A short history of China-Russia relations since November 2021
Sino-Russian relations over the past two years can be divided into four phases.
This edition includes a brief (and not comprehensive) timeline of China-Russia relations since November 2021 that I put together ahead of a session for The Telegraph’s excellent Ukraine: The Latest podcast. During the discussion, I raised how Chinese exports of ball bearings to Russia and Kyrgyzstan may be facilitating Russian tank production. The annual rate of tank production is thought to have doubled since before the war started.
Container xChange, a Hamburg, Germany-based trading platform, also found that there are 150,000 surplus containers in Russia amid surging imports of Chinese goods. CNBC also recently published a very comprehensive article examining Sino-Russian trade. Finally, I wrote about the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline for The Diplomat. While the proposed pipeline has astonishingly poor project economics, it might be built regardless.
The four phases of Sino-Russian relations over the past two years.
· The pre-invasion phase: denial and preparation. From November 2021- February 2022, the PRC publicly denies that Russia will escalate, but nevertheless privately prepares for a contingency, and attempts to undermine warnings from Western intelligence services.
· The immediate aftermath of the invasion: From February 2022 – June 2022, Beijing immediately offers moral support for Moscow and helps amplify Russian narratives around biological weapons and surging commodity prices, especially in the Global South. At the same time, Beijing is disappointed by the performance of Russian armed forces, stunned by Ukraine’s resiliency, and taken aback by Western sanctions.
· Semi-overt support: June 2022 – Present, The PRC expands bilateral trade, including critical exports of “non-lethal” goods that enable Russian military forces and have deadly consequences for Ukraine.
· Looking ahead: The two uncertainties: Western political support for Ukraine might erode as populists come to power. Alternatively, Beijing’s support for Moscow might falter amid China’s domestic economic troubles. Xi’s meeting with Putin later this month will provide important clues.
1. Pre-Invasion: denial, and preparation
Beijing may or may not have had advance warning of the invasion, but it took several steps to support Moscow in the run-up to the invasion.
November 2021
In November 2021, press reports emerged that U.S. intelligence was warning European allies about a potential impending invasion of Ukraine.
While the U.S. was warning about Moscow’s plans to invade Ukraine, the Chinese government was trying to undercut those warnings at around the same time. You saw this in the English-language People’s Daily, which began publishing an article series in early November 2021 attempting to undermine the credibility of U.S. intelligence assessments.
The People’s Daily is the authoritative mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party. Statements from the People’s Daily are about third in line in the unofficial hierarchy of who speaks for the Chinese government. The People’s Daily doesn’t carry quite the same weight as expressions from the Foreign Ministry, or especially from General Secretary Xi himself, but it’s an important outlet and a window into what the CCP is thinking.
The November article series in the People’s Daily included discussions about the Gulf of Tonkin incident, as well as the leadup to the Iraq war, suggesting that the U.S. had a history of provoking conflicts, issuing faulty intelligence, or both.
The People’s Daily was employing arguments that aimed to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe.
Also, at around this same time as U.S. and other Western intelligence services were warning about a potential invasion, the People’s Daily’s Chinese-language section on Russia stopped publishing articles, starting on November 5th, and went dark until well after the invasion. The People’s Daily’s section on Russia remains a useful barometer for measuring Beijing’s policy towards Moscow.
The People’s Daily’s decision to fire broadsides against the U.S. intelligence assessment of a potential Russian invasion was to be expected, of course. But the decision to suppress articles about Russia suggests that important elements of the CCP were, at a minimum, taking the prospect of an invasion very seriously.
December 2021
In late November, Putin confirmed at the Russia Calling! Investment Forum that he planned to attend the Olympics in Beijing in February.
Russian military forces continued taking preparations, while the People’s Daily ran cover for these actions, characterizing the Kremlin’s actions as sending a “strong deterrent signal” (强烈威慑信号) or playing a “counter-attacking card” (反击牌).
Additionally, in December of 2021, Chinese firms begin exporting larger amounts of semiconductors and other integrated circuits to Russia, which had engaged in stockpiling ahead of the invasion. Hat tip to Silverado Policy Accelerator for identifying this trend. It’s very likely that Beijing was aware that Russia was stockpiling semiconductors.
January and February 2022
Events began to pick up pace in early 2022. Western security services began to see more signs of preparations, including the announcement of large-scale Russian military exercises, which often serve as top-cover for military action.
There is intense speculation about how Putin and Xi will manage the optics of an invasion alongside the Olympic Games, which are to take place from February 4th to 20th.
One Western diplomat leaks to Bloomberg that “it’s possible Xi asked Putin in their recent call not to invade Ukraine during the Olympic Games.”
Beijing furiously denies that Xi asked Putin to delay an invasion, of course, but there’s very strong evidence that Moscow hears this message loud and clear.
In mid-January, Russia and Belarus announce they will hold combined military exercises called Allied Resolve in February of 2022. The exercise’s timing is extremely noteworthy: they will reportedly take place from February 10th through February 20th. Moreover, February 20th is not just any day: it’s also when the Beijing Olympics are supposed to conclude. By stating that the exercises will conclude on the 20th, Moscow seems to be signaling to Beijing that they will wait to launch the invasion until after the Games end.
Putin travels to Beijing for the Olympics Opening Ceremony, meets Xi Jinping, and signs a joint statement. The two sides write that “Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ”forbidden“ areas of cooperation.”
Interestingly, the PRC publishes the Joint Statement in Chinese but never translates it to English, perhaps to minimize damages to its relations with Europe.
On February 24th, Putin escalates the invasion by ordering the “special military operation” against Ukraine.
2. The immediate aftermath of the invasion: moral support, but economic caution
Xi Jinping called Putin immediately after the invasion started, signaling his support for the Kremlin. Still, the PRC was surprised by the ferocity of Ukrainian resistance and the strength of Western sanctions. Chinese companies treaded cautiously in the initial aftermath of the invasion.
February 2022
On February 25th, the day after the invasion, Xi and Putin hold a bilateral phone call. While Xi issues pro forma calls to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, he urges “dropping the Cold War mentality, attaching importance and respecting the legitimate security concerns of various countries,” in a clear signal of support for Moscow.
As Russian troops cross the border, Chinese diplomats in Ukraine are confronted with a problem: Chinese nationals remain in the country, as Beijing never issued an evacuation order. Chinese diplomats urge Chinese nationals to stay indoors and fly the PRC flag on their cars if they must drive out, presumably because they expect Russian soldiers to occupy Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government in a matter of weeks, if not days.
That’s not what happens, of course. Russian armed forces face profound setbacks, struggle to advance to Kyiv, and the war turns out to be a long one.
March – June 2022
In March, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirms China’s pro-Russia neutrality, saying “China and Russia will maintain strategic focus and steadily advance our comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era.”
The PRC MFA continues to promote Kremlin narratives, including effluvia about bioweapons laboratories.
Chinese companies start to dial back ties with Russia amid Western unity on sanctions. China’s Sinopec pauses its operations in Russia on March 25th, while Chinese state-owned oil refineries decline to enter into new contracts with Russian firms.
Chinese exports to Russia, as reflected in official trade statistics, decline from prior-year levels.
3. Preparing for a long war: Beijing shifts to more semi-overt support
From July 2022 to the present, Beijing has semi-overtly supported the Kremlin’s war effort. It has, at a minimum, done nothing to stop Chinese exports of key “non-lethal” but militarily consequential materials to Russia. Beijing may even be encouraging these exports, as well as direct lethal aid from the DPRK.
July 2022
Starting around late June and early July, the CCP started edging towards more open support of the Kremlin. An op-ed in the People’s Daily warned that “President Biden is making a final charge to convince and rally European leaders to come onboard the anti-China chariot.” More provocatively, the article made a contentious comment about U.S. domestic politics, claiming that a NATO summit in Spain would “very likely be Biden’s last dance in Europe, as the Democrats will probably lose the midterm election in November.”
The analysis cited high consumer inflation for Biden’s domestic political problems, but claimed that the U.S. had provoked the conflict.
The PRC’s economic narrative throughout the conflict is totally incoherent. They claim that the U.S. provoked the war in order to benefit its own domestic industries, but also say that the war is triggering massive inflation in both the United States and Europe.
Other statements around this time also reflect Beijing’s more openly pro-Russia neutrality.
The CCP’s more overt political support for Moscow in late June and early July is reflected in exports to Russia. In July 2022, Chinese monthly exports to Russia reach nearly $6.8 billion, nearly 22 percent higher than exports in July 2021.
September 2022
Xi and Putin met in Uzbekistan on September 15th. While most analyses at the time focused on the optics of the event – which were highly unfavorable for Putin – Beijing was quietly facilitating the Russian war effort through its exports of trench-digging equipment, such as excavators and front end shovel loaders. Beijing also said in September that it would not comply with Western price caps on Russian energy exports.
January 2023
A U.S. official commented to Reuters in late January that China was providing “non-lethal military assistance and economic support that stops short of wholesale sanctions evasion” to Russia.
It’s very likely that the U.S. knew about the trench digging equipment exports on or around this time, and potentially much sooner.
May 2023
Beijing expands its diplomatic involvement in the conflict, partly to hedge against an unlikely but possible Russian military collapse, but mostly because it sees an opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe.
French President Emmanuel Macron comments in Beijing that Europe should avoid “crises that aren’t ours” is widely interpreted as attempting to chart a course independent of Washington.
Perhaps not coincidentally, by May, it is clear that Donald John Trump is the overwhelming favorite to secure the GOP nomination and may even be favored to ascend to the White House again. While Florida Governor Ron DeSantis nearly eclipsed Trump in mid-February, the former reality TV show host dramatically expanded his lead over the next three months and was receiving support from more than half of all primary voters by mid April.
On May 10th, at a CNN townhall, Trump says he would solve the war in Ukraine in a day. Separately, in a December 2022 post on Truth Social, Trump called for the “termination” of parts of the U.S. Constitution. Later, in September 2023, Trump suggested that the United States’ top military officer, who had opposed his attempts to overturn the 2020 election, should be put to death.
With Trump’s impending nomination and possible ascendance to the presidency posing a major uncertainty for transatlantic relations, Beijing may have felt emboldened to more openly support Moscow and exploit possible fissures in US-Europe ties.
June 2023
The Prigozhin mutiny appears to surprise Beijing, which is slow to respond to the incident.
Ironically, several excavators make an appearance during the mutiny, as Russian civil authorities dig up roadways to slow the Wagner Group’s advance to Moscow.
Beijing does ultimately back Putin during the Prigozhin crisis, but only slowly.
July 2023
Two weeks after the Prigozhin mutiny is defeated, Xi Jinping and the CCP host Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko in Beijing. At the meeting, Xi frames Sino-Russian relations as a “strategic choice made by the two countries based on the fundamental interests of their respective countries and peoples,” in an apparent attempt to depersonalize the relationship and institutionalize ties between the two political systems.
Chinese monthly exports to Russia reach nearly $10.3 billion, an all-time high.
August 2023
Chinese year-to-date direct exports through August to Russia stand at nearly $63 billion, up 82 percent from the same period in 2021. When factoring indirect trade conducted via third parties, such as Belarus and Central Asia, the figures are likely much higher.
September 2023
During his September 8th video address to a Russia-China economic conference, Lavrov said “Our ties are built on the principles of equality, mutual trust, and mutual benefit. Most importantly, they serve the interests of our peoples and look towards the future.” This framing echoed Xi’s earlier comments, suggesting the political systems in both Russia and China seek to institutionalize relations amid uncertainty over Putin’s future.
4. Looking ahead: the period of two uncertainties
The first uncertainty: how will China’s economic weakness impact its tolerance for the war?
China’s economy is suffering from the war, on balance.
It benefits from increased demand from Russia, as well as discounts on crude oil imports from Russia.
On the other hand, China’s is the world’s largest importer of energy and commodities, so surging commodity prices have directly hurt the Chinese economy.
The indirect costs have also been huge. The war is leading to growing skepticism of Beijing in Chinese capitals, while world public opinion of China stands at all time lows, according to some surveys. European and Asian countries are increasingly willing to go along with U.S. technology restrictions.
The second uncertainty: will Western publics elect Kremlin-friendly populists? Putin’s strategy may be to ensure that economic dislocations from the war lead to the elevation of populists across North America and Europe, who will then reduce if not eliminate Western support for Ukraine.
Constitutional democracies account for about 60 percent of world GDP at current exchange rates. The Beijing and Moscow axis of autocracies accounts for about 20 percent of world GDP.
Accordingly, dividing the constitutional democracy bloc would pay huge dividends for Moscow and Beijing.
The elevation of Donald Trump would obviously have a huge impact on the war in Ukraine. He has a famously close relationship with Putin, and sometimes Xi; threatened to withhold aid from Ukraine unless its government contributed to his re-election; and has promised to solve the Ukraine war on day one of his second term if he’s elected.
The upcoming Xi-Putin meeting in Beijing will illuminate how the CCP leadership is grappling with these two uncertainties.
Joe Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report. This article represents his own personal opinion.
The China-Russia Report is an independent, nonpartisan newsletter covering political, economic, and security affairs within and between China and Russia. All articles, comments, op-eds, etc represent only the personal opinion of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position(s) of The China-Russia Report.