote new developments in bilateral relations. He valued China’s concerns regarding the Taiwan issue and was willing to maintain communication with China to ensure the good and stable development of U.S.-China relations during his term.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.

Bilateral gaps over a potential Middle East war?

Iran and 两国各自和共同利益

Bilateral ties between China and Russia may undergo strain if a war in the Middle East erupts. The two sides have structurally different interests in oil and energy markets: China is the world’s largest importer of both, while Russia is one of the world’s largest exporters. There are some indications that Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, delivered a subtle but public hint to Sergei Shoigu, the secretary of the Russian Security Council, emphasizing the two sides’ different interests in oil and energy markets.

Let’s be clear: Moscow and Beijing enjoy strong ties, and attempting a “reverse Kissinger” of separating the two sides will fail. Still, if a conflict in the Middle East breaks out, ties between Moscow and Beijing may become more uncertain.

Image source: ChatGPT 5.2

Structural divergences in energy markets

A potential Middle East war would hold huge implications for Beijing and Moscow but affect each country very differently.

Russia stands to be a major beneficiary of a conflict in the Middle East, on balance. Moscow has important defense, political, and economic ties across the Middle East and does not want to be perceived as a destabilizing force. At the same time, it appears highly willing to indirectly and deniably undermine energy competitors, which bolster the earnings of its own energy exports. Meanwhile, Washington announced that the US and India agreed to a trade deal, under the terms that India would cease importing of Russian oil. The Indian side, notably, did not mention this condition in their announcement.

If India does indeed halt Russian oil imports – which is highly unlikely but possible – then the Russian oil industry could face a crisis. India accounted for 38 percent of Russia’s crude oil exports in December 2025, there are relatively few suitable alternative export destinations for Russian crude outside of Europe, and Russia has little capacity to store oil. Russia may be forced to shut-in significant upstream production if India does, in fact, cease importing its oil.

Conversely, China, the world’s largest energy and oil importer, has an interest in stable global energy flows, especially from the Middle East. While Beijing understands China’s energy vulnerabilities and is quickly mitigating them, it recognizes that short-term outages would be disastrous for the Chinese economy.

Structurally divergent interests between Moscow and Beijing exist over energy. Given these incentives, Beijing had reason to explain its position to Moscow about the risks of stimulating a conflict in the Middle East.

A subtle warning?

There are hints that Beijing conveyed this message to Moscow. In comments likely related to Iran and the Middle East, Wang Yi may have suggested that China’s interests are distinct from Russia’s.

According to a Chinese readout, the Wang-Shoigu meeting largely concerned itself with geopolitical developments, as Beijing reported it “welcomed Shoigu’s visit to China for a strategic dialogue as designated by Russian President Vladimir Putin.” While neither Shoigu nor Wang mentioned the Middle East or Iran, the region was very likely the featured discussion. Not only is the region the dominant geopolitical story, but representatives of several Gulf powers, including Iran and the UAE, swung through Moscow immediately before Shoigu’s Beijing visit.

Intriguingly, Wang said the following in the official PRC readout: “Noting that China and Russia are each other’s largest neighbors and comprehensive strategic partners of coordination for a new era, Wang said the two countries should maintain close communication on major issues concerning bilateral relations, step up mutual support on matters involving each other’s core interests, and safeguard their respective and common interests [维护好两国各自和共同利益].”

This formulation – the two countries’ respective and common interests, or 维护好两国各自和共同利益 – is striking. This is not entirely a new formulation in the context of China-Russia relations, as Xi himself repeated a very similar line to Shoigu at their October 20, 2018 meeting, when he said”中俄要坚定不移深化战略协作，共同做好稳定国际秩序的压舱石，维护好各自和共同利益. [China and Russia must unswervingly deepen strategic coordination, together serve as the ballast stone for stabilizing international order, and safeguard [our] respective and common interests]”

While parsing CCP language may seem pedantic, the distinctions between Xi’s comments in 2018 and Wang’s comments in 2026, while subtle, may also be significant. In 2018, Xi’s comments (维护好各自和共同利益) acknowledged that each side has respective and common interests; moreover, this exact phrasing appears only to have occurred for bilateral China-Russia ties. In 2026, conversely, Wang’s comments elaborated on the differences between the two countries, or “维护好两国各自和共同利益.” This subtle shift may be intentional. Not only does the phrase “respective and common interests” occur only rarely in China-Russia ties and across Beijing’s other diplomatic relations, but senior CCP leaders do not appear to have ever uttered the framing to anyone but Shoigu. The framing by CCP leadership suggests that Beijing perceives that bilateral ties with Moscow are strong but, importantly, acknowledges “respective interests” and occasional divergences.

There are limitations to reading diplomatic tea leaves, especially when evaluating the two highly opaque governments found in Beijing and Moscow. Nevertheless, there is some limited evidence suggesting Beijing is concerned about a Middle East war and discouraging Moscow from lighting matches and stoking flames.

While Beijing and Moscow are undoubtedly moving closer, the two sides do not share identical interests. If a war in the Middle East erupts, likely sending oil and energy prices higher, ties between Moscow and Beijing could become more complicated.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.

Geopolitical Disorder in 2026 and Implications for Beijing and Moscow

China-Russia ties unlikely to shift even as U.S. alliances face ruptures; Iran, Venezuela, AI

Bilateral ties between the People’s Republic of China and Russia will likely be marked more by continuity than change in 2026, but both Beijing and Moscow will seek to capitalize on profound geopolitical disruptions that seem very likely to occur this year.

As in 2025, some assumptions about China-Russia relations seem safe to hold. In a continuation of trends seen since the Prigozhin mutiny, Beijing will continue to de-personalize and institutionalize China-Russia relations, in order to hedge against Russian domestic political uncertainty. Accordingly, bilateral political and military ties will likely remain robust no matter who sits atop the power vertical. Finally, PRC-Russian defense industrial base cooperation will remain in place for at least the duration of the war – although Beijing may have obtained Russia’s most valuable technology already, either through voluntary transfer or other means.

On the other hand, developments in Russian domestic politics could inject uncertainty into bilateral ties. A cease fire in Ukraine could, in fact, irritate ties between Beijing and Moscow, if post-war Russia experiences domestic political economy convulsions. If the war winds down, the Russian economy will need to reorient from military to civilian production, which will create winners – and losers. Putin’s ability to buy off losers will be constrained, moreover, by dwindling national wealth reserves and low oil prices, assuming there are no major global oil production outages. Finally, an unsatisfactory political outcome in Ukraine could roil elite and domestic perceptions of Putin, especially if paired with discontent from returning veterans. Still, the Russian economy is faring better than many anticipated and is not yet on the verge of crisis. Putin is an adept manager of Russian domestic politics and will likely continue to rule throughout 2026, but outside analysts, including in China, may pay growing attention to potential succession plans.

Bilateral economic ties will remain robust, although additional frictions will likely emerge as commercial relations become even more tilted in Beijing’s favor. As Russian firms return from a wartime economy they will increasingly compete with Chinese firms, raising questions about how much Chinese economic and technological influence Moscow will tolerate. Indeed, Chinese vehicles trade with Russia will be something to watch closely (and will be a subject of an upcoming analysis), as Moscow began imposing restrictions in 2024. Russia will also have to determine what role Chinese-owned Douyin (Tiktok in the West) and other Chinese technology companies will play in 2026.

Finally, bilateral energy ties will be worth watching, as always. Global oil markets will very likely be oversupplied throughout 2026 – barring major production outages in the Middle East and Latin America. Should oversupply persist, Russia’s export earnings and budget outlook will suffer. If Beijing stops stockpiling Russian crude oil, or if AI markets experience a severe correction, however, then Russian energy export earnings will fall dramatically. While China and Russia are unlikely to ever construct the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline, analysts should watch closely to see if and how the two countries expand cooperation in oil and nuclear energy.

Beijing and Moscow’s bilateral ties will likely see more continuity than change in 2026. At the same time, radical changes in geopolitics are possible – and perhaps even likely – and may present more opportunities than risks for the PRC and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Developments in artificial intelligence, Iran, Venezuela, and the fraying of the alliance system traditionally led by the United States will likely make 2026 disorderly, and potentially chaotic.

Beijing is primed to exploit geopolitical disorder in 2026

January 2026 started with a shocking Maduro raid, an unprecedented spat – or rupture – in the alliance system traditionally led by the United States, and is ending with, potentially, another round of U.S. – Iran military confrontation. The rest of the year could prove even more geopolitically tumultuous. The trajectory of artificial intelligence is highly uncertain but could upend geopolitics in 2026. Another great geopolitical uncertainty is the United States’ fraying ties with traditional allies across Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and even North America. China and, to a lesser extent, Russia are primed to translate short-term disorder into enduring geopolitical advantages vis-à-vis the alliance system formerly led by the United States.

Artificial intelligence

Although it will fade in-and-out of the headlines, the development of artificial intelligence (AI) could very well be the single-most important element shaping macroeconomics and geopolitics in 2026 – and, indirectly, China-Russia relations. As with COVID-19 (and vaccines) in 2020 and 2021, AI inescapably “makes the weather” across macroeconomics and geopolitics. Consequently, it’s worth examining potential scenarios for AI development in 2026, and their implications for China and Russia. The below chart (click to see it in a new page) identifies five different scenarios, lists their associated subjective probabilities and consequences, and elaborates on potential implications for global markets, Russia, and the PRC. The range of AI-related outcomes is very, very wide and will impact Beijing and Moscow in starkly different ways.

Source: Author’s research and analysis; visualization by Claude Opus 4.5

Note: Click to open in a new page

Turning to more traditional geopolitical matters, Beijing and Moscow may see more opportunities than risks in 2026. In ascending order of importance, Venezuela, Iran, and fissures in the alliance system traditionally led by the United States will hold major implications for the PRC and Russia. Both powers, especially Beijing, are poised to benefit from any missteps by DC.

Venezuela and Iran

A large-scale, long-duration U.S. military intervention in Venezuela will have relatively modest direct impacts on the PRC and Russia. Both countries are distant from Latin America, which is of modest strategic content. Still, both Beijing and Moscow could secure important benefits if the U.S. intervention is unsuccessful, which seems likely.

The Maduro raid was an undeniable tactical success, but one of little strategic consequence. The Chavista regime remains intact, and Washington’s ability to influence on-the-ground events in Caracas seems predicated on indefinitely maintaining a large U.S. naval presence off the Venezuela coast. Given the highly credible threat from U.S. forces in the Caribbean, the most hardline elements in Venezuela – such as the Interior Minister, Diosdado Cabello – are laying low in what Orlando Perez of the University of North Texas at Dallas terms “elite survival calculus.” The Trump administration, meanwhile, appears to be pinning its hopes on Delcy Rodriguez, believing her to be a relative soft-liner and open to rationalizing oil production and expanding engagement with U.S. oil companies. It is possible, as Imdat Oner of Florida International University posits in a tripartite scenario called “the good, the bad, the ugly,” that the Chavismo regime, led by Delcy Rodriguez, remains in power but boosts oil production. That scenario, while ugly, is not the worst outcome for the United States – or the Venezuelan people.

Still, in Oner’s “bad” scenario, “Cabello manages to bring key parts of the military to his side and openly challenges Delcy’s authority. A coup attempt might occur and a power vacuum emerges.” Will Cabello and other hardliners – including the Cuban security services operating in Venezuela – feel emboldened to challenge Rodriguez and other softliners if (when?) the U.S. carrier strike group and amphibious ready group sail away?

The direct financial costs of maintaining a U.S. presence in the Caribbean are significant but not exorbitant: about $28 million per operating day, according to a CSIS analysis, or about $10 billion per year. That compares to the total DoD budget of about $840 billion. Moreover, the U.S. operation could – potentially – defray costs, if Venezuela boosts oil production (or if the U.S. seizes enough oil barrels, leaving aside the legal ramifications and long-term diplomatic costs). But the most consequential costs of the U.S. intervention are not direct and financial. Rather, the strategic and indirect opportunity costs of a large-scale deployment in a tertiary theater are already impacting U.S. interests in higher-priority theaters such as the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East.

The long-duration, large-scale military intervention in Venezuela is already imposing immense tradeoffs on U.S. military forces: an aircraft carrier cannot be in two places at the same time. Mark Cancian and Chris H. Park of CSIS write perceptively that “The major cost [of the intervention] is the strategic trade-off: Forces in the Caribbean limit assets available for other hotspots, such as the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific.” The transfer of the USS Gerald Ford carrier strike group from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean has constrained the U.S. response to fast-developing protests in Iran, potentially allowing Tehran to viciously repress opposition at a moment of maximum danger for the Khamenei regime.

In response to spiraling prices and broader discontent with the Khamenei regime’s repressive social policies, Iranian citizens staged massive anti-regime protests. The regime responded with brutality. The true number of casualties will likely never be known, but credible estimates suggest that thousands of individuals were murdered by regime forces.

We’ll never know if U.S. forces might have prevented the atrocities, or even intervened on the side of protesters at a moment of peak danger for the regime. That’s because U.S. regional naval forces had been transferred to Venezuela: the USS Gerald Ford carrier strike group moved from the Red Sea to the Caribbean in October 2025.

Let’s be clear: a U.S. carrier strike group might not have proved decisive in responding to the Khamenei regime’s crackdown on protesters, and military intervention should be conducted thoughtfully – especially in the Middle East. Still, the United States’ unique capabilities, including in precision-guided munitions, may have been able to support the protests, or at least caused the Khamenei regime to think more deeply before murdering protesters at an unprecedented scale. But Tehran understood that the U.S. military response would be constrained by a lack of in-theater strike assets. The Venezuelan intervention is already impacting U.S. interests in higher-priority theaters.

The strategic tradeoffs from a long-duration intervention in Venezuela (and in Cuba?) could become more painful over time. In a delayed response to the protests, the U.S. has moved the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group from the South China Sea to the Middle East. While the Middle East undoubtedly needs more U.S. Naval presence, the Indo-Pacific – the primary theater – now only has two carriers in the region (if we classify the USS Tripoli LHA as a “light carrier”). While the PRC is very unlikely to escalate against Taiwan in 2026, in part due to extensive military purges in the PLA, it may be learning that stimulating out-of-theater crises, and drawing U.S. naval forces out of the Indo-Pacific, can be a fruitful tactic ahead of a contingency involving Taiwan.

Another U.S. – Iran conflict, while not necessarily likely, would have momentous impacts on global energy, markets, and politics. Russian energy exports could rise – or surge – in value terms if large-scale oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) production outages occur across Latin America, the Middle East, or both. China, meanwhile, is the world’s largest energy importer and would suffer from large-scale energy outages, all else being equal. Still, China’s total crude oil reserves stand at an unprecedented 1.2 billion barrels, versus about 839 million in all United States reserves for the week of 1/23/26.

Both Beijing and Moscow are taking another potential U.S. intervention in Iran seriously. The Kremlin reported that Putin met in Moscow with the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani on January 30^th; the PRC’s authoritative People’s Daily readout, meanwhile, noted RIA Novosti’s reporting that the meeting was not announced beforehand. Putin’s January 30th meeting with Iran’s top national security official occurred on the heels of Russia-UAE talks the day before.

In a discussion with UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Kremlin reported that Putin said “We attach great value to your significant personal contribution to all spheres of the Russia-UAE strategic partnership, which is multifaceted, mutually beneficial and growing dynamically.” Putin also said “Naturally, we are all also closely following developments on the Iranian track.” A People’s Daily article emphasized Putin’s comments in the article’s headline (正密切关注伊朗局势).

How will China and Russia respond? Beijing, the world’s largest oil importer, has an interest in stable oil flows; it also is highly sensitive to protests resulting in so-called “color revolutions.” Beijing will therefore seek to maintain stability but will tilt to the side of the Arab powers in any dispute. (For more: Ryan Hass and Allie Matthias of Brookings have written a helpful analysis, “How is China positioning itself as Iran’s regime teeters?” They note “China has considerable interests in Iran, but those interests are not existential or even critical.” For following China’s Middle East activities, Jonathan Fulton’s China-MENA Newsletter has been helpful.)

Russia is in a complicated position: it would reap short-term economic benefits from a crisis over Iran but would not necessarily benefit from a conflict. Iran is significantly integrated into the Russian defense industrial base, especially with its Shahed drones. At the same time, Russia has extensive commercial ties with the Middle East, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Still, Moscow’s energy export earnings would benefit greatly from widespread oil and gas outages in the Middle East. About 27 percent of global maritime oil trade, 20 percent of world petroleum liquids consumption, and 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas transit the Strait of Hormuz; the overwhelming majority of these shipments are directed to Asian markets. Russian oil and gas exports would therefore become much more desired if Middle East oil and gas exports are disrupted.

Moscow may be ambivalent about a conflict in Iran and may even see more opportunities than risks. Still, it certainly does not want to be seen as fomenting a conflict, given its important defense ties with Iran and commercial relationships with the Gulf States.

In sum, Beijing and Moscow are well-positioned to weather or even exploit an energy supply shock, respectively, whether it occurs in Latin America, the Middle East, or both.

Unprecedented Western fissures

But the greatest opportunity Beijing and Moscow are presented with in 2026 is the potential disintegration of the Western alliance system that has been led by the United States since 1945.

Traditional U.S. allies, from Canada to Denmark and beyond, are recoiling at the vision of American power on display. Washington DC is threatening to absorb the territory of its NATO allies, warning Denmark it could conquer Greenland, while the White House is entertaining conversations with separatists from the Canadian province of Alberta. In response, European NATO members are deploying forces to Greenland, while Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in thinly veiled criticisms of U.S. President Donald Trump at the World Economic Forum, warned that the world order faces a “rupture, not a transition.” Canada, traditionally the United States’ closest ally (and one of the only countries to align its connected vehicle policy with DC’s), later inked a trade agreement with Beijing allowing the import of up to 49,000 electric vehicles from China.

If the United States chooses to forfeit its alliances, Beijing and Moscow will benefit. The U.S. is undoubtedly the world’s greatest power, but its most powerful rival – the People’s Republic of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party – is rapidly closing the gap. By some measures, it already has. Take GDP at purchasing power parity, which roughly approximates a country’s military potential. According to this metric, the PRC is roughly at parity with the U.S. – and would have a slight GDP advantage if Moscow threw its defense industrial base behind Beijing.

U.S. vs PRC + Russian GDP, at Purchasing power parity

Sources: Author’s Calculations, IMF October 2025 WEO, Visualization by Claude Opus 4.5

On the other hand, the U.S. has a clear GDP and defense industrial base advantage over the combined forces of the PRC and Russia if it can draw on its alliances across North America, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. There’s a long history of U.S. and allies scaling up their combined defense industrial bases to overcome great power competitors. In World War II, the U.S. relied on Canadian uranium to power the war effort, including for the Manhattan project. During the Cold War, U.S. – UK collaboration was vital to nuclear submarine cooperation, while the Five Eyes intelligence network of the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand was critical for collecting signals and human intelligence against the Soviet Union and the PRC – as well as projecting power in space. Finally, and more subtly, the U.S. economic and financial alliance with Japan allowed the U.S. to run fiscal deficits, bolstered the U.S. economy and defense complex, and ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s dissolution. With the combined resources of the allied system, or what Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi call “Allied scale,” the United States easily outpaces both the PRC and Russia.

U.S. + NATO/non-NATO allies vs PRC + Russian GDP, at Purchasing power parity

Sources: Author’s Calculations, IMF October 2025 WEO, Visualization by Claude Opus 4.5

Besides their usefulness in scaling the U.S. industrial base, allies have fought – and bled – alongside the U.S. in conflicts for centuries. The Continental Army and Navy were not only able to tap into the scale of France, but the French fleet defeated the British fleet at the Battle of the Chesapeake, helping to seal the decisive victory at Yorktown. The British in World War II preserved a foothold in Europe, paving a way for the ultimate liberation of the continent. To aid the invasion of Normandy, fighters from the nations of occupied Europe, from Belgium, Denmark, France, and beyond – helped sabotage Nazi supply lines, often at profound cost.

Turning to the modern era, about 5,000 Korean soldiers and 500 Australian soldiers died fighting alongside American troops in Vietnam. Of the 3,500 NATO troops that died in the Afghanistan campaign, nearly 1,000 European soldiers gave their lives for the mission. Denmark, a country of under 6 million, suffered 44 deaths in the NATO operation, a higher per-capita casualty rate than the United States itself sustained.

The United States has chosen to lead alliances out of pragmatic self-interest, not out of charity. Even leaving aside normative considerations, the U.S. has reaped huge economic, strategic, and military benefits from its alliances. In order to overcome Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the U.S. leaned on alliances. The need for allied scale is greater than ever, as the U.S. finds itself confronting a much larger power in the People’s Republic of China.

In his December 23, 1981 address to the nation, President Reagan spoke on the Polish Solidarity movement, and the shared destiny of the U.S. and Europe: “When 19th century Polish patriots rose against foreign oppressors, their rallying cry was, “For our freedom and yours.” There is a spirit of solidarity abroad in the world tonight that no physical force can crush.”

The need for a spirit of solidarity between the United States and Europe is greater than ever in 2026. If the United States cannot find ways to work with allies across Europe and beyond, the Chinese Communist Party may reap the benefits.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.

China and Russia in 2025: year in review

Five themes in China-Russia relations last year

The last year in China-Russia relations was marked more by continuity than change. Overall, Beijing and Moscow continued to demonstrate strong political relations and robust economic ties despite some occasional minor frictions. Beijing continued to provide substantial defense industrial base support for the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; it also continued hedging against a post-Putin future by depersonalizing and institutionalizing its ties with the Russian political elite. Meanwhile, fissures emerged in the alliance system traditionally led by the United States, but neither Beijing nor Moscow has exploited these divergences, so far.

Image generated with ChatGPT 5.2

1. Beijing continues to de-personalize, institutionalize, and insulate China-Russia relations

As the CRR wrote in a May article, Beijing continues to de-personalize and institutionalize the bilateral relationship, including by highlighting societal ties. Even so, Beijing is preparing for all eventualities.

Importantly, “traditional friendship” (传统友谊) is increasingly being used more systematically and visibly in PRC high-level diplomacy with Russia, including joint statements, Xi’s signed articles, and People’s Daily editorials. The shifting emphasis reflects Beijing’s broader effort to de-personalize the relationship and reduce reliance on Putin by highlighting societal links between China and Russia.

2. China-Russia ties remained strong: Attempting a “Reverse Kissinger” will fail

Beijing and Moscow share enduring common interests and, even more importantly, mutual hostility toward the West, especially the U.S. Accordingly, any attempt at a “reverse Kissinger,” or detaching the China-Russia axis, is doomed to fail.

As the CRR wrote in February:

“No amount of personal charisma can disentangle the deep ties between China and Russia. While the two sides do not share identical interests, Moscow and Beijing both fundamentally value their bilateral partnership as a means to check their main adversary, the United States, as well as other countries in the constitutional democracy orbit.

Moscow chooses to be junior partner in the China-Russia axis because it regards the arrangement as uniquely valuable. Moreover, aiming at détente with Moscow while it seeks to subjugate a European democracy with brutal military force cannot but alarm U.S. allies across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.”

For more, see here:

Furthermore, in June, Chinese diplomats told EU diplomats that Beijing could not accept Russia losing the war, indicating that the two sides will not be detached from one another.

3. The PRC is still extending DIB support to the Kremlin

Beijing has firmly supported Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the early days of the invasion, Beijing extended diplomatic and informational support to Moscow, likely damaging Ukraine’s position in the Global South; more consequentially, the PRC provided critical defense industrial base assistance to the Kremlin at crucial moments. Russian forces constructed the “Surovikin Line” of defensive fortifications in Fall 2022 largely via imports of Chinese trench-digging equipment, including excavators and front-end shovel loaders.

While wartime tactics have shifted dramatically, Beijing’s provision of critical defense industrial support for Moscow has remained constant. Last year, Beijing exported critical wartime components such as fiber optic cables and lithium-ion batteries. Russian forces subsequently used these materials to fly tethered drones on the battlefield, killing Ukrainians and extending the conflict.

For the original CRR analysis, see here; this analysis helped inform a subsequent Washington Post investigation here (many thanks to Christian Shepherd and Siobhán O’Grady).

4. Bilateral economic and energy ties, while strong, are not unlimited, as the PoS-2 shows

While bilateral economic cooperation remained robust, it was subject to limits. Despite considerable Sturm und Drang amid September’s SCO announcement, the Power of Siberia-2 (PoS-2) is still only on the drawing board (and is unlikely to ever be completed). The smaller oil and gas (and nuclear energy) announcements were perhaps more consequential. Bill Bikales wrote an analysis, Mongolia’s High-Stakes Choices on Power of Siberia-2, from the Mongolian perspective that was informed by his recent trip to Ulaanbaatar.

5. Beijing and Moscow haven’t yet exploited widening fissures in the alliance system traditionally led by the United States

The past year witnessed a sea change in U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. is unpredictably reevaluating ties with NATO allies across Europe and North America, allies across the Indo-Pacific, and friends and partners from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific. While U.S. ties with traditional allies and partners have been in flux, neither Beijing nor Moscow has been able to effectively exploit these opportunities, to date. Still, any sustained diversion of U.S. attention away from Europe and the Indo-Pacific in 2026 could create openings that Beijing and Moscow may try to exploit.

In April, the CRR explored the potential economic and financial costs of pivoting away from Europe towards Russia. Unsurprisingly – and leaving aside any notion of shared values – this arrangement would be disastrous for U.S. consumers. Still, despite manifest difficulties in US-Europe ties, neither the PRC nor Moscow has been able to secure major tangible gains from DC-Brussels friction, to date.

In August, the U.S. initiated a trade spat with India, perhaps its most important partner in the technology competition with China. U.S.–India tensions have since eased but not abated. Although China has sought to capitalize on fissures between DC and Delhi, it has not yet been able to do so effectively.

Finally, the U.S. planted the seeds for a regime change campaign in Venezuela in 2025. Nicolas Maduro, the Venezuelan dictator, is unlikely to be ousted in a coup under current dynamics due to the extensive presence of in-country Cuban counterintelligence personnel. Furthermore, a large-scale military intervention could impose major costs on the U.S. and Europe.

While China would suffer some economic costs from an increase in global energy prices from an invasion of Venezuela, it would likely reap massive geopolitical rewards as U.S. attention and resources shifted from the Indo-Pacific to the Caribbean. Russia, meanwhile, would secure a windfall if diesel prices rose, although its ongoing refinery outages may stem gains.

Will 2026 be much different from 2025?

A subsequent post will explore 5 key potential trends in 2026. Still, the above five themes from 2025 will likely persist this year. Beijing will likely continue to subtly deepen political and societal ties with Russia to hedge against a post-Putin future; Beijing and Moscow will very likely continue to have strong bilateral political and economic ties, even in the (improbable) event that Putin leaves in 2026; the PRC’s defense industrial base support for Moscow will continue; and bilateral economic ties will remain robust but not unlimited.

There are two major “known unknowns” in 2026. The U.S. posture towards traditional allies and partners remains highly uncertain but could present opportunities for Beijing and Moscow to weaken cohesion between DC and other capitals. On the other hand, Zhongnanhai and the Kremlin have been unable to effectively exploit widening fissures – at least so far – and could overplay their hands, which could prove destabilizing and dangerous. But the most consequential uncertainty in China-Russia relations in 2026 remains artificial intelligence (AI). The U.S. economy and financial systems are essentially a bet on AI. Consequently, while AI capabilities are real and growing, an AI market correction would upend geopolitics and disproportionately impact the United States. Alternatively, AI could unlock self-reinforcing productivity gains and transform the economy. Or some other modality could emerge in this highly uncertain and consequential area.

In any event, bilateral relations between China and Russia in 2026 will likely maintain many of the same patterns from 2025, but developments in the U.S. policy ecosystem or artificial intelligence complex could prove highly consequential.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report. This article reflects his own personal opinion.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.

To weaken Maduro’s grip, pressure a linchpin: Havana’s counterintelligence networks

Cuban intelligence, regime elites, and Maduro himself aren’t currently incentivized to step aside.

The United States is once again edging toward escalation in Venezuela. About a dozen ships and 15,000 military personnel are in the region, the Trump administration has declared a quasi no-fly zone across Venezuela, U.S. forces have seized an oil tanker, and now President Trump has ordered a “total and complete blockade” of sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela. A large-scale military intervention in Venezuela would hold major implications for great power competition, weakening the Western alliance to the benefit of Beijing and Moscow.

Pro-interventionists have assured skeptics that Maduro can be replaced without large-scale military intervention, holding that coercive pressure will be sufficient to topple Maduro. Some proponents of limited strikes argue that Maduro’s support is brittle and that limited attacks – or even the threat of attacks – could trigger a palace coup. But Cuban counterintelligence personnel shape intra-elite incentives in the Maduro regime, rendering a swift or easy political transition via airstrikes highly unlikely. If “limited” airstrikes fail to dislodge the Maduro regime, mission creep becomes more likely.

Any Venezuela plan must grapple with the reality that regime elites and their Cuban supporters currently stand to gain nothing – and lose everything – in the event of a political transition. An easy overthrow of the Maduro regime via a pressure campaign in Venezuela is therefore highly unlikely, and any U.S.-led regime change effort will likely prove costly, entail significant U.S. casualties, require billions of dollars of investments, and distract from the Indo-Pacific, the primary strategic theater. Instead of its current approach, Washington should test whether a deal with Havana is possible. Though trust between Havana and DC is low, Cuba’s already severe and worsening energy crisis incentivizes the Díaz-Canel regime to make a deal. If Cuban counterintelligence personnel leave Venezuela, a regime transition becomes more plausible.

Image generated with ChatGPT 5.2

Chavismo elites and Cuba aren’t currently incentivized to fold

Any plan to unseat the Maduro regime must understand its three pillars: Maduro himself, other regime elites, and, crucially, Cuba’s in-country security apparatus.

Cuba plays a major and underappreciated role in the Venezuela crisis. Venezuela’s Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence, or DGCIM, is deeply entwined with Cuban intelligence, according to Reuters reporting. Cubans on-the-ground currently have few incentives to surrender: not only would any in-country personnel likely face reprisals from the new government, but a successful regime change in Venezuela would likely embolden Washington to try the same approach in Cuba. Additionally, the density of Cuban security personnel in Venezuela, including in counterintelligence and intelligence, is unknown and hard to quantify, but credible reports suggest it is substantial or even large; in recent months, Maduro has increased the number of Cuban counterintelligence officers and even in his personal security detail. In-country Cuban security personnel increase the perceived cost of defection for senior Venezuelan officers and intelligence officials, limiting the prospect of large-scale military and security defections and increasing the risk that the Venezuelan force structures will take Maduro’s side in a crisis.

Still, Havana’s incentives are not set in stone. Its massive, devastating, and ongoing electricity failures could render it more willing to reach an understanding with Washington over Venezuela. Interestingly, Reuters reports that elements in the Cuban regime reached out to Washington about what a post-Maduro future might look like, although Havana denied the claim. Any successful regime transition in Venezuela will likely include dismantling the in-country Cuban counterintelligence presence and is an avenue the Trump administration should strongly consider.

While the Communist Party of Cuba fears that a transition in Venezuela could embolden the U.S. to pursue regime change in Cuba, the regime may also face existential risks from the ongoing electricity and economic crisis, and Caracas is increasingly less useful for Havana. Between January and November, Venezuela sent 27,000 barrels per day of crude and fuel to Cuba, down from 32,000 last year, according to Reuters. U.S. power sector technical cooperation and direct fuel supply, paired with coercive measures like interdicting oil shipments, may alter the Díaz-Canel regime’s incentives, as appropriate use of carrots and sticks may persuade the regime to weaken counterintelligence support for Maduro.

Non-Maduro Chavismo elites have few reasons to quit, and many reasons to continue, especially due to the presence of Cuban counterintelligence. These elites know they are unlikely to be included in any deal Maduro would strike with the opposition. Furthermore, even wavering elites considering defection are aware of the dangers: Venezuelan and Cuban counterintelligence services have publicly disrupted plots in 2019, 2020, and 2025, imprisoning (or worse) scores of defectors. The benefits of defection by non-Maduro regime elites are uncertain, the probability of detection is high, and the costs of capture would be profound.

Finally, Nicolas Maduro himself is disincentivized to flee the country: he would be at high risk of interception by Cuban counterintelligence or other regime elites before reaching the airport, and face imprisonment or worse. Cubans embedded in his counterintelligence networks and personal security details would very likely be tipped off and are incentivized to prevent defection and collapse of their most important ally. Furthermore, other regime elites would have every incentive to prevent Maduro from defecting, unless they were also included in any deal. Given pervasive intra-regime electronic and physical surveillance, from both the Cubans and the Venezuelans, such coordination seems extremely unlikely. Maduro and other elites are unlikely to defect under present circumstances.

As the three pillars of the regime have little reason to defect, and much to fear from each other, any attempt at regime change via coercion and limited air strikes will very likely fail under current conditions.

Accordingly, any U.S.-led regime change effort could easily become a years-long military intervention; trigger regional unease; and entail massive costs and huge tradeoffs for the Western alliance. Venezuela is geographically larger than Texas, has a population greater than Florida, and combines vast jungle with dense urban terrain. A dead-ender coalition could melt into the jungle or urban environs, disrupting Venezuelan society for years and potentially necessitating large-scale deployments of U.S. troops. If global diesel and food prices rise due to oil production outages in Venezuela and (potentially) Colombia, the West – especially Europe – will bear significant economic costs.

Proponents of military action hold that the regime will crumble in the face of limited airstrikes. They note, correctly, that most of Venezuela’s population does not support the Maduro regime or even actively hates it. While a Chavismo collapse is possible, a total regime breakdown is unlikely. A large swathe of the Maduro regime is deeply committed – and willing to die – due to ideology, fear of prosecution for crimes, and material self-interest. Furthermore, interventionists overestimate the role of public opinion in armed insurgencies. A rigorous quantitative RAND analysis in 2010 by Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki found that insurgent popularity is, at best, moderately correlated with outcomes; unpopular insurgencies can be sustained for years, as the U.S. has experienced in Iraq and especially Afghanistan, where the insurgency eventually prevailed. History suggests limited airstrikes will not produce the desired outcome, necessitating greater and more sustained military involvement.

Such military commitments would come at a very high opportunity cost, especially in the Indo-Pacific, the primary theater of geopolitical competition. According to the U.S. State Department, the region accounts for more than half of the world’s population, 60 percent of global GDP, and two-thirds of global economic growth. It’s also the region of the world’s most important military competition. Not only do 6 out of the 9 world nuclear powers reside in the Indo-Pacific, but the Chinese Navy totals 395 ships versus 296 American ships; Chinese shipyards are producing about half of all civilian orders. Virtually all Chinese naval capacity is dedicated to the Indo-Pacific; by contrast, U.S. ships tied down in the Caribbean by the Venezuela crisis are operating far from the main theater of competition.

Use opportunities in Cuba to improve Venezuela and the migration crisis

Let’s be clear: Nicolas Maduro is one of the world’s worst dictators, immiserating his country since ascending to power in 2013. But any plan to overthrow Maduro must account for on-the-ground realities in Venezuela and the immense risks that policymakers would undertake in the primary theater.

If the U.S. is to commit significant resources to Latin America, a tertiary theater, then proponents of toppling Maduro need to deliver a realistic plan for success. Such a plan will very likely require first undermining Cuban counterintelligence networks, the Maduro regime’s linchpin, and cutting deals with regime elites – not just Maduro. Such a plan will take time and resources. The current plan of regime change via limited military pressure in Venezuela is highly unlikely to succeed. Meanwhile, a large-scale military intervention could raise energy and food prices, triggering affordability concerns in the U.S. and globally. Rather than expecting an easy pressure campaign in Venezuela, the U.S. should be very wary of overextending itself given its greater needs elsewhere. The U.S. military and intelligence services are the best in the world and will execute lawful orders, but they shouldn’t be asked to rush headlong into an unwise, large-scale military intervention outside of the primary theater.

That doesn’t mean, however, that the U.S. should accept a Maduro dictatorship. Given the outsized role of Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence in Venezuela, the Trump administration should consider cutting a deal with Havana. Such a deal with Havana would not guarantee a successful regime transition in Venezuela, given the Maduro regime’s own security services. Still, the withdrawal of Cuban personnel would materially weaken the Maduro regime, altering the calculus of regime political elites, the force structures, and Maduro himself.

Washington should test —quietly and skeptically—whether Havana is willing to trade verifiable reduction of its security footprint in Venezuela for narrow oil and energy relief. In exchange for Havana removing its security personnel from Venezuela, Washington might loosen trade restrictions and extend electricity technical cooperation, grid components, and fuel shipments from the U.S. to the Cuban power sector. Given the lack of trust between the two sides, details around important issues such as sequencing, verification, and the confirmed safe passage transfer of Cuban personnel from Venezuela to Cuba need not be public and could be decided at unofficial Track 1.5 or Track 2 discussions between the United States and Cuba.

Havana’s growing desperation and metastasizing electricity and economic crisis may leave an opening for Washington. While both regimes are odious, Havana poses less of a risk to U.S. interests: over 1 million migrants and refugees have left Cuba since 2020, versus nearly 8 million migrants and refugees from Venezuela. Pressuring the Maduro regime and ensuring Venezuelans can safely return, over the medium-term, could substantially reduce migration pressures across the Americas.

Resolving the Venezuela contingency and the migration crises sweeping the Americas might just require the art of the deal, but that path runs through Havana, not Caracas.

Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative; he also edits the independent China-Russia Report.

This article reflects his own personal opinions.

The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.